In 2022, the Comptroller and Auditor General identified Aadhaar name mismatches that had prevented 67,379 PM-KISAN beneficiaries in Karnataka from receiving payments. In 2024, the Punjab and Haryana High Court examined the case of a woman whose old-age pension was affected by discrepancies between her birth certificate and other identity records. In 2025, the Madras High Court intervened in a similar case involving a widow's family pension.
Across different governments, welfare schemes and judicial forums, these instances highlight a shared opportunity to strengthen administrative coordination, improve record verification and make public service delivery more responsive to citizens.
Such instances are systematically documented across multiple institutional and administrative platforms. Citizens complain through scheme portals, departmental helplines, state systems and CPGRAMS. The EPFO uses EPFiGMS; the Union tracks litigation through LIMBS and audit observations through the Audit Para Monitoring System. Parliamentary committees and inspections generate further evidence.
Delayed pensions, provident fund withdrawals, erroneous tax demands, land-record discrepancies, recruitment disputes and unpaid government bills continue to generate grievances. Where existing administrative mechanisms are unable to provide timely resolution, these matters often progress to courts and tribunals. While individual interventions can secure relief, they also offer valuable insights into broader administrative and procedural challenges. The opportunity lies in ensuring that these insights inform institutional improvements so that similar difficulties can be anticipated and addressed for others. India has developed an extensive architecture for recording and resolving grievances. The next step is to strengthen its capacity to translate this evidence into sustained administrative learning and systemic reform.
Understanding systemic gaps
First, evidence remains fragmented. The government's 2024 grievance guidelines recognise the need to connect complaint systems. By February 2026, portals in 17 states and Union Territories and four central ministries had been integrated with CPGRAMS. But linking portals does not connect evidence from tribunals, courts, auditors and inspections. A pension complaint, audit finding on verification and judgment on documentation may expose the same defect without ever being examined together.
Second, disposal is misunderstood as correction. CPGRAMS received 22.78 lakh grievances in 2025. Central ministries averaged 15 days for disposal. Yet among 26,407 respondents reporting resolution in DARPG's August 2025 feedback exercise, 8,900, or 34 per cent, were dissatisfied. Feedback is not a representative measure of every complaint, but it reveals why closing a file is not enough. Releasing one pension is redress; fixing the verification workflow is process improvement; amending unreasonable documentation requirements is policy reform. Administrative metrics more readily capture the first. DARPG's Indicator-based Root Cause Analysis mainly measures categorisation, staffing, disposal times, appeals and satisfaction. These assess how grievances are handled, not why they reoccur.
Third, judgments do not automatically change government practices. In September 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed a batch of roughly 271 Union appeals and petitions contesting disability pensions awarded to former service personnel. Most were time-barred. A committee had recommended withdrawing such appeals in 2015, and the Ministry of Defence accepted that recommendation in 2018. Yet litigation continued. Legal cells handle cases, while policy divisions control instructions and rules; a precedent does not necessarily trigger administrative correction.
Fourth, those detecting a problem cannot always fix it. District officials cannot rewrite central rules. An identity mismatch may involve scheme administrators, registrars, banks and digital platforms, with no owner of the complete process. Federal responsibilities further complicate corrections. A provident fund transfer, for instance, may stall because employer records, fund databases and identity details disagree. Each office can close its part without fixing the claimant's problem.
Lastly, there is no institutional mechanism that can take a holistic view of the problem across different ministries and departments, and suggest system reforms. Systems thinking needs to be embedded in the system itself. Bureaucratic incentives compound these shortcomings. Acknowledging a systemic defect can expose senior chinks in earlier decisions, require additional spending or challenge another department. Closing a file is often easier than reopening a policy.
Other countries offer lessons. Australia's Robodebt scandal exposed challenges persisting despite tribunal rulings; its Administrative Review Tribunal Act, 2024 provides for identifying systemic issues and obtaining agency responses. South Korea's Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission analyses complaints across agencies to recommend reforms. The UK's Complaint Standards emphasise learning from recurrent challenges.
Building a learning architecture
First, connect evidence, not just portals. DARPG should adopt common standards for identifying root causes: defective rules, broken workflows, conflicting records, inadequate capacity or poor coordination. Ministries should cluster recurring grievances with related judgments, tribunal orders, audit findings and inspection reports. Surveys can detect problems among those unable to complain. Classifications should distinguish administrative errors from genuine legal disagreements; not every grievance or adverse judgment establishes a defective policy.
Second, establish clear institutional ownership. Each Union Secretary should periodically review recurring administrative challenges, supported by a designated Joint Secretary responsible for maintaining a register of supporting evidence, underlying causes, responsible authorities, proposed corrective measures and implementation timelines. A threshold of substantiated grievances or repeated adverse judicial findings could trigger a structured review of the underlying administrative process, ensuring that institutional responsibility extends beyond individual grievance disposal to lasting corrective action.
Third, institutionalise cross-ministerial reform. DARPG should refer significant common problems to NITI Aayog, drawing on its Development Monitoring and Evaluation Office. NITI should convene relevant ministries and states to recommend specific amendments to rules, database validations, workflows, staffing or responsibilities. The Cabinet Secretariat should assign lead departments, settle disputes and track implementation. Every referral must end in a time-bound decision, not another report.
Fourth, feed evidence into decisions. The Department of Legal Affairs should use LIMBS to identify repeated adverse rulings and prompt ministries to review their legal interpretations and extend relief to similarly situated citizens where justified. The Department of Expenditure should require major scheme proposals to show how recurring grievances and audit findings changed program design and budgets.
Finally, verify the results. Measure wrongful pension rejections after verification reforms, payment delays after procurement changes, and recurrence of previously diagnosed errors. NITI could evaluate cross-ministerial reforms; CAG could independently audit them. DARPG should publish an annual account of recurring challenges, corrective decisions and verified outcomes, preserving unresolved issues across official transfers.
Grievances can serve a purpose beyond individual redressal: they offer valuable evidence for identifying systemic gaps, strengthening administrative processes and informing policy improvements. A well-governed state measures its effectiveness not only by the grievances it resolves, but also by the institutional reforms it undertakes and the recurrence of preventable difficulties it helps avert. Ultimately, state capacity is reflected in its ability to translate experience into institutional learning, ensuring that the resolution of one citizen's grievance contributes to a better experience for others.
The authors, Ahuja is a former secretary of the labour ministry as well as chemicals & fertilisers, and Jhaveri is a public policy professional.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.