In what is perceived as a diplomatic setback for New Delhi and its steadfast stance against Pakistan’s role as a hub for terrorism, Islamabad has secured influential positions within key counter-terrorism bodies at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Pakistan now holds the Chair of the 1988 (Taliban) Sanctions Committee, the Vice-Chairmanship of the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), and Co-Chair roles within both the Sanctions Informal Working Group (IWG) and Documentation IWG.
This development has sparked scrutiny over India's foreign policy approach, particularly the necessity and effectiveness of the seven separate all-party delegations sent to various nations. While criticism of India’s diplomatic narrative persists, Pakistan’s appointments to these UNSC bodies cannot be viewed in isolation. A series of concurrent geopolitical developments—including the release of a $1.023 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) tranche under its Extended Fund Facility (EFF) programme on May 9, and a $800 million Asian Development Bank (ADB) loan to Pakistan—reflect broader efforts to challenge India’s stance on global security matters.
One of the underlying factors behind these shifts appears to be the West’s strategic rebuttal to India’s decision to maintain diplomatic and economic ties with Russia amidst the ongoing Ukraine conflict. Despite mounting pressure from Western allies, India remained steadfast in supporting President Vladimir Putin, emerging as the largest purchaser of Russian oil, effectively mitigating the impact of Western sanctions on Moscow.
Pakistan’s ascent within the UNSC structure aligns with emerging international economic recalibrations. Merely days after the Pahalgam terror attack, Pakistan secured a major cryptocurrency agreement with World Liberty Financial —a company in which US President Donald Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner holds a 60 per cent stake—to integrate blockchain technology into its financial systems. This move raises questions about whether Pakistan’s recent diplomatic windfall is an indirect reward stemming from its crypto dealings with a firm linked to Trump.
Trump’s administration, too, has played a crucial role in shaping Pakistan’s international leverage. During the military standoff between India and Pakistan, Trump falsely claimed to have used the threat of economic sanctions to compel India to halt its operations within just three days. While Pakistan praised Trump’s mediation efforts, suggesting that US involvement could facilitate broader negotiations, India categorically denied any role played by the American president and dismissed the notion of external intervention.
Notably, Pakistan has benefitted from Trump’s selective exemptions—including a $396 million security assistance package that was spared from his broader foreign aid freeze—ensuring continued favorable treatment even after tensions with India subsided.
China’s unwavering support for Pakistan adds yet another dimension to this equation. As a permanent member of the UNSC, Beijing enjoys a privileged role in shaping multilateral policies within the UN framework. Western nations have gradually withdrawn from certain UN processes and reduced their multilateral funding, creating avenues for China to expand its influence.
China has taken decisive steps in strengthening its presence within the UN system: contributing significantly to both the UN’s regular and peacekeeping budgets, providing an 8,000-strong standby peacekeeping force, and deploying more personnel than the other Permanent Five (P5) members combined. By strategically positioning allied individuals in key roles within the UN system, Beijing's broader strategy is to expand its influence and representation within the UN's international secretariat—a key component of its long-term geopolitical ambitions.
In parallel, Pakistan has actively deepened its engagements with China-linked global initiatives. In a noteworthy development, Islamabad appointed Changpeng Zhao, co-founder of Binance—the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange—as a strategic advisor to its newly formed Crypto Council. To add another layer to the complex intersection of global finance and politics, Changpeng, who served four months in prison, is reportedly pushing for a presidential pardon in exchange for Trump’s family a financial stake in the US arm of crypto exchange Binance.
Given these entanglements, Pakistan’s rise in multilateral institutions appears less a result of principled diplomacy and more a consequence of opportunistic business deals and calculated compromises.
Despite the apparent diplomatic win for Pakistan, the actual implications of its UNSC roles remain debatable. While its delegation may herald these appointments as a major achievement, the assigned positions fall significantly short of what its international backers could have secured. For instance, the Vice-Chairmanship of the 1373 CTC—a role Pakistan now holds—is largely ceremonial, carrying minimal substantive influence.
Furthermore, the establishment of a dual co-chairing arrangement within the Sanctions Informal Working Group (IWG)—the first of its kind in UNSC history—suggests an implicit effort by the Council to restrain Pakistan’s maneuvering. These developments suggest that while Pakistan may be gaining visibility within global diplomatic circles, its actual capacity to shape UNSC counter-terrorism policy remains circumscribed.
Long before the adoption of Resolution 1373 in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, India had been advocating for a comprehensive legal framework to combat terrorism. By piloting the draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, India underscored the necessity of eliminating double standards in the global fight against terrorism. In a complex geopolitical landscape where economic deals, strategic alliances, and tactical compromises often determine the course of international policy, India’s diplomatic fight against terrorism is far from over.
Vaishali Basu Sharma is a security and economic affairs analyst.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.
