OPINION | Navigating the debris of Muhammad Yunus’s foreign policy

Bangladesh’s foreign policy is at a critical juncture, moving from Muhammad Yunus's era of performative sovereignty and regional friction with India

Tarique Rahman and Muhammad Yunus Tarique Rahman and Muhammad Yunus | X, Salil Bera

The departure of Muhammad Yunus’s interim administration marks the end of an 18-month tenure defined by a paradoxical pursuit of "sovereignty." In his televised farewell address on February 16, 2026, Yunus invoked a troika of pillars: sovereignty, national interest, and dignity, claiming his regime had successfully steered Bangladesh away from a "submissive" foreign policy. However, a normative assessment of his leadership reveals a framework that often conflated strategic autonomy with regional friction. By grouping India’s northeastern states, the "Seven Sisters," alongside sovereign nation-states like Bhutan and Nepal, the outgoing administration engaged in a brand of cartographic revisionism that serves as a cautionary tale for the incoming government.

The rhetoric of independence presented by the outgoing Chief Advisor sits uncomfortably alongside the record of his administration. True sovereignty is rarely characterised by the immediate pursuit of validation or the granting of significant concessions to extra-regional powers. While Yunus championed a policy free from the instructions of other nations, his administration simultaneously facilitated a deep strategic embrace of Beijing. The virtual red carpet rolled out for Chinese-backed initiatives, most notably the Teesta River Master Plan and critical healthcare and other projects in Nilphamari, signalled a willingness to bypass established regional sensitivities. To characterise this as a restoration of dignity overlooks the reality that the interim government essentially exchanged one form of external dependency for another, potentially more compromising, strategic alignment.

The attempt to position Bangladesh as a "guardian of the sea" for a "landlocked" northeast India is perhaps the most problematic legacy of this period. By conceptually decoupling the Seven Sisters from the Indian Union in his economic vision, Professor Yunus did not merely irritate New Delhi; he challenged the fundamental normative principles of territorial integrity that underpin South Asian stability. However, it is essential to recognise that such rhetoric ultimately does less damage to India than it does to Bangladesh’s own bilateral standing. India’s control over the Siliguri Corridor and its internal administration of the northeast are sovereign realities that remain unaffected by the oratory of a departing interim head. New Delhi is seasoned enough to distinguish between a temporary administrator's posturing and a permanent state policy. Conversely, for Bangladesh, these verbal provocations create a trust deficit that complicates essential negotiations on water sharing, trade transit, and border management. A foreign policy built on testing the patience of a primary neighbour is not an exercise in strength but a strategic liability that isolates Dhaka from its most immediate economic and security partner.

With the inauguration of Tarique Rahman on February 17, 2026, Bangladesh has a critical opportunity to move past the performative defiance of the interim period. The landslide mandate received by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) allows for the formulation of a mature, interest-based foreign policy that prioritises stability over symbolism. This transition is not merely a change in leadership but a chance to redefine Dhaka’s regional identity through the lens of the "Bangladesh Before All" doctrine. By centering the tangible economic and security needs of the populace, the new administration can replace ideological grandstanding with a realist's focus on sustainable growth. The Rahman administration must recognise that respecting security red lines is a reciprocal necessity. For a fresh direction to take hold, Dhaka must move beyond the "gatekeeper" narrative and return to a framework of mutually beneficial connectivity. This includes maintaining a policy of zero tolerance for insurgency, ensuring that Bangladeshi soil is not used by groups targeting India’s northeast, thereby securing the very borders the previous regime’s rhetoric sought to blur.

Furthermore, the new government should seek to de-escalate geopolitical friction by balancing relations with China without allowing sensitive infrastructure projects to become dual-use facilities that threaten India’s maritime or territorial security. A balanced approach does not mean isolationism; rather, it requires a sophisticated diplomacy that prevents Bangladesh from becoming a theatre for great-power competition. Prioritising pragmatic interdependence, focusing on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and energy cooperation, is far more valuable than using connectivity as a tool for strategic leverage. True sovereignty will be found in economic resilience and the ability to negotiate from a position of domestic stability.

As Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent invitation to Tarique Rahman suggests, the door for a reset is open. This high-level outreach, facilitated by figures like Speaker Om Birla, underscores a mutual desire to restore a multifaceted relationship. By abandoning the cartographic experiments of his predecessor and adopting a normative approach that respects regional boundaries, Rahman can ensure that Bangladesh’s sovereignty is defined by its success as a stable regional partner, rather than a fleeting provocateur in a fragile neighbourhood. The mandate for change is clear; it is now up to the new leadership to choose a path of constructive engagement over one of continued discord.

Abhijan Das is a strategic consulting and national security expert. He is a governing body member of SHARE (Society to Harmonise Aspirations for Responsible Engagement).

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.