Former Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale, in his recent interview with a leading newspaper, stated that although the Chinese had never regarded India as an equal after 1949, they did not dismiss India entirely as a country of no consequence.
The attitude of China may have stemmed from the view of Chinese Communist Party and Mao Zedong that ultimately, success comes through a violent armed revolution that majority of Indian political leaders rejected during the independence struggle.
However, the Chinese attitude had its own ripples in India.
Both India and China endured immense hardships before being established as independent countries in 1947 and 1949 respectively.
India fought a long and exhausting struggle against British colonial rule, during which its people suffered economic exploitation, violence, and killings, finally gaining freedom in 1947.
Meanwhile, China had endured the brutal War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (1937-1945), followed by a second internal strife fought between the Nationalists (Kuomintang) under Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists under Mao Zedong as competing forces sought to control the destiny of the nation. During the Japanese occupation, the country witnessed widespread atrocities and immense suffering, particularly the horrific abuse of Chinese women at the hands of the Japanese Imperial army. Further, the Japanese had also conducted inhuman clinical experiments on Chinese people at Unit 731.
In recent times, China has increasingly demonstrated that it considers itself far ahead of India in every sphere, and it continues to treat India as not equal. Independent sources have echoed this perception, though there were no official statements issued in this regard.
However, the recent statement of Chinese scholar Victor Zhikai Gao, Vice President of the Center for China and Globalization, cleared the position more explicitly by asserting that India was not on par with China—whether militarily, economically, or financially.
When both India and China transformed into independent nations, their internal situations were more or less similar. Both devastated by internal struggle, economic ruin, and weakened—but combat ready—militaries.
Both were looking to the future with hope and aspirations. However, a major and notable difference can be seen in the military setup of both the countries.
Despite all the adversaries it faced, the People's Liberation Army, at the time of establishment of the Peoples Republic of China in 1949, was headed by General Zhu De, a Chinese war veteran and strategist.
New Delhi, at the time, surprisingly chose a foreigner to head the Indian Army. The political leadership may have chosen a foreigner after considering various options available to them at that point of time. However, the decision was definitely an indication that decision-makers were not confident in handing over the reins of the Indian military to an Indian Army officer.
Many theories are in the air on selecting a foreigner for the post. The Indian Army had to wait for another two years before Gen K.M. Cariappa was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Army on January 15, 1949. This was the time when China—though not officially established as the PRC—was firmly in control of its army under a Chinese general.
There were criticisms from various quarters on India’s hurried decision to recognise the PRC on 31, December 1949, and establishing diplomatic relations on April 1, 1950.
Even Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was opposed to taking a hasty decision on recognising PRC in 1949. Jawaharlal Nehru may have decided to recognise the PRC out of good neighbourly intentions, despite opposition from seniors in his own party.
However, within the next ten years the policy, based on good neighbourly intentions, seems to have yielded a desired result. Within one year of its establishment, Beijing sent PLA troops to Tibet on October 7, 1950 to occupy the territory and to stamp its authority.
This was followed by the signing of a 17-point agreement between Beijing and the Tibetan Representatives on May 23, 1951, aimed at formally annexing Tibet to the mainland, and then the escape of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959 after the violent uprising of March 10, 1959. Then followed the unforgettable Sino-India war of 1962.
Sino-Indian relations can be understood through three distinct phases of 'China phobia'—the first phase spanning 1947-1962, the second from 1962 to the Doklam standoff in 2017, and the third and the current one post Doklam.
The first phase was marked by India’s efforts to extend an olive branch—seeking friendly ties with China in the spirit of two newly independent Asian nations striving for mutual goodwill.
However, we should not forget the fact that China already possessed a deeply entrenched bureaucratic system, refined over centuries through successive dynasties, and a formidable military that had gained maturity and extensive experience during the first half of the 20th century.
Meanwhile, India also had a strong bureaucracy inherited from British colonialism and a combat-ready military. During the first half of the 20th century, the Indian Army mainly remained under the command of the British Crown, primarily engaged in military manoeuvres and large-scale operations during the Second World War, to protect the interests of the British Crown.
As mentioned above, the Chinese had never really regarded India as equal after 1949, but also did not dismiss India entirely as a country of no consequence. At the time of their establishment as independent states, both India and China were considered equals on the basis of respective national strength, yet an unpleasant argument has come to the fore: Why did China view India as unequal?
One plausible explanation may be found from Mao’s famous quote: “Revolution comes through the barrel of a gun”.
Mao first said this famous line during a speech at an emergency CCP meeting on August 7, 1927, and later reiterated it at a speech on November 6, 1938.
The Chinese Communist Party and Mao Zedong always followed a violent path to achieve success during their struggle against Japanese aggression or during the internal conflict. Mao’s quote is the clear indication that the 'gun' is the ultimate instrument to decide the outcome.
