Operation Inherent Resolve ends: What does the US exit mean for Iraq?

American forces completed their withdrawal from Iraq yesterday, officially ending Operation Inherent Resolve after a 12-year campaign against the Islamic State. The “orderly departure” from Irbil Air Base ended a withdrawal process that began two years ago. “October 1 will be a new day in the course of the Iraqi state, with the country free of any foreign military presence and the completion of national sovereignty over its territory,” said Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi. Rarely has a withdrawal been welcomed so loudly by parties with such opposed aims.

The scale of what has ended is easy to forget. America invaded in 2003 to oust Saddam Hussein, and troop numbers peaked at about 170,000 in 2007. Barack Obama pulled out combat forces in 2011, but Islamic State soon seized nearly 40 per cent of Iraqi territory along with large parts of Syria, forcing US forces to return in 2014. Working with Iraqi forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga, the coalition broke the caliphate territorially in 2017. What remained was an advisory, training and intelligence role. By late 2025, about 1,500 personnel had gathered at Erbil. They have now gone, and the coalition's regional task force headquarters moves to Jordan.

The timetable is older than the present White House. It grew out of a phased agreement negotiated in 2024 between the Biden administration and the then Iraqi prime minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. Donald Trump honoured it as it suited his instincts. He has called the Iraq years a "quagmire" and a "very expensive excursion into Hell", and ending old commitments abroad is a pledge he likes to keep. The Pentagon and CENTCOM add that Islamic State is no longer an organised military threat in Iraq or the wider region, a verdict that lets Washington describe the exit as a conclusion rather than a retreat.

Baghdad has its own reasons. Al-Zaidi, newly installed, has declared "Sovereignty Days" to mark the occasion, but the symbolism carries a calculation. Iran-aligned militias have long cited the foreign presence to justify their independent arsenals. With the US troops gone, that argument is no longer valid. He has set June 2027 as the deadline for bringing all non-state weapons under government oversight.

The militias read the moment differently. Groups such as As'hab Al-Kahf and Harakat al-Nujaba have hailed the departure as a "historic victory" won by their drone and missile pressure, and the major factions have openly refused to hand over their arms. Tehran, squeezed in Syria and Lebanon, gains room in Baghdad just when it needs it. A sovereignty drive that strengthens the very forces it was meant to weaken would be a bitter result for the Iraqi prime minister.

No one feels the change more sharply than the Kurdistan Regional Government. The departure took with it the Patriot and C-RAM air defence systems stationed in Erbil, leaving Iraq and the Kurdistan Region without organic protection against regional drones and rockets. Kurdish leaders point to more than 1,000 Iranian ballistic missile and drone attacks on their territory this year. 

Meanwhile, Islamic State is broken but not finished. Clandestine desert networks of several hundred fighters raise about $500,000 a year through local extortion, and the cost falls on farmers, shepherds and minority communities. Security experts warn that an operational vacuum could let insurgent activity return in pockets. Future American support will rest on non-binding intelligence sharing and technical training under the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement, a thinner bond than the one it replaces.

The coming months will test the arrangement. American forces and Iran-aligned militias have informally agreed to hold their fire for 90 days. Beyond that, Iraq risks becoming a theatre in the wider confrontation with Iran, and attacks by Iraqi-based militias on outside assets could invite sanctions or foreign strikes. Baghdad is hedging. It is pursuing petrochemical ventures and alternative fuel delivery routes to reduce its exposure to disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, a sign that it expects regional turbulence to last. The coalition will watch Islamic State from Jordan and continue operations in Syria.

Washington will be relieved that its troops are beyond the reach of proxy fire, and its resources are free for other theatres. Al-Zaidi gains political capital by being seen to command security decisions, and he hopes to turn Iraqi attention to oil, trade and development. While both gains are real, neither is secure, as each depends on the goodwill of groups that have just claimed the credit.