Last month, at the Lok Sabha, the Minister Of State For Prime Minister’s Office Dr. Jitendra Singh, told fellow members of the Parliament that India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom were in "regular discussions" to strengthen the cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, especially in the area of large capacity Nuclear Power Plants and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs).
A week ago, the same Rosatom’s CEO Alexei Likhachev said that the company had evacuated close to 100 people from Iran. However, the company noted that some of its personnel were still at the Bushehr nuclear power.
India has a sort of complicated relationship with Iran. But its historic relationship with Russia has not been that "confusing". With the Middle East in turmoil, POTUS Donald Trump might have got what he wanted—a spike in crude just two months after the United States "liberated" Venezuela. But India may not be ready to pay the price, especially given Russian "friendship".
India’s purchases of Russian oil rose from marginal levels before 2022 to a peak of roughly one‑third of its crude imports, and although that share has started to fall, Russian barrels still generally offer India a better mix of price, volume and manageable risk than Venezuelan or US crude, even as New Delhi diversifies.
Before the Russia-Ukraine "crisis", Russian crude was a niche source for India, supplying around 2–2.5 per cent of India’s imports in 2021. India relied primarily on Gulf producers such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia. However, when the West and the G7 hit Russia with sanctions and a price cap on oil in late 2022, Moscow began offering steep discounts, at times below 40–45 dollars per barrel. In response, India and China rapidly ramped up purchases. Soon, Russia’s trade flows shifted strongly towards its Asian peers.
In India, Russian crude jumped from under 3 per cent of imports to more than 21 per cent in fiscal year 2022–23. By FY 2023–24 and 2024–25, Russia supplied 36 per cent of India’s crude imports, making it India’s single largest supplier for three consecutive years. According to the foreign affairs think tank CFR, cheaper Russian barrels saved India about $16.7 billion versus buying similar grades from other exporters. But as global trade patterns stabilised and sanctions enforcement tightened, discounts on Russian crude narrowed, though they remained meaningful. October 2025 saw a sharp year‑on‑year drop in Russian imports (about 38% by value, 31% by volume), yet Russia still provided roughly 32 per cent of India’s crude that month.
The Trump administration, around the same time, used sanctions and sharply higher tariffs on Indian exports to push New Delhi to reduce Russian oil purchases. By January 2026, Russian crude’s monthly share of India’s imports slipped to about 21.2 per cent, the lowest since late 2022, while Middle East and US volumes rose. Even so, on an annualised basis, Russia remains India’s largest single supplier.
Why Russian crude still rules over Venezuelan and US oil for India
Reports reveal that Russian barrels are still sold to India at a discount to benchmark crudes like Dubai, even after the steepest wartime discounts faded. Kotak Institutional Equities estimates the average discount for Russian crude in FY 2026 so far at about $4.7 per barrel, higher than in FY 2025 and large enough to keep Russian oil cheaper than many alternatives. For India, the cumulative savings of about $16.7 billion are something that matters—it helps New Delhi keep its trade balance and arrest fuel inflation.
In contrast, US crudes like WTI Midland and Mars tend to trade closer to global benchmarks. Yes, India has ramped up US purchases, but they are more arbitrage‑led and opportunistic rather than structurally cheaper. Of course, Venezuelan crude can be priced attractively when sanctions are relaxed, but Trump—now de facto leader of Venezuela—is yet to provide any clarity on it.
Russia has shown it can reliably ship large volumes of medium‑sour grades suited to India’s complex coastal refineries, having re‑routed a sizable share of its exports from Europe to Asia since 2022. CFR also notes how India–Russia energy ties are now underpinned by bespoke shipping, insurance and payment channels that allow high volumes despite sanctions. Venezuela’s heavy, high‑sulphur crude is technically a good fit for several Indian refineries, and it was once a top‑six supplier providing up to 7 per cent of India’s crude and $7.2 billion US dollars in imports at its FY 2019 peak. But US sanctions from 2020 drove Venezuelan volumes to zero in FY 2022 and FY 2023 and only a modest rebound thereafter, making it an unreliable large‑scale source.
US crude is abundant and technically attractive for India. But Washington cosying up to Pakistan and US oil being lighter and more naphtha‑rich limits the profitability of Indian refiners. Plus, the bill on longer voyage times and higher freight from the US Gulf makes it structurally costlier.
Technically, chemically, logistically, and strategically, US oil is not really India’s best bet. India had moved to Middle East grades following trump tariffs, but if the same Trump becomes the reason for crude oil instability in the Gulf region, India might have to go back to Russian crude. In fact, the G7 price‑cap regime, while restrictive, is relatively more predictable than that of Trump. If India can keep buying Russian oil within or around these constraints using non‑Western shipping and financial channels, it becomes more cost-effective for New Delhi.
And India is too big to rely on one supplier for its massive energy needs. In fact, India will need US, Venezuelan, Middle East, and Russian oil to quench its appetite as the world’s fourth-largest economy.
