It is a well-known truism that wars are a violent extension of state politics. After the high-intensity US–Iraq War of the early 2000s, many believed that the futility and massive costs of such conflicts would deter large-scale wars in the future. Unfortunately, that expectation was misplaced. The Russia–Ukraine war, which began on February 24, 2022, and continues more than three years later, has shown that prolonged wars are not going away. This is why the world looked forward to the recent Trump–Putin peace talks in Alaska on August 15, aimed at ending the conflict. Although inconclusive, the negotiations highlighted that Russia is unwilling to give up most of the Ukrainian territories it occupied or captured before and during the war, and it appears there is not much that Ukraine's Western backers may be able to do about it.
Over the past three and a half years, the Russia–Ukraine war has become a laboratory of modern warfare, in the backdrop of evolving global power equations. Both strategic and tactical lessons are being drawn, many of which hold relevance for India’s national security.
Strategic lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War
There are a number of important lessons from the war that have implications at the politico-strategic level.
1. Wars will remain instruments of politics - prolonged wars favour the stronger side
The Russia-Ukraine conflict illustrates that wars, whether initiated directly or through proxies, will continue to occur, as states pursue political aims. And for Ukraine, being a proxy has not implied that support from backers has been wholehearted and guaranteed throughout. Also, the war has not been short or decisive as was initially planned by Russia, but has stretched into a prolonged attritional struggle. The prolonged war has favoured Russia, the stronger side, as time has gradually weakened Ukraine, the weaker. For India, this implies not just preparing for swift conflicts but for long-drawn wars and prolonged standoffs too. The war also highlights the importance of staying away from getting caught up in a situation of becoming a proxy for a major power.
A strong and sustained warfighting capability needs to be built up. Stockpiles of ammunition, precision-guided munitions (PGMs), drones, and spare parts are essential. India’s drive toward Atmanirbhar Bharat in defence must accelerate, with particular focus on artillery, drones, PGMs, air defence and electronic warfare.
2. Once lost in war, it may not be possible to recover territory through diplomacy
It is apparent that, in the current state of global and regional geopolitics, loss of territory in war would be extremely difficult to reverse through diplomacy. India shares a long-contested border with its northern neighbour—an aggressive major power, which is likely to continue its 'salami slicing' policy. Preventing loss of land would be a more doable option than trying to recover it after loss. Thus, deterrence must not be just symbolic, but should be based on strong warfighting capability. Therefore, the need for strength through deterrence, resilience, preparedness and self-reliance is paramount.
3. The character of war is rapidly changing
While the fundamental nature of war remains constant, its character is swiftly evolving with technology. Modern conflicts are being fought across multiple domains—land, sea, air, cyber, space, and information. The Russia–Ukraine war has been marked by drone warfare, precision-guided munitions (PGMs), AI-driven targeting, cyber operations, and grey-zone tactics. Ukraine benefitted from NATO’s technological and informational support, leveraging Western media and diplomacy to mobilise global opinion. India must prepare for grey-zone warfare in peacetime and ensure readiness for technology-driven multi-domain wars against potential adversaries at extremely short notice.
4. Nuclear deterrence has limits
Russia’s nuclear arsenal has deterred NATO from direct military intervention, but it has not stopped Western support to Ukraine in terms of arms, intelligence, and financial aid. Likewise, India’s nuclear capability may not prevent adversaries from initiating limited conflicts, as seen in China’s 2020 intrusions in Ladakh. Deterrence against this northern neighbour cannot rest entirely on possession of nuclear weapons or defensive posturing. In the case of our western adversary, India must remain cautious about escalation but should not be overly constrained by its nuclear posturing.
5. Alliances and partnerships are vital
Ukraine’s survival has depended heavily on NATO’s logistical, financial, and technological support. Russia, in turn, has leaned on China, Iran, and North Korea, while maintaining pragmatic ties with Turkey despite its support for Ukraine. For India, this highlights the importance of cultivating strategic partnerships alongside self-reliance. Strong ties with the US, France, Japan, and Israel should be deepened, while also maintaining relations with Russia and Iran. Not creating new adversaries unnecessarily is equally important.
6. Resilience is decisive
Ukraine has resisted strongly despite being the weaker side in the conflict, facing relentless Russian strikes on its energy, infrastructure, and cities. National morale, governance, and determination have allowed it to impose high costs on Russia. For India, this means keeping the armed forces motivated and resilient while hardening energy, telecom, and transport networks against cyber and missile strikes. National willpower can offset asymmetry in size and resources.
8. Airwarfare lessons
As demonstrated by Ukraine, drones have become the air force of the weak. Moreover, despite stronger airpower resources, air dominance was not guaranteed to Russia due to challenges from resilient, dispersed and well-integrated Ukrainian air defences. The Russian Air Fforce has frequently targeted Ukrainian airfields, radars and command networks by launching drones, PGMs and glide bombs from stand-off ranges. Yet, hardened shelters, dispersal of air assets to advanced landing grounds and rapid runway repair have allowed Ukrainian air assets to survive. Besides, Ukraine has used asymmetric warfare means, such as innovative drone attacks in Operation Spider Web, to destroy crucial Russian airpower assets.
