OPINION | West Asia’s new security architecture: Where does India stand?

The past week witnessed a flurry of developments pointing to a rapidly evolving security architecture in West Asia. Iran and Oman moved towards an arrangement for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, though Tehran linked this to the US concessions. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed a trilateral mutual-defence pact; 14 countries endorsed a Saudi-led maritime defence coalition for securing the Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden, while Pakistan and Kuwait advanced a five-year defence cooperation framework. Russia and Syria agreed to restructure Russian military facilities at Tartus and Hmeimim as joint training centres. Israel rejected the US-backed Gaza peace plan, while Washington continued its diplomatic push to de-escalate the region and restore freedom of navigation. And while all this was happening, the US vice president called up the Indian prime minister on August 8, 2026, and, over an important conversation, reviewed regional and global developments, and reiterated the US commitment to the Indo-US strategic partnership.

Undoubtedly, West Asia is approaching a strategic inflexion point. What is emerging is not merely another tactical rearrangement of alliances following a regional war, but a simultaneous questioning of the security foundations that governed the region for nearly eight decades.

Relatedly, it appears the United States is reassessing the costs of its overseas military commitments. Gulf monarchies are actively pursuing strategic autonomy. Iran has demonstrated that American bases in the Gulf can become targets rather than unambiguous security guarantees. Israel remains the region’s premier military power, but finds that tactical superiority does not easily yield political acceptance. Türkiye is asserting itself as an independent security pole, while Pakistan expands its military footprint in the Gulf, based on its Sunni Muslim identity.

Concurrently, China expands its economic footprint, Russia manoeuvres for strategic space, and the European Union recognises that regional instability directly threatens European energy security, trade routes, and migration patterns.

For India, this transformation comes at a challenging moment. Traditional friendly relations with Tehran are under stress, the Chabahar route to Afghanistan and Central Asia appears blocked, Pakistan is formalising its long-standing military links in the Gulf into broader strategic partnerships, and most significantly, ties with Washington face geopolitical friction over a number of issues. The central question facing New Delhi is no longer whether West Asia is changing, but who will shape the emerging order—and where India will fit within it.

Shifting sands of the post-war Pax Americana

Since the Second World War, the United States has served as the primary external security provider in West Asia. This architecture rested on several pillars: naval deployments, forward bases, advanced arms sales to Gulf monarchies, intelligence sharing, and an enduring military partnership with Israel.

The arrangement protected oil flows, prevented hostile regional hegemony, contained Iran, and secured Israel’s qualitative military edge. The 2020 Abraham Accords sought to institutionalise a new phase of this order, converting Arab-Israeli confrontation into a tripartite framework combining Israeli technology, Gulf capital, and American security guarantees to contain Iran.

Subsequent regional escalation and direct conflict involving Iran exposed the vulnerabilities of this model. The Gulf states drew a stark lesson: hosting American forces provides deterrence, but it also renders their territory vulnerable to incoming counter-strikes from Iran.

While Washington will remain the dominant external military actor in West Asia, its willingness to provide unconditional security guarantees is increasingly questioned, accelerating a search for security diversification across the region.

Strategic realignment: The four external powers

The emerging order is shaped by four key external powers, each operating with distinct objectives, instruments, and limitations:

The United States: Seeks to preserve primacy, protect Israel, secure sea lanes, and contain China and Iran primarily through forward military deployments, bilateral defence ties, and sanctions. However, its primary restraint is a declining domestic political appetite for prolonged military commitments.

China: Focuses on securing energy import routes and expanding Belt and Road infrastructure through economic investment, commercial port management, and transactional diplomacy. Its key limitation is a low willingness and capability to project hard power or resolve regional conflicts.

Russia: Aims to prevent Western hegemony, preserve strategic access, and manage energy markets using its military footprint in Syria, OPEC+ coordination, and defence exports. It is constrained by resource limits and external pressures that restrict long-term power projection.

The European Union: Seeks energy security, supply chain stability, and migration management through infrastructure funding, trade, and diplomatic engagement. Its primary vulnerability is a lack of hard power capabilities, leaving it heavily reliant on the US security umbrella.

Regional Dynamics: Pakistan, Iran, and the Gulf

Pakistan’s evolving role: Pakistan is actively leveraging its defence footprint in West Asia. Beyond long-standing security arrangements with Saudi Arabia, Islamabad is expanding military ties with other Gulf states and deepening defence cooperation with Türkiye.

The Saudi-Türkiye-Pakistan triangular partnership: As formalised by the Makkah Pact - signed on August 7, 2026 - the partnership presents a coherent Sunni security architecture spanning Anatolia, the Arabian Peninsula, and South Asia. While not explicitly anti-Indian, this structure enhances Islamabad's strategic utility to Gulf capitals, requiring India to expand its own defence diplomacy beyond commercial sales into active maritime security and intelligence cooperation.
The Iranian Imperative: Tehran represents a crucial link in India’s regional strategy, providing strategic access to Eurasia and Afghanistan via Chabahar Port. If New Delhi is perceived as fully aligning with an anti-Iran bloc, it risks pushing Tehran closer to Beijing and Moscow, potentially compromising India's northern connectivity ambitions. Preserving operational space with Iran independent of ties with Israel and the US remains vital for Indian strategic flexibility.