Meanwhile, the strong tactics and theories of the Communists may not be in tune with the peaceful agitation pursued by Indian leaders to gain independence. The clash between these political theories may well be one of the main reasons China came to regard India as unequal.
This line of thinking could be the reason behind Mao Zedong holding the powerful post of Chairman of the Central Military Commission from 1949 till his death in 1976.
In the first decade after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the strength of the People’s Liberation Army was used both domestically and externally.
Domestically, the PLA was deployed in the integration of Tibet and Xinjiang and the violent protest of Tibet in 1959, while externally, it played decisive roles in the Korean War.
By contrast, although the Indian Army was employed domestically to incorporate princely states into the Indian Union, it also fought a war against Pakistan in 1949. However, all such decisions were taken within the ambit of the democratic government.
Since 1949, when China began to see India as unequal, it is quite possible that the Chinese response, especially on unofficial exchanges, carried a sense of superiority.
Rather than countering China’s sense of superiority, certain circles in India amplified a phobia—the China phobia—deliberately to instil a fear of China in the public mind.
Those behind this narrative sought to undermine India’s confidence and strength. During the 1962 war, this phobia was clearly visible. Although the Indian Army had brave soldiers and combat-ready formations, some commanders especially posted in Arunachal Pradesh reportedly pressed for withdrawal instead of mounting a determined offensive, citing the belief that defeating the PLA was impossible.
There were, of course, other political missteps both before and after the Sino-Indian conflict, which were repeatedly amplified by political and military circles time and again.
After the 1962 debacle, the ‘China phobia’ gained further ground. A telling example was the decision to block the road from Tawang to Bumla with massive boulders, intended to halt any future advance of PLA forces—a fear factor turned into a phobia.
It should not be overlooked that when the PLA previously crossed the border through the Bumla Pass, a new road was constructed to facilitate their troop movements. No policymaker ever thought that removing the boulder blockade may not be a difficult task for those who constructed a new road in a mountainous area within a short span of time.
During his tenure as Defence Minister, George Fernandes declared China to be India’s potential threat number one in early May 1998. He made this statement in New Delhi during interviews and press interactions.
His statement was hailed for coming out openly about the threat coming out from China. He had declared that India should consider China the number one enemy above Pakistan.
Considering the military and economic might of China, the statement may have been factually and technically correct.
However, instead of making a public statement, which added further fuel to the already existing China threat, it would have been wiser for the government to make smart moves to enhance its military and economic might to counter China.
There is no doubt, at least on paper, that the Chinese military surpasses the Indian Army in many respects. However, it does not mean that India cannot stop the PLA at the border.
India showed its grit and determination during the Doklam standoff with the PLA which lasted for 73 days in 2017. Earlier too, the Indian Army faced incursions and repelled them, but none like Doklam, in which Indian soldiers showed great valour and did not allow Chinese soldiers to move an inch into the Indian territory.
From the Doklam incident, a third phase of the 'China phobia’ emerged—though this time in a reversed form.
Gradually, we are dismantling the long-standing myth of Chinese supremacy, a narrative echoed across many quarters in India for the past seventy years.
Then comes the Galwan issue. The loss of 20 soldiers in a sudden attack was definitely a setback for India. However, New Delhi fought back with grit and determination.
Although the Centre was at the receiving end from the Opposition on the question of its handling of the Galwan crisis, it must be acknowledged that the Chinese side also suffered considerable causalities. The incident was a loss of face for the Chinese Army, as it made a considerable dent in what was perceived as a superior military force.
'China phobia' also created barriers to recognising and informing the public about the Indian Army’s successful operations against the PLA.
Whenever the China factor is discussed, the first reference is always the military debacle of 1962, which tends to obscure the victory of Indian forces on other occasions.
The Nathu La conflict of September 1967 and the Cho La clash of October 1967 are rarely mentioned or discussed, and due credit is not given to the soldiers.
On both occasions, Indian forces successfully repelled Chinese advances with minimal casualties, while the PLA reportedly suffered heavy losses. These two incidents demonstrated that the Indian Army could defeat the PLA, and that too within just five years of the unforgettable military debacle of 1962.
In this context, we must remember the sacrifice of Rifleman Jaswant Singh Rawat during the 1962 war.
Born into a humble family in present-day Uttarakhand, he joined the Army as a rifleman. During the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962, with the help of two Monpa youths, he held an advancing PLA battalion for 72 hours near Tawang, employing his own tactical moves.
It took the Chinese 72 hours to realise that a single Indian jawan, armed with limited weapons and ammunition, had stalled their forward movement.
Ultimately, with the help of captured locals, the Chinese forces killed Rawat and one of his associates, while capturing another. His valour was honoured by the Indian Army, and his name became a lasting symbol of courage, tactics and sacrifice. The Army maintains the Jaswant Garh War Memorial near Sela Pass in his memory.
The author is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Public Policy Research, Kochi.
