The current tension between Russia and Ukraine is the most serious crisis that Europe is witnessing in post-Soviet times, with the prospect of war looming over the horizon. Often considered estranged brothers, the two countries share a complex relationship of shared history, religion, culture and language, but also their own distinct interpretations of these.
Benedict Anderson, in his 1983 publication Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, described the nation as imagined because it creates a bonding among people who often do not know each other. They imagine belonging to the same collectivity based on common history, traits, beliefs and attitudes. Though the nation is an imaginary construct, countless people have willingly sacrificed themselves at its alter, according to Anderson. Perception plays an important role in this imagination.
Ukraine is the second-largest country in Europe in terms of territory and seventh largest in population (Russia is number one in both respects). With its extensive fertile lands that are naturally suited to grain production, Ukraine is one of the world’s top wheat exporters (along with the US and Australia) and has often been called the Breadbasket of Europe (Breadbasket of Russia in the past). The country had a developed industrial base during the Soviet times, including ferrous metals, transportation equipment, heavy machinery, chemicals and food products. The country faced a serious economic downturn in post-Soviet times. Thus, at present, in nominal GDP terms, it is 23rd in Europe, and in per capita income, it is the poorest in the region. During Soviet times, and afterwards, much of Russia’s oil and gas has been exported to Europe through pipelines criss-crossing Ukraine. It is a source of revenue, but also a bone of contention with the great northern neighbour, Russia.
Vladimir Putin, in his article On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians (July 2021), claims that “Russians and Ukrainians were one people—a single whole” with “essentially the same historical and spiritual space”. He has a point. The roots of the first eastern Slavic civilisation and state (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are its offshoots) are traced to Kyivan/ Kievan Rus (882-1240). It adopted Orthodox Christianity in 988 AD under Prince Vladimir (Volodymyr) and emerged as a powerful state under the Rurik dynasty in the 10th and 11th centuries.
The Rurikid rule was weakened by the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century. The end of more than two centuries of ‘oppressive’ ‘Tatar yoke’ (the popular term for Mongol rule) was followed by the rise of Moscow princes. According to Russian nationalist historiography, henceforth, Muscovite Rus became the focal point of Eastern Slavic civilisation and state/ imperial system. The Ukrainian nationalist historiography maintains that much of present-day Ukraine (northwestern and central) remained outside the Russian state as it became a part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and later of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth after the mid-14th century. Thus it had a very distinct historical-cultural experience, a different trajectory.
Since the 13th century, many Poles, Armenians, Germans and Jews had settled in Ukrainian cities and towns, creating a very mixed culture and way of life. However, the Ukrainians were subjected to legal disabilities due to their Orthodox faith and exploited by the Catholic Polish feudal lords.
The emergence of modern Ukraine can be traced to the rise of a new martial community—the Cossacks (from the Turkic kazak, meaning “adventurer” or “free man”)—in the 15th century. Initially, they were hunter-gatherers, but also included free peasants fleeing serfdom. The Cossacks by the mid-16th century had developed a strong democratic military polity, with a general assembly (rada) as the supreme authority and elected officers, including the commander in chief, or ‘hetman’. Initially, they were used by the Polish rulers against the Ottoman Turks but were a constant source of discontentment.
In 1648, the Cossacks, under the leadership of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, defeated the Polish army and laid the foundation of an independent state with a regular army, taxation and administrative structure. However, in order to protect his fledgling state against the Poles and the Ottomans, Bohdan Khmelnytsky concluded the Pereyaslav agreement with the Russian Tsar in 1654. The Russians consider it as legitimisation of Russian rule. The Ukrainian nationalist historians, on the other hand, interpret it as recognition of Ukraine’s autonomy.
For the next century, the Cossack state was able to retain some autonomy before it was subordinated to Russian political and linguistic-cultural domination during the 18th century. Many of the Ukrainian hetman during this period resisted, even revolted against, the Russian policies, something not fully appreciated by Putin and other Russian nationalists. The final partition of Poland in 1795 brought many of the Polish-held Ukrainian territories into the Tsarist empire.
