‘We don’t want the left to become too weak’: V.D. Satheeshan

Interview/ V.D. Satheesan, UDF chairman

Q/ You predicted that the UDF would win more than 100 seats and that at least a dozen ministers in the Pinarayi Vijayan cabinet would lose. What is the secret behind this accuracy?

It began with the Thrikkakara byelection. While everyone predicted defeat, I forecast a win by 20,000–25,000 votes. We won by nearly 25,000. I then correctly called the margins in Puthuppally, Palakkad and Nilambur. In the Lok Sabha polls, I predicted 17–19 seats; we got 18. In the local body elections, I said we would take four corporations—we did.

My baseline for the assembly elections was 85–96 seats, with a realistic target of 87–88, stretching to 90. But I had marked 15 exceptionally tight contests where I sensed a clear swing. Others dismissed it; I didn’t. Through years of reading ground signals—crowd responses, local reactions and deep data—I believed the trend would deliver those extra seats and push us past 100.

That’s exactly what happened. Of those 15, we won 13.

This isn’t guesswork or prophecy. It’s electioneering—an art built on science. For decades, I’ve studied all 140 constituencies: past winners, margins, community equations, party bases and the “plus votes” a strong candidate can pull. We build teams, crunch every variable and turn it into a meticulous, evidence-based exercise. Not magic—method.

Q/ What is the signature feature of your election management?

My trademark style is building an iron-clad organisation from the ground up. Everything begins at the booth level—strong booth committees and deep grassroots networks.

Next is flawless voter enrolment. While we design social engineering at the top, it must be executed perfectly on the ground. All internal issues and local disputes are resolved well before polling day. We also put in place robust systems to bring in outside votes.

None of this is possible without meticulous management and a strong, dependable team. No one can win elections alone.

Q/ You forged a close working relationship with UDF allies and created ‘Team UDF’—a term that now carries real weight. Tell us about it.

After the Nilambur byelection, we began functioning as a single unit—both inside the assembly and outside. There was genuine give-and-take. I took the lead in structuring this coordination, and the allies fully supported it. The result was a unified front that sent a powerful message to workers at the grassroots.

In the past, when a candidate from one party contested, workers from other partners often held back. This time, that changed. In Thavanur, where there was a Congress candidate, Muslim League workers campaigned relentlessly. In Kalamassery, Congress workers threw their weight behind the League candidate. The same spirit was visible wherever Kerala Congress candidates contested.

To break the old pattern and build a collective mindset, we introduced the idea of ‘Team UDF’. It worked brilliantly. Today, when I say ‘UDF’ in a speech, the audience often corrects me: “Sir, say Team UDF.” That’s how deeply it has caught on. I firmly believe that Team UDF in Kerala has become a model for effective coalition politics in India.

Q/ After the results, you made it a point to thank even left sympathisers and “good communists” who voted for the UDF.

During the campaign itself, I could see the deep troubles within the CPI(M). I was confident this would lead to a clear erosion of their support. So I told our workers: ‘When you meet CPI(M) cadres, greet them warmly—they are going to vote for us. When you meet left fellow travellers, embrace them—they, too, are coming our way.’

We consciously reached out to left-leaning voters. We positioned the CPI(M) as the extreme right, while presenting the UDF as the genuine Nehruvian left—progressive on environment, gender justice and core social issues. In a state with a strong centre-left ethos, this message resonated, especially with the youth.

The shift in those votes made the difference in several seats, including [CPI(M) strongholds of] Taliparamba, Payyannur and Ambalappuzha.

Q/ You focused sharply on women voters, the youth and Kerala’s secular ethos. You also took a personal risk by confronting certain community leaders.

Yes, we were the first opposition in India to not only criticise the government, but to also begin constructive work two years in advance. Wherever the government failed, we built alternative policy frameworks—through health, education and industry conclaves, engaging experts and producing detailed documents.

Our Puthuyuga Yatra was deliberately thematic: 75 per cent of it focused on the future of Kerala—dream projects, stopping brain drain, turning the state into a hub for health and education, and showcasing 1,000 MSME projects with mentors and revolving funds. These ideas resonated, especially with the youth.

Simultaneously, we took a firm, unambiguous secular stand. When certain community leaders pushed divisive agendas, I openly opposed them—despite the personal risk. I told people clearly: Pinarayi Vijayan and I may not be here forever, but Kerala and our children will remain. We cannot allow communal harmony to be destroyed.

The message connected emotionally with parents, youth and families. We didn’t just criticise—we projected credibility and a clear roadmap for change. In election management, narrative is as vital as organisation.

Q/ Despite the massive UDF wave, the BJP won three seats—its best performance in Kerala. What explains this?

We have openly alleged a deal between the BJP and the CPI(M). All three seats were sitting CPI(M) constituencies, two of them held by former ministers. We believe these were strategically handed over. Importantly, it wasn’t our seats or our votes that shifted.

Q/ How would this alter Kerala’s political equation?

The more critical issue is that the CPI(M) must correct itself. There has been a steady erosion in their support since the last Lok Sabha polls. We were careful this time—our votes did not shift to the BJP.

Q/ Would you push for an ‘LDF-mukt Kerala’?

No. We don’t want the left to become too weak. We don’t want Kerala to witness what happened in West
Bengal or Tripura.

Q/ You delivered the 100-plus seats you promised. Should that be the decisive factor in electing the chief minister?

There is a clear process within the Congress. I’m not making any claims. Let them (high command) decide.