What Turkey’s growing ties with Pakistan indicate

ISTANBUL

The alignment between Turkey and Pakistan against India is growing as a pact of solidarity between two Muslim-majority countries. At first glance, it may appear to be another manifestation of the ‘clash of civilisations’―especially since both Turkey and India are currently ruled by religio-nationalist parties led by ambitious leaders. Moreover, India and Pakistan have been hostile neighbours since their inception, owing to complex political and historical reasons. Turkey’s traditionally close ties with Pakistan further reinforce this perception. However, Turkey’s increasing involvement in Pakistan–India relations warrants closer scrutiny, particularly as Ankara has begun to provide more military assistance to Islamabad.

The ‘New Turkey’, as the ruling party refers to it, has pursued a foreign policy centred on regional leadership for over a decade. Initially, Turkey sought to assert ‘soft power’ across the Middle East, buoyed by successful economic growth policies following the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) rise to power in 2002. However, after the Arab Spring, Turkey’s regional role became more political, with military involvement becoming a core component of its strategy.

The ideological underpinning of this shift is often referred to as ‘neo-Ottomanism’. While the term may suggest a backward-looking, revivalist outlook, it is more accurately understood as a fusion of historical memory, ideological aspiration and contemporary political reality. Neo-Ottomanism emerged as a politics of nostalgia among Islamist middle-class intellectuals who contrasted themselves with Turkey’s secular republican elite. In this light, it represented a search for noble identity rooted in the Ottoman past, in opposition to westernised secular nationalism. This resentment shaped a foreign policy outlook that seeks Turkish leadership in the Muslim world, extending beyond the historic borders of the Ottoman Empire. The ruling party’s covert anti-western and anti-imperialist rhetoric can also be seen as part of this neo-Ottomanist vision.

To its supporters, the JDP represents a form of historical revenge, both domestically and internationally. After President Recep Tayyip Erdogan consolidated his power through the adoption of a presidential system, Turkish foreign policy has come to be framed as a matter of national security―no longer open to political debate or public criticism. However, Turkey’s deepening alliance with Pakistan cannot be explained solely in ideological terms. It is not simply a case of an Islamist government aligning with a fellow Muslim country against a non-Muslim adversary.

Turkey’s close alignment with Pakistan has a long history. Pakistan emerged not only as a Muslim nation following the 1947 partition of India, but also as a Cold War actor from its inception. The political divide between India and Pakistan also reflected Cold War geopolitics, beyond historical grievances and territorial disputes. While India pursued an anti-colonial foreign policy and became a leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement, Pakistan allied itself closely with the US-led western bloc. As a fellow US ally, Turkey found common cause with Pakistan.

Turkey and Pakistan signed a treaty of friendship and joined the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 to counter ‘communism and Soviet influence’. While the cultural rhetoric of friendship and brotherhood is often portrayed as ‘historical’, it largely crystallised during the Cold War. This is not to say that the relationship was purely strategic; it developed its own dynamics and, crucially, did not dissipate after the Cold War but adapted to the new geopolitical landscape.

Another important dimension is the unofficial ideological solidarity between Islamists in both countries. Pakistani Islamist thinkers such as Abul A’la al-Maududi and Muhammad Iqbal are revered figures among Turkish Islamists. Islamist parties and networks in both countries have maintained close ties over the years. Although Islamism was historically viewed as a serious threat under Turkey’s secular governments, both Turkey and Pakistan maintained covert cooperation in the Afghan jihad following the Soviet invasion in 1979. This alignment was also underpinned by Cold War geopolitics, as the US and western powers supported the Afghan mujahideen. Pakistan became a frontline state in the jihadist movement, while Turkish Islamists and right-wing nationalists―initially backed as anti-communists―later came to be supported as moderate Islamists against more radical elements.

In recent years, western support for Turkey’s ruling party has declined, as the JDP came to be seen as an unpredictable ally due to Erdogan’s periodic challenges to western powers and his pursuit of ‘strategic autonomy’. Simultaneously, Pakistan’s deepening ties with China have become increasingly troubling for the US, which now views India as a valuable partner. The growing Turkey–Pakistan alignment, especially in the military sphere, reflects both countries’ aspirations for relative independence from the US in what is being termed the ‘new world order’. For ‘New Turkey’, Pakistan represents a critical zone for political influence and a key market for its expanding defence industry.

Nevertheless, Erdogan is not a reckless adventurer seeking unrealistic foreign entanglements, and Turkey’s ties to western alliances remain intact. The policies of India’s ruling party, too, push Turkey into closer alignment with Pakistan. Even under a more secular Turkish leadership, relations with Pakistan would likely remain close under such circumstances.

The author is a Turkish political scientist and columnist.