Media, missiles and mistrust: Lt Gen D.S. Hooda (retd)

Lieutenant General D.S. Hooda (retd)

The military relationship between India and Pakistan has long operated in a narrow space between restraint and retaliation. Each recent crisis―from Uri to Pulwama and Pahalgam―has tested deterrence, political will and strategic signalling. Yet with each iteration, the climb up the escalation ladder becomes swifter and more precarious.

What once unfolded over days or weeks of diplomatic signalling and military posturing now plays out within hours. This drastic compression of response time carries significant risks, shrinking the space for de-escalation, considered decision-making and backchannel diplomacy. There are three primary drivers of this rapid escalation.

The first driver is the conduct of war from a distance, which lends it a detached quality. Drones, long-range stand-off weapons and missiles enable precision strikes to be executed without endangering one’s own forces. Viewing strikes through monitors far removed from the battlefield dulls the sensory shock of close-quarters combat.

This insulation from the battlefield encourages leaders to perceive military options as virtually risk-free rather than as instruments of last resort. Because remote operations seldom endanger their own troops, each successful hit appears consequence-free. This illusion emboldens decision-makers to persist with attacks. Yet the destruction inflicted by modern long-range weapons is real, compelling the adversary to respond.

The speed of remote operations compresses reaction time, forcing leaders to make decisions instantly. Such haste often leads to overreaction, as neither side wishes to appear to be losing the immediate battle. Ironically, the further we are from the front line, the closer we are to rapid escalation.

The second driver is the role of the media. Traditional media outlets, driven by ratings and sensationalism, often amplify nationalist sentiment in real time. Non-stop coverage of military operations fuels public appetite for immediate and visible retribution, leaving little room for restraint.

Social media, awash with misinformation and disinformation, further intensifies nationalist fervour. Political leaders, attuned to the digital mood, cannot be seen to step back, and therefore feel compelled to take ever-stronger actions. In this age of instant information, there is scant room for calm deliberation. As Henry Kissinger writes in World Order: “The temptation to cater to the demands of the digitally reflected multitude may override the judgment required to chart a complex course in harmony with long-term purposes.”

Consequently, even when governments internally seek to contain a crisis, media optics make de-escalation politically hazardous. It is often asserted that military decision-making should be insulated from real-time media hysteria, yet achieving this is increasingly difficult.

The third driver of escalation is the absence of crisis-management mechanisms between India and Pakistan. Diplomatic relations between the two countries are largely frozen, and India does not favour third-party mediation. A military hotline exists between the directors general of military operations, but it is only effective for minor tactical matters, and only in peacetime.

All military escalation ultimately aims to achieve deterrence or coercion―either to dissuade the adversary from future actions or to compel a reversal of hostile behaviour. Operation Sindoor, in this context, was a coercive signal of India’s capability and sought to impose costs on Pakistan’s continued use of cross-border terror proxies.

Eminent strategist Thomas Schelling described coercion as a bargain: to compel the adversary to do what one wants while providing a route for retreat. For this to succeed, communication between the two sides must be clear and unambiguous. In Operation Sindoor, India stated that its actions were “focused, measured and non-escalatory in nature”, and had avoided Pakistani military installations. Pakistan thus had a clear off-ramp to avoid further escalation.

Unfortunately, in the absence of a credible crisis-management framework, each side is left to interpret the other’s intentions through public statements, political posturing and a media landscape that often fuels hostility. The lack of structured communication channels deepens mutual suspicion, provoking overreaction and setting in motion a spiral of escalation.

The current crisis appears to have abated, but dangers remain. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his speech to the nation on May 12, unequivocally stated that a befitting response would be given to terror attacks, and that there would be no distinction between the government sponsoring terrorism and the masterminds behind it. Another India–Pakistan military confrontation is, therefore, a realistic possibility.

It may be said that both countries should impose some guardrails on the media and institutionalise direct crisis-communication channels to prevent rapid escalation in a future crisis. Much of this depends on confidence-building measures between the two countries, but this agenda currently has little momentum. Therefore, the onus clearly lies with Islamabad to rein in terrorism if it is to avoid leading the country into a ruinous war.

The author was the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Northern Command.