Recently, India standardised the names of 27 places in Arunachal Pradesh, including villages, mountain passes, a lake and memorials. The move is not about inventing new names but about standardising and reaffirming them on official Survey of India maps to counter China’s repeated renaming campaigns. Establishing standard names would aid the census, land records, infrastructure, and border road planning.
Since 2017, China has been on a renaming spree in Arunachal Pradesh. In 2017, China renamed six places; in 2021, 15 places; in 2023, 11 places; and during 2024-26, the remaining locations, thus bringing the total to 112. India’s delayed response came only in August 2026, when it announced the renaming of 27 locations to counter China’s new mapping tactics aimed at indirectly asserting its authority over Arunachal Pradesh, which it calls Zangnan, meaning South Tibet.
When China started its mapping war in 2017, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) strongly criticised the move and declared in unequivocal terms that assigning invented names would not alter the reality that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India. After China renamed 11 places in 2023, an MEA statement said that Arunachal Pradesh was, is, and will always remain an inseparable part of India. Assigning invented names will not alter this reality. MEA’s subsequent statements were also very strong and termed China’s moves “absurd, fictitious, and null and void”, stressing that such acts carry no legitimacy.
Despite the strong statements condemning China’s move to rename places in Arunachal Pradesh, unfortunately, it took nearly nine years for New Delhi to respond with equal audacity. India should have responded in the same manner to the Chinese tactics in 2017 itself to block any further moves. The prolonged delay in responding to a very serious national integration issue gave Beijing the leverage and enough time to gauge the turf and expand its campaign, ultimately issuing additional lists covering more areas across almost every part of Arunachal Pradesh.
In future diplomatic manoeuvres with China, this lapse could well serve as an advantage for Chinese negotiators, strengthening their position at the bargaining table. By issuing ‘standardised names’ in Chinese and Tibetan, Beijing seeks to normalise its territorial claims at the international level. Renaming thus becomes a tool of diplomatic pressure, forming part of China’s broader strategy to contest India’s sovereignty over Arunachal and further complicate border negotiations. This is in tune with signals coming out of Beijing that it is not keen to resolve the border issue in the near future.
Out of the 27 renamed locations, Longju, Maja and Bisa are located in Upper Subansiri. Longju was occupied by the Chinese in 1959 and has remained a flashpoint, along with Maja and Bisa, since then.
At this juncture, a comparative analysis of the renamed locations by both sides and their geographical locations would be interesting. The three flashpoints, Longju, Maja, and Bisa, which India renamed/reaffirmed, are located along the LAC and very close to Taksing. All the other 24 places on the list either fall close to the LAC or are located well inside Arunachal Pradesh.
Meanwhile, China’s renaming lists since 2017 have included places around Bomdila, which is located deep inside Indian territory, and which has never been a border flashpoint. Other important locations renamed by China include Jaswant Garh, a memorial near Nuranang on the Bomdila-Tawang road, and the Sher-e-Thapa Memorial. Curiously, both commemorate those who fought valiantly against Chinese forces in the 1962 war. China has even renamed the easternmost districts of Arunachal Pradesh, particularly Lohit and Anjaw, near the Myanmar border.
A closer look at the locations included in China’s renaming lists reveals a deliberate attempt to identify and rename sites across the entire area of Arunachal Pradesh, signalling an intention to project claims over the whole state rather than just contested frontier areas.
However, New Delhi, though acting belatedly, identified and renamed/reaffirmed only four flashpoints, including Thag La, along the LAC. To counter the Chinese attempts since 2017, India must rename/reaffirm another 85 locations to achieve diplomatic balance. It is imperative that New Delhi acts swiftly, as any delay would undermine the country’s strategic interests. Most importantly, the delay would also allow Beijing to advance its narrative in the global arena, contending that India’s silence is a tacit acceptance of Chinese claims over the locations.
It is also a matter of curiosity to examine the timing of the government’s decision on border management with China. The recently concluded monsoon session of Parliament saw most of its working days washed out due to Opposition protests, resulting in delays to several bills that the government considered important. Against this backdrop of legislative deadlock, the announcement of border-related measures stands out as a calculated move. Further, it was also a calculated move by the government to thwart any attempt by the Opposition parties to take advantage of the Nah Welfare Society (NWS) report, which alleged that the PLA has gradually expanded infrastructure (roads, bridges, camps) near the Taksing sector in Upper Subansiri, encroaching on lands traditionally used by locals. In this regard, the NWS submitted a memorandum in June 2026.
On the global stage, India is set to host the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi under its chairship. The summit is slated for September 12-13, 2026. As per the latest indications, Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to attend the summit. India has experienced border skirmishes or incursions whenever senior leaders of the PRC visit India, which has been attributed to the Chinese way of exerting pressure. This time, however, India appears to have moved a step ahead by officially renaming 27 locations in Arunachal Pradesh and even locations administratively held by China, a move that would certainly irk the Chinese leadership.
As expected, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted sharply to India’s decision to rename 27 locations. China stated that India’s move was “illegal and invalid,” and reiterated its claim that Arunachal Pradesh is part of “Zangnan” (South Tibet). It remains to be seen what position China will adopt during the upcoming BRICS Summit, whether this incident will cast a shadow over the proceedings, or whether Beijing will allow the summit to pass without further provocation.
(The author is a Senior Fellow at Centre for Public Policy Research, Kochi.)
(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)
