Analyst lists the two major mistakes Israel made in war with Iran: 'One severe, another rectifiable'

An Israeli analyst has listed "two major mistakes" carried out by Israel in its "unparalleled and unprecedented" 12-day war with Iran. He claims that these two "mistakes" made what could otherwise be a golden moment of historic triumph a job not done.

Ilan Pomeranc, an Israeli hi-tech entrepreneur and a member of the Israel Leadership Forum, said Israel’s massive opening attack against Iran shocked the world and the country was on course for a place of honour in its hallowed history until it was "blunted by two mistakes, one severe and one more easily rectified."

First mistake

The analyst, involved with various Israel advocacy causes, said in a piece that appeared on the Jerusalem Post that the first severe mistake occurred on June 22 when Israel allowed the United States to take part in direct strikes on Iran.

Pomeranc argued that the "narrow and limited" US action not only upended Israel's record of going it alone in warfare but also resulted in an arguably "less effective and less thorough neutralisation" of the Fordow facility.

He said the only time foreign forces ever helped Israel was in the 1956 Sinai Campaign, wherein France and Britain took part "separately but in parallel". The plan was that France and Britain would seize the Suez Canal, and Israel would conquer the Sinai Peninsula. The European powers failed in their objective, which, however, helped highlight Israel's success in quickly defeating the Egyptians and seizing the Sinai.

However, the crucial difference was that the British and the French acted separately from Israeli forces geographically and operationally, and toward a different objective. But, for the US strike in Iran, there are questions about its efficacy. "The consequence of Israel allowing a foreign power to act – even if narrowly – in its place has degraded its deterrent power, regardless of whether that foreign power’s action was particularly effective or not," Pomeranc argued, adding that the IDF and government officials had operational plans to deal with Fordow.

For the US, taking part in the campaign provided a huge dividend, but for Israel, it created a basis for its enemies to question whether it can defend itself alone, no matter what the circumstances.

The second mistake

Pomeranc says the second mistake is, however, rectifiable, and it is Israel's decision not to eliminate Ali Khamenei and his son Mojtaba, a potential successor.

He adds that Iran is driven by "apocalyptic ideology" that views its nuclear ambitions as a divinely mandated tool, and therefore, it was important to cause either the fall of the regime or at least severely neuter it in the near term. Pomeranc says taking out Khamenei would also "symbolise a metaphysical defeat, something that carries great significance in Middle Eastern consciousness."