India’s key multilateral initiatives under pressure

Traditionally, India had pursued a policy of strategic autonomy whereby it enjoyed good relations with all sides of the geopolitical equation in West Asia. India’s primary interests in the region are energy security, maritime security, safety of the diaspora, and thwarting the threats posed by possible anti-India machinations in the region. In recent years, it has strengthened relations with Israel and the UAE, while continuing to maintain good relations with Iran as well as Arab countries of the Gulf and the wider region, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Indo-US strategic congruity provided necessary heft. I2U2, IMEC and INSTC are multilateral strategic initiatives pursued by India to enhance outreach and connectivity, but currently these appear to be under pressure.

India-Israel-United States-UAE (I2 U2)

In the aftermath of the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, during a virtual meeting of the foreign ministers of India, Israel, UAE and the United States in October 2021, it was decided to start a four-nation economic alliance called ‘International Forum for Economic Cooperation’, which was later renamed as I2U2, and also referred to as the West Asian Quad. Conceived as a flexible platform linking India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States, I2U2 aimed to integrate Indian technology and workforce, Gulf capital, Israeli innovation, and American financial weight. However, its momentum has decelerated.

The primary reasons for this slowdown are the Gaza conflict and broader regional instability involving Iran, which severely constrained political space for overt Arab-Israeli integration. Simultaneously, political friction between New Delhi and Washington has added strain. While this is not the primary cause of I2U2’s delay, the cumulative effect of diplomatic disagreements weakens the political trust essential to driving complex quadrilateral initiatives.

India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)

Announced at the 2023 G20 Summit, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), connecting Mundra port to Europe via UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan and Greece, was designed as a multimodal trade and infrastructure network connecting India through the Arabian Peninsula and Israel to Europe.

IMEC’s progress has stalled due to two structural issues:

Geopolitical exposure: The corridor’s land route relied on political assumptions—specifically Saudi-Israeli normalisation—that were disrupted by the Gaza war. Regional escalation highlighted the fragility of transit corridors passing through potential conflict zones.

Institutional and funding gaps: European assessments note that IMEC remains largely a memorandum of understanding lacking fully institutionalised governance structures, dedicated funding mechanisms, and clear operational timetables.

For New Delhi, IMEC slowdown demonstrates that infrastructure designed to bypass geopolitical chokepoints cannot depend entirely on politically vulnerable corridors without built-in redundancy.

Chabahar and INSTC: Chabahar Port is strategically vital to India as a Pakistan-bypassing gateway to Afghanistan, Central Asia and Russia, and as the maritime anchor of the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) connecting ‘Mumbai to Moscow’, also reducing dependence on the Suez trade route. The current problems are US sanctions, uncertainty over exemptions, Iran’s instability, inadequate rail and road links, financing and insurance difficulties, and security risks compounded by the war.

Strategic roadmap for India

To navigate a fragmented West Asia, India should, while maintaining strategic autonomy, pivot from passive balancing toward active framework-shaping across five key priorities.

Rebalance strategic relationships: Ensure ties with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE do not isolate Tehran. Clear diplomatic signalling must emphasise that Indian security engagement in the Gulf is non-aligned and non-adversarial toward Iran.

Expand defence diplomacy in the Gulf: Elevate security partnerships with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar beyond military exercises. Focus on domain awareness, maritime security in the Arabian Sea, counter-drone technologies, cyber defence, and critical infrastructure protection.

Refocus I2U2 on non-military sectors: Anchor I2U2 firmly to non-ideological, functional cooperation—such as food security, clean energy, health tech, logistics, and water management. De-linking the grouping from regional defence frameworks allows Gulf partners to participate without taking sides in regional conflicts.

Redesign IMEC for resilience: Reframe IMEC to include multimodal contingencies. Integrate maritime bypasses, alternative port nodes in Oman, and digital or energy connectivity that remain functional even during regional crises.

Compartmentalise US-India disagreements: Manage growing friction with Washington over domestic policy, trade, and sanctions by insulating core shared interests. Differences regarding domestic issues should be compartmentalised and resolved to prevent disruption of strategic convergence in maritime security, technology transfers, and Indo-Pacific stability.

Navigating the emerging order

West Asia is transitioning toward a multipolar, non-linear architecture where major powers and regional states maintain overlapping, issue-based partnerships rather than rigid alliances. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Türkiye will simultaneously engage the US on defence, China on trade, Russia on energy, and India on trade and technology.

In this environment, India’s primary strategic asset is its unique position as a trusted partner across competing camps. By moving beyond reactive bilateralism and modernising initiatives like IMEC, I2U2 and INSTC for a volatile geopolitical climate, New Delhi can position itself not merely as a passive observer of West Asian shifts, but as an active architect of its emerging order.

(Lt Gen Philip Campose (Retired) is a former Vice Chief of the Indian Army. He has authored a book titled ‘A National Security Strategy for India: The Way Forward’)

(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)