During the Nilambur bypoll campaign, UDF chairman and Opposition Leader V.D. Satheesan had declared he would take sole responsibility if the UDF lost but credit the entire team if they won.
A landslide win for UDF candidate Aryadan Shoukath would have significantly elevated Satheesan’s stature within the front. He had predicted a victory margin of no less than 15,000 votes. While that target wasn’t fully met, Shoukath’s margin of over 11,000 votes—double what Aryadan Muhammad secured in 2011, the first election post-delimitation—rendered the outcome respectable.
Though the margin fell short of Satheesan’s projection, the victory reinforces his image as the UDF’s chief strategist and bolsters his claim as the leading contender for the chief minister’s post if the alliance returns to power in 2026.
Satheesan took the risk of sticking with Shoukath as the candidate, despite pressure from P.V. Anvar. Even though Anvar had attacked Satheesan personally and also pinned him as the sole roadblock to the former’s UDF entry, Satheeshan stood his ground. Also, Satheeshan applied the strategy of not engaging directly with Anvar’s diatribe against him.
The UDF win validated Satheesan’s strategy, even though Anvar made a surprise run, bagging more than 19,000 votes, fighting both UDF and LDF. Notably, if Shoukath had lost and Anvar had bagged a sizable chunk of votes, Satheeshan’s decision would have earned blame not only from his party men but also from his coalition partners.
Satheesan’s strong stance against bringing PV Anvar into the UDF fold—despite internal disagreements—demonstrated his willingness to make tough calls and prioritise discipline within the UDF.
The UDF victory also would help Satheesahn to counter-narratives of factionalism and leadership weakness within the Congress, reinforcing his image as a decisive and effective leader.
Satheesan and other UDF leaders have framed the Nilambur bypoll victory as a 'comeback moment and a precursor to the 2026 state elections. The win is expected to boost morale, energize the party cadre, and give Satheesan greater leverage to shape the UDF’s agenda going forward.
Notably, in many parts of Malappuram district, Congress workers have historically been wary of the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML). Before delimitation, Nilambur was among the few constituencies where Congress could win without significant support from the League. However, post-delimitation, Nilambur lost its status as a Congress stronghold, and in both 2016 and 2021, UDF’s losses were partly attributed to IUML vote leakage.
This bypoll marked a clear departure. Despite the Aryadan family’s historically uneasy relationship with the League, IUML cadres worked with as much—if not more—enthusiasm than Congress workers. Satheesan’s ability to mobilise both Congress and IUML votes was crucial in securing the win.
He also opened the campaign to the Congress’s younger leaders, giving them space to prove their mettle in election engineering and outreach. The experience they gained—and even the mistakes they made—will provide strategic strength to the UDF as it heads into next year’s assembly elections.
While Anvar’s strong performance did dim the lustre of the UDF’s victory, the hard-fought win gave Satheesan increased moral and political capital, enabling him to set the tone for future electoral strategies and alliance negotiations.
The success of local campaign themes—particularly around human-animal conflict, welfare delivery, and governance failures—will likely prompt Satheesan to prioritise grassroots issues and direct voter engagement in future political battles, too. Nilambur also showcased a successful model built on booth-level organization and personalized outreach, offering the UDF a replicable template for the upcoming local body elections and assembly elections.
Given Nilambur’s diverse voter mix, the constituency offers strategic insight for a Kerala-wide approach: one that consolidates minority votes while also attracting anti-incumbency sentiment.
However, Satheesan’s remarks suggesting that Jamaat-e-Islami Hind has moved away from its theocratic roots may still carry political consequences. Several Muslim organisations, as well as the Catholic Church, publicly criticised his statement. While IUML now adopts a more lenient posture toward Jamaat-e-Islami than in the past, it remains wary of formal normalisation with the group and its political arm, the Welfare Party.
During the campaign, CPM leaders accused the UDF of communal compromise by accepting Welfare Party support—an allegation likely to gain more sound and volume in the coming days as the CPIM will be looking for reasons for its Nilambur loss. Notably, Satheesan’s stance on accepting support from organisations with questionable histories and affiliations appears to have evolved since he assumed the role of Opposition Leader.
The contrast is stark: in 2022, during the Thrikkakara bypoll, Satheesan had firmly stated that the UDF did not need the backing of communal organizations. In Nilambur, however, he himself defended an outfit long accused of communal politics and a theocratic worldview.
Another emerging flashpoint is the 'Anvar factor'. Some believe Anvar's presence limited the UDF's margin to just over 11,000 votes. Early reactions from UDF leaders—including KPCC president Sunny Joseph and IUML veteran P.K. Kunhalikutty—hint at openness to bringing Anvar into the alliance. But Satheesan appears reluctant. Despite Anvar publicly expressing interest in joining the UDF and contesting from Beypore against Tourism Minister Mohamed Riyas (the Chief Minister’s son-in-law), Satheesan has downplayed his performance.
There are indications that Satheesan views Anvar as a potential internal critic backed by his detractors within the Congress. Letting Anvar in may mean empowering a rival voice from within—a risk Satheesan seems unwilling to take. Whether Satheesan can withstand pressure from both UDF allies and his party colleagues to accommodate Anvar remains to be seen.