9. Naval warfare lessons
The Russian Navy has maintained overall dominance of the northern and eastern Black Sea and continues to control access to Crimea. It has employed long-range precision strikes, launching Kalibr cruise missiles from Kilo-class submarines, to project power against Ukraine's ports and shipping, and to strike at Ukraine's infrastructure and power grids in depth, thus extending its role beyond traditional sea control missions. Its control of sea lanes and partial opening to allow Ukrainian exports of grains and metals has shown it can weaponise maritime trade effectively. Nonetheless, though Ukraine's navy has no large ships at its disposal, its asymmetric tactics, using sea drones, long-range missiles, like Neptune and Storm Shadow, and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) as well as drone swarms from the sea have resulted in heavy losses to Russia's Black Sea fleet at Sevastopol. Ukraine claims 27 Russian naval vessels have been destroyed or seriously damaged. This has forced Russia to re-base its main combat ships to Novorossiyisk and other ports, to avoid further casualties and remain operational. The Indian Navy too needs to strike deep inland from the sea. Ukraine’s use of asymmetric warfare assets, especially Neptune missiles, UAVs and naval drones against the Black Sea Fleet offers lessons for India’s potential confrontations with both our potential adversaries. Also, the need to enhance jointness between the Navy and the Air Force has been emphasised.
Tactical Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War
1. Drone-centric warfare
Drones have dominated the Russia-Ukraine battlefield. Ukraine has employed Turkish TB-2s, long-range Bober drones, commercial quadcopters, first-person view (FPV) racing drones, Warmate loitering munitions, and Magura naval drones, often coordinated through AI-assisted targeting. Russia has used Lancet loitering drones, Iranian-designed Shaheds, Orlan UAVs, and custom FPVs for ISR and strikes. From $400 FPVs to long-range kamikaze drones, UAVs have proven decisive. India too must develop drone swarms, naval drones and loitering munitions as well as robust counter-drone capabilities for operations within and across its borders.
2. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs)
Ukraine’s NATO-supplied Excalibur shells, HIMARS rockets, Javelin missiles, and Storm Shadow cruise missiles allowed it to maximise the effect of limited arsenals by destroying high-value targets with fewer munitions. Russia, by contrast, used mass PGMs—FAB glide bombs, Kalibr cruise missiles, and Kinzhal hypersonic missiles—to overwhelm defences and inflict psychological pressure. India must expand stocks of indigenous PGMs such as Pinaka rockets, SAAW, and BrahMos variants for achieving economy of effort through precision strikes.
3. Layered air defence
Russia’s saturation tactics using drones and missiles have forced Ukraine to deploy a multi-layered air defence, including Patriot, NASAMS, and IRIS-T systems. India must integrate its S-400, Akash, QRSAM, and Iron Dome–like systems into a seamless, multi-tiered defence architecture, backed by counter-drone capabilities.
4. Electronic warfare and communications
Russia’s GPS jamming and electronic warfare (EW) disrupted Ukrainian drones and communications, but Ukraine adapted using Starlink and frequency agility. There are lessons in this from both sides. India must strengthen EW forces, secure both satellite and ground communications, and invest in resilient quantum and frequency-hopping systems.
5. Infantry and urban warfare
Battles in Mariupol, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka underscored the enduring importance of infantry in close combat, trench warfare, and urban fighting. India must modernise infantry equipment, enhance night-fighting and drone capabilities, and train for dense urban and semi-urban combat—similar to conditions on its borders.
Conclusion
The Russia–Ukraine war has emphasised that future conflicts in our context will be multi-domain and technology-driven, and could well be protracted. Also, any loss of territory to a stronger, aggressive adversary will be extremely difficult to reverse diplomatically. For India, several imperatives emerge. Strategically, India must accelerate defence self-reliance, while simultaneously building military strength, resilience and reliable partnerships. Just as Ukraine leveraged civilian and corporate innovation, partnerships with private industry and startups in drones, AI, cyber, and EW are vital. More budget must be assigned to capital spending.
Tactically, India must prioritise drone warfare, PGMs, stand-off air strikes, layered air defence, sea-launched missiles and modern infantry capabilities. Preparing for attritional, high-tech conflict with China in the Himalayas requires a focus on drones, EW, and cyber resilience. Against Pakistan, precision strikes and drone swarms may deliver early gains, but the possibility of saturation attacks in return must be anticipated. In the maritime sphere, Ukraine’s use of asymmetric warfare assets, especially Neptune missiles, UAVs and naval drones against the Black Sea Fleet offers lessons for India’s potential confrontations with both our potential adversaries.
The overarching message is clear: India must prepare not just for winning short, decisive wars but also for gaining favourable outcomes in prolonged, grinding conflicts across multiple domains. Advantages in technology, partnerships, resilience, and national willpower will be the deciding factors in tomorrow’s wars.
(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK)
