Bangladesh is once again at a historical crossroads. The fall of Sheikh Hasina in 2024 did not merely remove a long-serving prime minister; it unsettled the political equilibrium of a country whose stability has been central to India’s eastern security calculus for more than a decade and a half. As Dhaka struggles to navigate an uncertain transition marked by political exclusion, street mobilisation and ideological churn, New Delhi faces a test of strategic maturity: can it protect its long-term interests without appearing partisan, intrusive or complacent?
For India, the answer will determine not only the future of bilateral ties but also the wider stability of the Bay of Bengal and India’s own eastern periphery.
The unravelling of a familiar order
For over 15 years, India’s Bangladesh policy rested on a single, comfortable assumption: Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League would remain in power, delivering political stability, cracking down on anti-India insurgent groups, and anchoring Dhaka firmly within a cooperative regional framework. That assumption collapsed abruptly in August 2024, when mass protests—initially triggered by anger over a government job quota system—snowballed into a nationwide revolt against perceived authoritarianism, corruption and elite capture.
Hasina’s hurried exit created a constitutional and political vacuum. The interim administration that followed, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, inherited a fractured polity and enormous public expectations. Yet instead of steering a consensual transition, it quickly courted controversy—most notably by banning the Awami League from political activity pending trials against its leadership. In a country where competitive politics has always been messy but inclusive, this move deepened polarisation and raised doubts about the credibility of future elections.
Bangladesh today is neither a consolidated democracy nor a failed state. It is something more fragile—and more dangerous: a polity in flux, where institutions are weak, street power matters, and political legitimacy is contested daily.
A shifting political landscape
Into this volatile space has stepped the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), long marginalised under Sheikh Hasina. The return of Tarique Rahman from exile has injected new energy into opposition politics and reintroduced electoral competition as a plausible pathway out of the crisis. For many Bangladeshis, this represents a chance to restore democratic choice; for others, it revives memories of unstable coalition politics and uneasy alliances with Islamist groups.
Alongside the BNP, a range of new actors—student-led movements, citizen platforms and reformist parties—have emerged, all promising a “new Bangladesh” free of the old duopoly. Their rhetoric resonates with a generation frustrated by dynastic politics, but their organisational weakness and ideological incoherence limit their capacity to govern.
More worrying is the growing assertiveness of Islamist and radical groups in street politics. While they remain electorally marginal, their ability to mobilise, intimidate and shape public discourse has increased—particularly in a climate of political uncertainty and economic stress.
Minorities, violence and the politics of fear
Political instability in Bangladesh has once again exposed its most vulnerable communities. Reports of attacks on Hindu minorities, destruction of property, and targeted intimidation have surfaced intermittently since 2024. While such violence is neither systematic nor state-sanctioned, it thrives in moments of weak governance and contested authority.
For India, this poses both a moral and strategic dilemma. Silence invites domestic criticism and erodes India’s claim to be a civilisational power that values pluralism. Overreaction, however, risks fuelling Bangladeshi nationalist narratives that portray India as meddling or patronising.
The challenge lies in addressing minority protection firmly but discreetly—through diplomatic channels, development partnerships and international coordination—without turning the issue into a political weapon on either side of the border.
The geopolitical undercurrent
Bangladesh’s internal churn is occurring against a shifting regional backdrop. With the Hasina era over, Dhaka has predictably sought to diversify its external partnerships. China has moved quickly to expand economic and diplomatic engagement, while Pakistan has re-entered the Bangladeshi strategic conversation after years in the wilderness.
None of this should surprise New Delhi. Smaller states hedge; they always have. The danger lies not in Bangladesh talking to Beijing or Islamabad, but in India responding with insecurity or resentment. Geography alone ensures that India will remain Bangladesh’s most consequential neighbour—economically, culturally and strategically.
What has changed is the tone of the relationship. The easy warmth of the “golden era” has given way to suspicion, bruised pride and mutual misreading. Restoring trust will require restraint as much as initiative.
India’s policy blind spot
India must also confront an uncomfortable truth: its Bangladesh policy became overly personalised. By investing disproportionately in one leader and one party, New Delhi allowed its broader credibility with Bangladeshi society to erode. When that leader fell, India appeared exposed—viewed by many in Bangladesh as an interested party rather than a neutral neighbour.
This is not an argument for abandoning friends, but for institutionalising relationships. Mature diplomacy cannot hinge on electoral outcomes in neighbouring countries. It must survive them.
A strategy for strategic maturity
How, then, should India respond?
First, New Delhi must recalibrate from personality-centric diplomacy to state-to-state engagement. This means maintaining open channels with all major political actors—the interim authorities, the BNP, remnants of the Awami League, emerging parties and civil society—without signalling preference or prejudice.
Second, India should consistently and publicly support inclusive, credible elections in Bangladesh. Not by dictating outcomes or timelines, but by affirming democratic norms: participation of all major parties, transparent processes and international observation. Stability imposed through exclusion will not last.
Third, India must resist the temptation to securitise every development. While border management and intelligence vigilance remain essential, Bangladesh’s current crisis is fundamentally political, not insurgent. Treating it otherwise risks alienating precisely the constituencies India needs to engage.
Fourth, economic cooperation should be insulated from political turbulence as far as possible. Connectivity projects, energy trade, port access and sub-regional integration benefit both countries and create constituencies for stability. India’s value proposition lies in shared growth, not geopolitical competition.
Fifth, India should deepen people-to-people engagement—academic exchanges, medical cooperation, cultural platforms and youth programmes. In a hyper-connected age, public opinion matters as much as elite consensus.
Finally, New Delhi must exercise patience. Bangladesh’s political transitions have rarely been linear. The temptation to seek quick fixes—or to anoint a new “reliable partner”—should be resisted. Strategic relationships are built over decades, not election cycles.
Why Bangladesh still matters profoundly
For India, the stakes could not be higher. Bangladesh is not just a neighbour; it is a geographic hinge connecting India’s Northeast to the Bay of Bengal, a major trading partner, and a cultural cousin with deep historical ties. Instability in Bangladesh inevitably spills over—through migration pressures, border tensions, criminal networks and regional uncertainty.
Conversely, a stable, confident Bangladesh enhances India’s own security and economic prospects. The choice before New Delhi is stark: react tactically to daily provocations, or invest strategically in long-term equilibrium.
Conclusion: The test of statesmanship
Bangladesh’s current turbulence is not an aberration; it is part of a longer struggle to reconcile popular aspiration with institutional weakness. India cannot—and should not—try to manage this process. But it can influence the environment in which it unfolds.
Doing so will require empathy without indulgence, firmness without arrogance, and engagement without attachment. In short, it will require strategic maturity.
If India gets this right, it will not only help stabilise a vital neighbour—it will signal that New Delhi has learned the most difficult lesson of regional leadership: that influence endures not through control, but through credibility.
(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK)
(The writer was Vice Chief of the Indian Army. He has authored the book ‘A National Security Strategy for India – the Way Forward’)
