'General Asim Munir could attempt a coup or bring Islamist parties to power': M.J. Akbar

Interview/ M.J. Akbar, former minister of state for external affairs

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s message that the only matter pending between India and Pakistan is the return of Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir signals the end of the traditional diplomatic framework in New Delhi’s engagement with Islamabad. In an exclusive interview with THE WEEK, former minister of state for external affairs M.J. Akbar says Pakistan has consistently made the error of underestimating Indian response in all the wars it started. He says General Asim Munir, the Pakistan army chief, has been trying for a power grab by creating turbulence in India. Edited excerpts:

Q/ After Prime Minister Modi’s assertion that Operation Sindoor has added a new dimension to Pakistan’s battlefield defeats, what could be Asim Munir’s next step?

A/ To understand Munir’s next step, we need to take a close look at his first step. When you hear an ideological speech by a Pakistan army chief, in which the defunct but toxic two-nation theory has the primacy of place, perhaps the place to begin is the unique share of power that the army commands in Pakistan’s ruling structure. An army chief does not make political speeches in a democracy. Pakistan is not a functioning democracy; it is a stuttering oligarchy in which power is shared between a civilian political party and the permanent party in power, which is the armed forces.

More interesting is the fact that Munir has spoken after two years of silence. Why? There was no provocation. He intervened in the public domain unilaterally. He was sending two signals: he was laying the framework for what became the terrorist communal invasion of Pahalgam, a preferred strategy of the morally and militarily corrupt Pakistan army. The second objective was to create turbulence with India to give legitimacy to an expansion of power for the army chief in Pakistan―another power grab, as if the Pak Army does not exercise enough power already. Could this extend to another coup in the name of that deadly combination of Islamism and national security? Munir will not be the first chief to exploit a defeat in a war against India for personal empowerment. Such a paradox has history. He is going to be blamed for defeat in the war he started, and the most likely route he will take is to deflect blame and puncture the public upheaval against him.

There are three models for a coup in Pakistan: Ayub Khan took over to clear a mess by civilian politicians; in 1976, General Zia-ul-Haq became a despot allegedly to end president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s civilian dictatorship and restore the confidence of his army after its traumatic defeat. Pervez Musharraf took over after Pakistan was once again whipped on the battlefield in Kargil. Munir has two options. If a coup is not feasible, he will work towards bringing Islamist parties to power in the general elections of next February, possibly as part of a coalition. The favoured party is probably the latest political child of the ISI, Pakistan Markazi Muslim League, the political party of Hafiz Saeed and his associates.

But the mistake that Pakistan has consistently made in all the wars it has started is to underestimate the Indian response. After Operation Sindoor, Pakistan has realised that its ultimate security blanket, a nuclear blackmail, is of limited effect. India’s deep penetration missile strikes, particularly at the Nur Khan airbase in Rawalpindi, were both accurate and dangerously close to the nuclear assets of Pakistan. America woke up when it discovered what had happened and ordered Islamabad to cease and desist. But the challenge for India will come when the terrorists who are on top of the Pakistan power pyramid resume their suicidal games.

Q/ Prime Minister Modi has clearly said that the only pending issue with Islamabad is Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir.

A/ India is not going to discuss anything else. So, the normal framework of talks has now been sent into the dustbin of history by Pakistan’s dangerous, volatile stupidity. It always amazes me how the Pakistani army leadership has believed since 1947 that they can keep repeating the same thing―use terrorism―and expect different results. This is one definition of insanity. They won’t get different results. Successive Pakistani army chiefs’ ability to convert defeat into personal victory at the expense of their country is a matter of historical record. Munir could be on the verge of using the Musharraf ploy, that the humiliation of defeat can only be corrected by the Pakistan army’s ability to lead its country back to “salvation”.

Q/ How do you see the role of the United States in reining in terror groups in Pakistan?

A/ Washington gets interested only when the threshold of danger rises to what they consider to be an unacceptable level. Don’t forget that the havoc of any nuclear confrontation is not going to be limited to the geography of the subcontinent. The potentially devastating nuclear cloud could spread over the whole of West Asia, Europe and East Asia, and who knows to what levels of the world population. When the tremors reached Washington, Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio started calling. Pakistan may be a client state of China, but it is also a servitor state of America. Pakistan was forced to listen and accept, at least for the record, that any more terrorism would have unbelievable consequences.

Q/ How significant is President Donald Trump’s offer of talks between India and Pakistan at a neutral location?

A/ At some point, Trump would be tempted to try and become a broker on South Asia. But India is not going to accept the brokerage of any third country. It can accept the goodwill of any friend, but it cannot accept the brokerage of any third party.