Interview/Mahfuz Alam, activist and former adviser to the interim government
Professor Yunus called you the “brain behind the July uprising” and you were also part of the interim government. In the one-and-a-half years, what were the gaps that could not meet the aspirations of the people?
If you were emotionally invested in July, as many of us were, you genuinely believed something new would emerge. From August 8 onwards, people wanted to believe that the interim arrangement, led by figures from within the system, might take the country somewhere new. There was an attempt to maintain law and order, to build consensus among political parties, and to stabilise the situation. But if you look at what happened after July—especially after August 8—the reality is that political parties and what I call the old political settlement regrouped. This settlement includes civil and military actors, business oligarchs, sections of the media, and parts of civil society—the remnants of previous regimes. These forces came together, throttling the process of change.
Who would you blame for this?
Today, Bangladesh is stuck in a familiar cycle: everyone is searching for someone to blame. That happens everywhere after a popular mass uprising. I joined the government on August 28, about 23 days in. I witnessed the first few weeks closely—met people across the country, especially minority leaders. I had to reassure them that under a July-backed, student-supported government, they would be safe. But instead of reforms, we spent those early months firefighting. The period was tense and tumultuous. From within the government, I realised that the blocs of the old political settlement did not want meaningful change. That much is certain.
When you say “power blocs”, are you referring only to the Awami League, or also to the BNP and the Jamaat?
All of them. There's no real difference. I met people in powerful administrative positions—some with Jamaat-BNP backgrounds—who were part of this settlement. Once you reach a certain position, you stop wanting change. You think: we've arrived; let the next government deal with reforms.
But these were the same groups who were on the streets during the July uprising. How do you explain who really wanted change?
That's the problem. The younger generation—the real drivers of July—don't control the administration, the military, big business, or the media. They don't own conglomerates or institutions. The NCP, for instance, is essentially a temporary collective of young people that existed for eight to ten months. They are voices of youth, yes—but with serious limitations. They lack administrators, military professionals, business leaders, and media ownership. They have almost no institutional backing.
Don't these young groups need your support? Why didn't you join or support the NCP?
I am part of that same generation, without backing from the old guards. But I disagreed with the NCP's ideological and political positions. We failed to present a coherent idea of a new political settlement—ideas like a society based on compassion and responsibility.
Instead, space was allowed for the Jamaat to expand its influence. Bangladesh politics was pushed back into a binary—secularists versus Islamists. We were trying to move beyond that, to focus on nation-building rather than cultural or ideological warfare. Today, politics is once again trapped in the 1971 narrative. The aspirations of 2024 are nowhere to be seen.
The killing of Sharif Osman Hadi shocked the nation. Do you see it as a turning point?
It will remain an emotional memory, but it won't translate into a broader political or ideological shift. Nearly 2,000 deaths during July didn't change society structurally. Hadi had clarity and vision, which may spark dialogue—but that too will fade. Even today, families are discovering, through DNA tests, their relatives who disappeared during July and are buried in mass graves. Emotion alone doesn't bring change. Power structures do.
You've said students are being systematically maligned. Why?
A tiny fraction—maybe one or two per cent—were involved in misconduct. But media narratives portray the entire generation as violent, corrupt, and responsible for looting the country. People don't believe this instinctively, but repeated media messaging creates perception. Meanwhile, the BNP and the Jamaat have already recaptured institutions, without being in power. I saw this firsthand in government.
You were information adviser. Do you think the government failed to control the narrative?
You can't control what you don't own. Bangladesh's media is owned by oligarchs. Did the government act against them? No. Because civil–military interests protect them. A few individuals closely tied to the previous regime were arrested, but the broader establishment that enabled corruption remains untouched. They still dominate politics and media.
How do you see the attacks on Prothom Alo and The Daily Star? Aren't they attacks on freedom of speech and expression?
Yes, absolutely. I went there that night and spoke to the editors. But this wasn't a simple extremist attack. It involved multiple layers—some students were used, but they were not the drivers. Different business groups, political interests, and factions within and outside government played roles. Many attackers weren't even from Dhaka. Who brought them? That's the real question.
The objective was to divert attention—from Hadi's killing and from deeper political failures—towards a narrative of "cultural institutions under attack". No one in Bangladesh supports attacks on the media. Students support freedom of expression, though they have mixed feelings about media houses that once supported authoritarianism.
You feel upset that 1971 is dominating today's politics as well. Are you trying to reject 1971 itself?
Not at all. 1971 is the foundation of our republic. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman up to 1971 is a national hero. But what we oppose is the essentialisation of 1971—turning it into an Awami League family narrative. The Liberation War was a people's struggle, not a single party's or family's. Millions suffered. History must reflect that.
Are you worried the next government will reverse changes made by the interim government in textbooks and narratives?
Sheikh Mujib hasn't been removed from textbooks. The six-point movement is still there. What we questioned was how party narratives were constitutionalised—how one family was elevated above collective struggle. Any future government will reform, not erase.
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- ‘If elected leaders fail again, army will once again side with the people’: Major General (Retd) Fazle Elahi Akbar
If you're disillusioned with the Jamaat and unconvinced by the NCP, who do you think represents real hope for the people?
The BNP and the Jamaat both have credibility and weaknesses. The real question isn't parties—it's delivery of change. Beyond the NCP, there are multiple July-origin platforms. We share the same spirit. Whether or not we join a party, we will continue pushing for structural change—in politics, institutions, and the constitution. That struggle will last our lifetime.
Why didn't you join the BNP, especially since your constituency is a BNP stronghold?
I was waiting for a broader alliance of new forces, not alignment with old parties. Once the NCP aligned with the Jamaat, it became clear to me that it lacked vision and strategy. The Jamaat would eventually dominate any such alliance. Then, I spoke with the BNP after my resignation. But their decisions were already finalised.
Finally, who are Bangladesh's friends today—and what should India and Bangladesh do to reset relations?
Friendship in foreign policy is never permanent. Interests evolve. India must acknowledge the July uprising as a genuine popular movement—not dismiss it as a "July–August event". Denial, as Pakistan's history shows, leads nowhere. India also needs to engage with people, not just establishments. It continues to speak to voices from the 1960s and 70s, ignoring new generations. And Indian media must stop treating Bangladesh as a propaganda subject. Come here. Talk to people. Report reality. These three steps—acknowledgement, people-to-people engagement, and responsible media—are essential.