In early June, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met at Astana, Kazakstan, where India was being formally inducted into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
It was a difficult time. India had boycotted China's One Belt One Road Summit earlier in May, largely because the proposed China Pakistan Economic Corridor would wend its way through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. China too wasn't happy with the way India had allowed the Dalai Lama to travel to Arunachal Pradesh.
Yet, in a bilateral on the sides of the summit, the two thrashed around for common ground. They spoke on economic ties. They discussed two Indian exports that are popular in China—yoga and cinema. And, they forged the Astana Consensus (the architect of which is reportedly foreign secretary S. Jaishankar). This consensus recognises that at a time of global uncertainty, India-China relations are a factor of stability. More importantly, it says differences between the two nations should not be allowed to become disputes.
When there are two large countries aspiring for regional supremacy, and they share a boundary over four thousand kilometres long (much of which is still not settled), it is a given that there are bound to be differences. But did the two nations have a premonition that the Astana Consensus would be put to test within days of its establishment? Throughout the 70-day plus "stand-off", while China postured itself threateningly and India retorted that "this is not 1962", foreign office communiques from both sides continued to stress that diplomatic channels remained open. India emphasised that Doklam should find solution within the Astana Consensus, even as it sent its forces to the tri-nation boundary at Doklam.
Now that there has been "an expeditious disengagement of border personnel at the face off site" as the ministry of external affairs (MEA) calls it, everyone is breathing easy. For the situation was unprecedented. While China and India have had longer standoffs in the past, this was the first time that a third country was involved. The Doklam border is a dispute between China and Bhutan, and Indian presence there was in the capacity of Bhutan being its "protectorate". Sandwiched, Bhutan had issued a statement opposing the Chinese road building on its territory, but then, decided to opt for a potent diplomatic tool—silence.
"Good diplomacy has won, the MEA has done its job well," said Lt Gen S.L. Narasimhan, former formation commander in the Doklam area and member, National Security Advisory Board. "But it was also correct for the Chinese Army to have stopped road building immediately on getting the call from Bhutan. Land in that area is compact, road building is quick work, and, had we waited for the matter to be taken up diplomatically, within five days, you'd have seen the road ready for use. Then, it would have been difficult to get them to break it."
So, India's strategy this time was different from the Chinese. While China breathed fire through its official communiques and state sponsored media, India chose to stay silent, offering just a line or two when it became imperative. Every time the MEA was asked what was being done, the officials sidestepped the query by saying it was a work in progress.
Away from the media glare, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar and Indian Ambassador to China V. Gokhale were hard at work. It helped that Jaishankar knows the country well, he was ambassador there earlier. Doval's visit to China in late July, for the national security advisor level meet of BRICS was crucial. It not only gave him opportunity to meet with top Chinese leaders, including Jinping and his counterpart Yang Jiechi, but also reiterated India's stand of giving diplomacy a chance, Astana Consensus style. For the first time in over a month, the Chinese official news agency toned down its belligerence to say the countries were "not born rivals", and spoke of the need to avoid war.
Yet, there was no immediate outcome. Battle positions, it appeared, hardened over the days, China baited India, quoting how it had reduced its soldiers from 400 hundred to over 40. Was it trying to assess Indian strength or get India to reveal its position? The jury is still out on that.
War, of course, was not an option for either side. China's brows are perpetually furrowed these days with the activities on its eastern sea board, what with North Korea's unpredictable behaviour making those waters rather choppy. India already has its Pakistan headache. War would also hit economic growth, something the aspiring neighbours are keenly aware of.
Yet, the stand off had the potential to get more acrimonious with time if it came to a who blinks first situation. Both sides had the capability to winter it out. Indian forces were already stationed there, the Chinese would not find it too difficult to erect portable shelters. Besides, there was fear on the Indian side of how far Bhutan was willing to be drawn into this strife.
The approaching BRICS leaders' summit gave both nations a target to work towards—a deadline to meet to resolve the issue. China, as host, wants it to be a success, which a no-show by India would have scuttled. On August 28, MEA announced rather cryptically that expeditious disengagement of border personnel at the face off site has been agreed to and is ongoing. China, rather than complete India's statement, added another dimension, saying Indian troops had pulled back and thus, China will make "adjustments and deployment in accordance with the situation on ground". And that it would continue to patrol the border. It's taken some days to get more clarity on the picture, though the Chinese commitment still seems fuzzy.
"We've gained as we got China to stop road building and revert to the status quo pre-stand off. But the gains are tactical, not strategic. The core issues of conflict have not been addressed," said Lt Gen G.M. Nair, former military secretary. Indeed, neither side can even pretend they've bought lasting peace and tranquility. "Since such flare ups are likely in future, both nations have to work maturely at developing mechanisms to diffuse them."
M.V. Rappai, honorary fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies, noted it was important when Bhutan complained of road building into the disputed territory that India had exhibit it was working in Bhutan's interest, which the Indian Army did. "But one lesson from Doklam is that we must not take our smaller neighbours for granted, we have to ensure Bhutan feels secure with Indian protection. This can be done with greater economic engagement, which will thwart any pro-China leaning by Bhutan. Good military intelligence to nip any development that could flare up into another Doklam is also crucial," he said.
So Modi is heading to Xiamen to shake hands and take selfies with Xiamen and show to the world that "All is well" (a line from the Indian film Three Idiots that was hugely popular in China). But the two countries have a lot of homework to tackle, too. "To avoid future Doklams, we have to engage on many fronts. The canvas of interaction should include competition and cooperation, rivalry and collaboration, where no single event can topple the overall relationship,'' said Ravi Bhootalingam, honorary fellow, ICS.
Also, experts warn that there is no guarantee China might not get its road rollers out the following summer. How China responded to a dispute with Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal standoff should serve as a reminder that China's thought process is not the same as ours. Then, in a deal mediated by the US, China was supposed to withdraw its forces from the shoal till its ownership was established. China, however, did not abide by the agreement, claiming no deal had been reached. The matter remains unresolved till date.