After the collapse of the Tsarist rule in 1917, Ukraine achieved two years of autonomy before being absorbed by the Bolshevik state. Many Ukrainians believe that the Soviet policies led to more than 3 million casualties during the Holodomor famines in 1932-33. During the Tsarist and Soviet rule, the Ukrainian language and culture was mostly neglected.
During the Second World War, some Ukrainians initially cooperated with the Nazis in the hope of independence from the Soviet Union and due to memories of maltreatment by Soviet authorities.
However, the Nazi mistreatment led to a rapid change in their attitude. What is also true is that more than 4.5 million Ukrainians had joined the Soviet Red Army to fight Germany and nearly 7 million sacrificed their lives for the Fatherland. The Ukrainian ‘collaborators’ were harshly dealt with by the Soviet authorities. Many times, the memories of real/perceived discrimination and of persecution become very-potent elements, leading to alienation and radicalisation of communities.
In 1954, on the 300th anniversary of Ukraine’s accession to Russia, the then Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (who had been the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party) gifted the region of Crimea, which has been part of Russia since 1783, to Ukraine. Incidentally, many Russians describe Ukraine as ‘Little Russia (Malo Russia)'. The Ukrainian nationalists, who emphasise their unique and distinct identity, are outraged by such descriptions.
Ukraine’s importance for Moscow is not just civilisational but also because it is strategically located on Russia’s border with Europe. As the biggest energy supplier to Europe, Moscow wants to control the pipelines that pass through the territory of Ukraine. Russia’s Sevastopol Naval Base, located in the Crimean Peninsula, is the main base of its Black Sea Fleet.
In 2005, Vladimir Putin claimed, “The breakup of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century.” In December 2021, a bill was introduced in the Russian Parliament to that effect. Putin also maintains that the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of “historical Russia” and is a “tragedy” for “most citizens”. Hence his foremost objective has been to re-establish Russia as a great power and to regain primacy in the post-Soviet space.
His pet project—the Eurasian Economic Union that seeks to reintegrate the former Soviet states—is aimed at partly negating the Soviet disintegration. That would be incomplete without Ukraine. Putin also believes that the US and Europe are trying to harm Russian interests and minimise its influence in the post-Soviet space, especially Ukraine, and bring the countries in the region into NATO and perhaps European Union. Hence the tussle over this important country.
Before 2014, not many Ukrainians were in favour of membership of European organisations (NATO and EU). However, most Ukrainians were keen to keep their country’s strategic autonomy and wanted to emphasise their unique and distinct identity. They are uncomfortable with Vladimir Putin’s attempt to reintegrate the former Soviet republics in the Eurasian Economic Union.
During president Yanukovych's tenure (2010 to 2014), nearly 40 per cent Ukrainians preferred the EU to Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union, which was favoured by around 30 per cent (according to the Democratic Initiatives Foundation in Ukraine). To them, the EU represented prosperity, while the association with Russia would have political cost, that is domination by Russia. Hence they protested when Yanukovych, considered as pro-Russia and very corrupt, stopped negotiations for an association agreement with the EU in November 2013.
Subsequently, he had to flee Ukraine, and Russia intervened to take away Crimea, which they consider as very much their own—80 percent of its population is Russian speaking and overwhelmingly voted in favour of joining Russia in a Moscow-organised referendum in March 2014. What turned Ukrainians even more against Russia was the trade war, banning many Ukrainian exports.
After the Crimea incident, the opinions changed. By November 2015, pro-NATO sentiment in Ukraine stood at 75 per cent, with 19.8 per cent against (Democratic Initiatives Foundation in Ukraine). According to an opinion survey conducted by International Republican Institute in November 2021, 58 per cent of Ukrainians support joining the EU, while only 21 per cent prefer the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (54 per cent supported joining NATO). They believe that the European option would be better for their country’s security and economic interest.
Thus, identity politics, differing perceptions of the historical past and cultural inheritance and present-day geopolitics have created a dangerous cocktail, which may lead to the biggest catastrophe of post-Cold War Europe.
Sanjay Kumar Pandey is a professor at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies at JNU's School of International Studies.
