Beyond oil: How India and the Gulf are forging a deep strategic partnership

Few relationships have evolved as swiftly and substantively in the past decade as the one between India and the Gulf, where economic pragmatism and strategic necessity are shaping a new regional alignment. What was once a partnership rooted mainly in oil  imports and expatriate labour has now expanded into various other domains, including defence cooperation, technology investment, maritime connectivity, and climate-linked infrastructure. This shift marks not just a diplomatic recalibration, but the emergence of a long-term strategic convergence across the Arabian Sea.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar—are undergoing economic diversification and recalibrating their foreign policies in response to shifting global power dynamics, energy transitions, and regional security challenges. Simultaneously, India’s expanding economic aspirations, quest for strategic autonomy, and being a major global market and investment destination have provided new bases for partnership. Energy remains a core pillar of this partnership, with almost 60% of India’s oil and gas needs fulfilled through the Gulf region. However, the relationship is rapidly broadening into infrastructure investment, fintech linkages, strategic connectivity corridors, maritime cooperation, and defence diplomacy. This transformation reflects a deeper strategic logic wherein India and the Gulf region visualise each other as critical partners in shaping stable economic and security architectures across the regions.

Recent economic partnerships in the Gulf are increasingly geared toward diversification and long-term strategic cooperation, with investments flowing into digital infrastructure, renewable energy, logistics, and financial networks. These initiatives go beyond trade, creating structural interdependence through shared technology, supply-chain connectivity, and modernisation agendas that align future growth trajectories on both sides. Diaspora and labour continue to be a vital dimension of India–Gulf relations, though the nature of this interdependence is evolving. Indian workers have been central to the Gulf’s urbanisation and service-sector expansion. However, ongoing localisation policies in various Gulf countries, alongside post-pandemic labour reforms, are reshaping migrant hierarchies and skill requirements. India is responding by shifting from unskilled labour export to skilled workforce mobility, vocational training, and digital credentialing frameworks. This transition has strategic significance as it not only safeguards the economic security of millions of Indian households reliant on Gulf remittances but also strengthens India’s position as a knowledge-skill provider within the region’s technological and digital transformation agendas.

Security and maritime cooperation represent another significant pillar. The maritime domain is fast becoming a contested space due to piracy risks, energy vulnerabilities, and geopolitical rivalries among major powers. Joint naval exercises, port calls, intelligence exchanges, and counter-terrorism mechanisms between India and Gulf states reflect a collective recognition that sea-line security is foundational to energy supply stability, trade flows, and economic resilience. The rise of West Asian minilaterals—most notably I2U2 (India–Israel–UAE–US)—signals a new strategic architecture built around technology, food security, green energy, and connectivity. The proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), though currently challenged by the Gaza conflict and regional instability, embodies this emerging geography of cooperation. IMEC envisions a multi-modal transport and energy network linking Indian manufacturing, Gulf logistics, and European markets. This can serve as a counterweight to China’s connectivity initiatives in the region while drawing the Gulf and India into a shared economic and strategic orbit.

However, the strategic convergence is not without constraints. The Gaza conflict has complicated normalisation and regional diplomacy, stressing Gulf states to balance domestic sentiment, strategic autonomy, and external partnerships. India must also carefully manage its ties with Iran while deepening relations with other Gulf states. Yet, the overriding momentum remains strong because the structural incentives for cooperation outweigh interim shocks. The Gulf sees India not only as a reliable economic partner but as a significant geopolitical actor whose stability, market scale, and oceanic position are essential for its diversification. India, in turn, recognises that its aspirations for global influence and economic growth are inseparable from stable relations with the Gulf. In this sense, the India–Gulf relationship is no longer transactional or reactive, and it is emerging as a strategically integrated partnership grounded in shared economic futures, interdependence in energy and labour markets, and converging maritime and geopolitical interests.

The author is Assistant Professor, Amity Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (AIDSS), Amity University, NOIDA.