Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his May 12 speech, officially called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff and spelt out the new normal. The ‘Modi doctrine’ has three specific facets: A terrorist attack on India shall be seen as an act of war; India will not tolerate nuclear blackmail; terror sponsoring regimes and terrorists shall not be differentiated.
This cannot be just rhetoric.
For a start, it follows Operation Sindoor striking close enough to Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure for its DGMO to call his Indian counterpart asking for a ceasefire. The prime minister’s words also stand on substantial research and war gaming, following step by step progress on an escalation matrix over the years since 2016. From Uri and Balakot to Operation Sindoor, the trend is evident and, with the new doctrine, it can be extrapolated.
Owing to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s yearning for a nuclear bomb, even if it meant the nation went hungry, Pakistan today wields the nuclear bogey even as it begs for alms. But, with the new doctrine, restricted trade, talks and water, it now fails to meet its objectives.
Therefore, it is in Pakistan’s best interest to trade in its nuclear arms for economic alms. Some might argue such a trade did not work out for Ukraine. But, Pakistan’s chronic economic instability, internal strife, vulnerability to nuke theft by non-state actors and the new aqua restrictions make its nuclear arsenal a much larger burden to itself. Moreover, Pakistan faces an adversary with a no-first-use nuclear policy which, with the bluff called, makes its nuclear arsenal redundant.
As Mahatma Gandhi said, for a poor man, God resides in his bread. Thus, as hunger and thirst get the better of Pakistan, its focus as a nation might shift organically.
In the past, the US has conveyed categorically to Pakistan that there was no war game scenario where it could win against India. Pakistan’s standard retort to this is: we will wage a war for 1,000 years. But that requires surviving for a 1,000 years, as famously pointed out by former prime minister Indira Gandhi. Pakistan’s current state does not instil confidence that it will be around for that long.
Since 1998, Pakistan has tried to lower the nuclear threshold with its leaders’ nuclear sabre-rattling. Nevertheless, India has continued to create and expand the space for a sub-conventional or limited conventional war, below the nuclear threshold, starting from Kargil up till Operation Sindoor.
From a war gaming perspective, the nuclear bogey can be dissected in a few ways. Here are a few primary scenarios.
If it is a tactical weapon, the impact is small.
With multiple asymmetries between India and Pakistan, from size to GDP to diplomatic reach and, above all, India’s submarine attack capabilities, mutually assured destruction is not a possibility, as former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had succinctly pointed out.
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A larger strategic strike is not a push-button that can be deployed instantly. From the political decision making to assembly for loading to eventual deployment, it provides enough opportunities for India to create a slip between the cup and the lip. India has proven this possibility with Operation Sindoor hitting close to Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure.
Lastly, actual use of nukes would instantly make Pakistan a global outcast, thereby accelerating its ruination.
Thus, the prime minister’s pronouncement of the new normal is not just rhetoric, but based on sound homework. One can only hope that Pakistan sees the writing on the wall before it again gives birth to a nation or two.
The author was a member of the National Security Advisory Board.