Bangladesh remains a key vector for India’s national security calculus. This has been true even before Bangladesh was not a nation state. This importance is driven by the two-and-half front conundrum that the Indian strategic community has been confronting since 1947. Two-and-half front would refer to hot borders with Pakistan and China and the “half-front” would be the internal security challenges in India’s North East (NE) region, backed by Pakistan or China or both.
Contrary to popular belief, Indian security apparatus was aware of the possibility of such a violent turn of events resulting in a classical regime-change. Meticulously detailed reports were present with India since late 2021 to demonstrate how a BNP-Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) grouping was planning to hijack a popular protest to overthrow the Sheikh Hasina government as was seen in the students’ protest of 2024. Even media reports forewarned of such eventualities. Even the former Director General of Police of Assam wrote a warning piece in August 2023.
India’s deliberate and matured approach to the fall of Hasina as opposed to its somewhat haphazard reaction to the 2021 coupé in Myanmar is a testament to such preparedness.
Beyond the loud rhetoric, thinking minds on both sides are aware that the relationship is too crucial to be permanently jeopardized for short-term politics. Thus, “managed hostilities” to assuage internal political pressures seems to be the approach both countries have taken. For the trained eyes, how India is tackling the fluid internal turmoil in Bangladesh is impressive. The street protests, not limiting to those for minority rights, is reminiscent to pre-May 1975 Sikkim. The developments in Rakhine, including the temporary seizure of Teknaf peninsula by Arakan Army, are developments Indian agencies would be keenly monitoring, to say the least.
Learning from its experiences, India had developed effective backchannels with the BNP during the 1975-2009 phase of bilateral relationship.
Today, the situation demands that New Delhi does not waste time in adopting certain short term and long term measures for safeguarding regional and domestic interests. Firstly, it would only be prudent for India to communicate its red lines and its intent on collaboration. The primary red line, which India seems to have made abundantly clear, is the repatriation of Sheikh Hasina. If India is not to host Hasina, its reputation as an emerging power, a hegemon in South Asia and a dependable partner for other relatively young or unstable democracies will be dented beyond repair.
Another key aspect is the topic of illegal immigration. Any number of political/economic/religious refugees will be unacceptable especially in the North East where this issue has led to massive bloodshed for decades, especially in Assam.
On the economic side, reopening and reinvigorating border trade through Border Haats will be a welcome measure. These Haats have been shut since Covid-19 and this has impacted the populace on both side of the border. For states like Meghalaya, the major market of their local produce remains Bangladesh and not the rest of India. For the Bangladeshi, border trade remains the primary supply-chain as well. Thus, any disruption to this channel shall further fuel already palpable anti-India sentiments among the masses.
Engaging the Bangladeshi populace at a people-to-people level should remain a top priority, especially in the border areas. This has both humanitarian and strategic vectors. Border regions of both the countries share common interests in sports like football, cricket and volleyball. Friendly matches can be organised under the watchful eyes of the BSF without compromising the security of the borders. This would also provide an outlet to the youth in Bangladesh to channelise their energies in a positive direction.
Bangladesh’s medium-term goal would be economic stability in the country. Arresting inflation and unemployment will remain a priority, irrespective of who is in power in Dhaka. A one billion USD Rupee-based loan from India would go a long way to stem the inflation and economic downturn in Bangladesh.
Imparting skill training to the youth of Bangladesh in Indian skill development institutes is likely to be acceptable even to some of the more extreme elements within Bangladesh. Given India’s large capacity, including the Industrial Training Institutes, providing skilling and employment-oriented training to deserving youths from Bangladesh would help foster close ties with Bangladesh. Similarly, preferential treatment to scholars and students from Bangladesh in Indian educational institutions will send a positive message to the youth – the primary stakeholders in Bangladesh today. Opening up schemes for Indian MSMEs & Startups to their Bangladeshi counterparts is a low cost-high influence policy option for New Delhi. Such intervention shall also have a broad-based reach which will touch the bottom of the pyramid, thus building goodwill through actual impact.
New Delhi will always be an irreplaceable partner for Dhaka. In addition to close economic partnership and long-term connectivity projects, Bangladesh’s geography makes it impossible for them to ignore India. Thus, both nations will have to find ways to address core concerns and make mutual respect and cooperation the cornerstones of their bilateral relationship.
From India’s perspective Bangladesh solves a critical geostrategic challenge, a dependable alternative to the Chicken’s Neck for the security and economic prosperity of the North East. The two neighbours should also work together to strengthen multilateral forums such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) initiatives.
Such regional groupings will provide platforms for synergistic policy formulations on issues like climate change, which has regional implications.
Finally, India should build on the existing defence cooperation agreements with Bangladesh. Though the Sampriti Exercise has been ongoing for some time, it was only in 2023 that the first Bangladeshi officer was commissioned from Indian Military Academy. This is important since the Bangladesh army is a critical stakeholder in the political and policy making circle of the country.
Abhijan Das is a strategic consulting and national security expert, and a governing body member of SHARE (Society to Harmonise Aspirations for Responsible Engagement).
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.
