The Soviet Cryogenic Engine deal encapsulates India’s space cooperation with the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. This is a classic example to understand India’s Space Diplomacy during the Cold War and how India was placed vis-à-vis the two superpowers. Throughout the Cold War, India managed to get the best benefits out of both the Soviet Union and the United States. These benefits were in the form of technical, financial, and logistical assistance regarding India’s space-related needs.
During the Cold War, India managed to use its non-aligned credentials pretty well. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had any major objections to India having cordial relations in the space sector with the other power. The Cold War was on, but India largely managed to get out of any big hurdles that could potentially harm its space interests. But this cryogenic engine deal, which started during the fag end of the Cold War, had major repercussions on the immediate aftermath of the post-Cold War space relations between India, the United States and the newly formed Russian Federation. It was only during the Cold War period that India and the Indian Space Research Organisation couldn’t manage the geo-politics of the era. It ended up impacting India’s space interests.
In January 1991, India and the Soviet Union were discussing this cryogenic deal. The Soviets had agreed to provide India with two flightworthy cryogenic stages as well as the cryogenic technology to make the stages in India. The Indian Space Research Organisation signed a deal with the Soviet Union’s space agency, the Glavkosmos. The contract was valued at ₹ 235 crore, and it allowed India an option to buy three additional cryogenic stages. The Indo-Soviet contract was fairly technical. Under that, the Soviet engine was supposed to produce a thrust of 7.5 tonnes. The cryogenic stage was holding 12.5 tonnes of propellant.
Technical details aside, while the ISRO team was busy signing the contract with the Soviets, it didn’t think about the MTCR and its side effects. The MTCR (Missile Control Technology Regime) was neither an international agreement nor a treaty. It had begun as a voluntary arrangement between the United States and its six main trading partners. MTCR came into being in 1987. The intent behind this arrangement was to prevent the export of technology which could contribute to the development of long-range missiles. MTCR used to provide regular updated guidelines which were implemented by the adhering nations through their export control laws. Most of the technology used in satellite launch vehicles was directly applicable to the missiles as well. This is because the same launch vehicle which launched a satellite or a rocket can be used for launching missile warheads as well.
When India approved its Geo-Synchronous launch vehicle (GSLV) project in November 1990, the United States federal government amended its laws specifically so that it could apply sanctions to countries like India that were violating the MTCR. This GSLV project was the one for which ISRO had signed the cryogenic engine deal with the Soviet Union two months later in January 1991. The amendments in the MTCR transformed this control regime. Now, under the United States laws, it became mandatory to apply sanctions against countries such as India and others that were violating the MTCR. However, the fact was that the MTCR was not potent in itself. Neither the MTCR nor the changes in the United States laws could have impacted ISRO’s contract with the Glavkosmo, had the Soviet Union been as strong a power as it used to be during the height of the Cold War years.
The policies of Glasnost (openness) and Perestroika (restructuring) adopted by the Soviet Union in the late 1980’s had changed the power dynamics of the Soviet Union in the international system. Many of its republics started breaking away by the time ISRO’s cryogenic deal with Glavkosmos was being finalised in 1991. By the end of the year, the Soviet Union had disintegrated. Writing about this issue in his book, ‘Reach for the stars’, science journalist Gopal Raj pointed out, “The only person who seems to have recognised the dangers of depending on the Soviet Union for the cryogenic technology was S. Chandrashekhar, who was then with the Launch Vehicle Program office at ISRO headquarters in Bangalore.”
Talking to Gopal Raj, Chandashekhar said, “The cryogenic deal clearly violated the provisions of MTCR, and so sanctions required by US law were inevitable. I was convinced that the Soviet Union, in the political and economic situation it found itself, was not going to be able to withstand US pressure. But no one in ISRO was willing to listen to me”.
The fears of Dr. S. Chandrashekhar from the ISRO proved to be true. The United States government imposed sanctions on the Indian Space Research Organisation and the Glavkosmos in May 1992. The sanctions prohibited any kind of export or import from these two organisations for the next two years. Since the newly formed Russian Federation had inherited the contractual obligations for the cryogenic deal with India, the United States federal government pressured the Russians to terminate their contract with the ISRO.
The Russians were offered two choices by the United States. If Russia chose to terminate its contract with India, the US would reward it with access to the commercial launch market and participation in the International Space Station. However, if Russia opted to go with India and oblige the contract (which was worth just $120 million), repercussions were huge. Russia would then have to lose opportunities for their well-developed space industry through which they could earn multiple times more than the contract signed with India. The choices offered to Russia made it very hard for it to stand with India. The Russians took over a year to officially decide on the issue.
In July 1993, the decision was made known to India. In a statement in the Parliament’s Monsoon session in August 1993, India’s then prime minister, Dr. PV Narasimha Rao told the Lok Sabha, “The Chief of the Directorate of International Scientific and Technical cooperation of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs handed over a non-paper to the Indian ambassador in Moscow on 16th July in which it has been stated that in the context of unforeseen circumstances, Glavkosmos finds itself in a situation of not being able to fulfill further its obligations regarding the transfer of technology and production equipment under the Agreement of January 1991". The statement further revealed, “The paper given to the Indian ambassador invokes the force majeure clause of the January 1991 Agreement as the basis of Glavkosmos resiling from its contractual obligations”.
Russia had pulled out of the contract, which India had signed with the Soviet Union. The official ISRO document of the 1993-1994 Annual Reports mentions that the Russians officially suspended the contract in October 1993. The Missile Technology Control Regime wasn’t intended to impede the national space programmes. Nevertheless, it was based on the premise that the technology for launch vehicles could be used for missiles as well. So, the MTCR’s implementation in actual practice meant that even the technology transfers which are intended for launch vehicles would not be permitted. Looking at these technical provisions of the MTCR, no country dared to field a missile with a cryogenic engine.
Despite all this, ISRO’s cryogenic contract with the Soviet Union’s Glavkosmos fell outside the ambit of the MTCR requirements. The Indian space administrators should have known the specifications of the MTCR regime and then signed the cryogenic deal with the Soviet Union. The specifications of the MTCR were very precise. It stated that the Missile Technology Control Regime’s Equipment and Technology Annex lists solid and liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse of 1.1 mega Newton-seconds under its Category 1. The Category 1 items, as per the MTCR, were those having the greatest sensitivity. Their transfer was permitted very rarely.
The MTCR wasn’t even allowing the rocket engines having an impulse 1.1 mega Newton-seconds. Under the deal which the ISRO signed with the Glavkosmos, the total impulse of the Russian cryogenic engine and its stage was 50 times more than the cut-off limit stated above. Right from its early years, the Indian Space Program promoted indigenisation to protect itself from becoming vulnerable to embargoes like this. ISRO, since the time of Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, has been acutely conscious of the US and its suspicions about the Indian Space programme. ISRO’s failure to assess the situation vis-à-vis the MTCR and its consequences for importing the cryogenic technology was its own doing.
(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)
