As the current Knesset completes its full four-year term, Israel is set to hold its 26th Knesset election on October 27. Political parties are negotiating coalition terms, finalising candidates and, most importantly, canvassing voters. Many new popular figures are in the race for the next premiership, creating a neck-and-neck competition. Still, there are 10 reasons Netanyahu could still retain his job as prime minister.
First, Israel’s demography is changing. The right-wing supporters are dramatically increasing, driven by higher birth rates among ultra-Orthodox and national-religious populations. According to survey reports, 75 per cent of first-time voters and 68 per cent of veteran voters identify as right-wing because Netanyahu has positioned Likud as a natural anchor of the broader national-religious camp; demographic expansion within these constituencies provides a durable electoral platform.
Two, Netanyahu relies on a symbiotic, transactional political alliance with ultra-Orthodox parties like Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ). These parties act as a unified political bloc to maximise their legislative leverage and provide steadfast support to maintain a governing majority. In return, he provides them with state funding for their religious institutions and protects their military draft exemptions. While ultra-Orthodox leaders have recently expressed discontent regarding a future coalition, this friction is widely viewed as a calculated manoeuvre to maximise leverage amid the conscription crisis rather than a definitive break.
Third, the persistent fragmentation and structural fragility of the political opposition constitute a significant advantage. The anti-Netanyahu camp remains divided across personal rivalries, differing economic ideas, conflicting approaches towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Arab-Israeli legislative inclusion. Even if the anti-Netanyahu bloc secures 56 to 60 seats, forming a stable coalition will remain difficult due to competing ambitions among figures such as Naftali Bennett, Yair Lapid, Benny Gantz, Avigdor Liberman, and Gadi Eisenkot.
Fourth, beyond coalition dynamics, Netanyahu’s personal brand as ‘Mr. Security’ even after the 7 October terror attacks remains an asset. While his credibility was deeply fractured, several political dynamics and strategic arguments enabled him to weaponise the security crisis to maintain a path to electoral victory. He pivoted his ‘Mr. Security’ persona by criticising the intelligence and military establishment for keeping him in the dark. He projects the image of a leader with international stature and backbone to withstand foreign pressure. As a result, the US$100 billion defence budget was initiated to expand domestic weapons manufacturing. Netanyahu’s rhetoric frames national survival as contingent on experienced, unyielding leadership and resonates strongly with voters during times of crisis.
Fifth, complementing his national security narrative, Netanyahu has a mastery of international diplomacy and great-power relations. Netanyahu has routinely leveraged high-profile relationships with foreign leaders, including Narendra Modi, Donald Trump, and even Vladimir Putin, to project his unmatched diplomatic authority. His framing of regional normalisation initiatives, such as the Abraham Accords, reinforced the premise that regional integration could be achieved without major territorial concessions. This approach resonates strongly across broad segments of the centre-right.
Sixth, Netanyahu’s consolidation of absolute authority within the Likud ensures party discipline and prevents internal challenges. This centralised control allowed him to maintain a unified political base and negotiate effectively with coalition partners. It is more evident in his push for control over the party slate, in which the Likud Central Committee approved eight reserved slots at positions 3, 5, 9, 11, 15, 18, 26, and 29 for candidates he chose directly. Additionally, reserved and guaranteed slots were added for key figures such as Israel Katz, Gideon Sa’ar, and Haim Katz, giving Netanyahu a whopping 11 reserved spots among the top 29 positions on the Likud list. Over successive decades, he has systematically neutralised internal challengers and marginalised dissent by creating an environment in which intra-party advancement is tied directly to loyalty.
Seven, by constructing a sophisticated media ecosystem and direct-to-voter communication apparatus, Netanyahu bypassed traditional media and started influencing voters in the digital realm. Contrasting with Edmund Burke’s concept of the press as an independent ‘Fourth Estate,’ Netanyahu, bypassing it, employs specialised right-wing broadcasting networks and targeted social media messaging to maintain direct alignment with his base. This infrastructure enables him to frame political narratives, delegitimise hostile coverage as partisan bias, and mobilise voter turnout during elections.
Eighth, Netanyahu commands the mechanics of the Israeli electoral system. Under Israel’s nationwide proportional representation model with an electoral threshold of 3.25 per cent, minor shifts in vote distribution can drastically alter Knesset seat allocations. Netanyahu has repeatedly demonstrated his ability to engineer surplus-vote agreements by coordinating merger strategies among ideological allies to prevent wasted votes and exploit the threshold vulnerability of smaller factions, thereby securing governing majorities even in narrowly contested elections. This leverage was evident in the 2022 electoral pact between Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism and Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit, along with the anti-LGBTQ+ Noam party, to file a single joint list and prevent right-wing votes from being wasted below the electoral threshold.
Nine, Netanyahu’s strategic socio-political framing of Israeli society along populist and cultural cleavages reinforces group loyalty. By contrasting traditional, Mizrahi, periphery-based, and religious communities (second Israel) against what he characterises as an entrenched, secular, Tel Aviv-centric legal and media establishment (first Israel), he transforms political contests into broader struggles for cultural representation. This dynamic fosters an intense emotional bond with his electorate, ensuring that his supporters interpret external attacks on his leadership as attacks on their own political agency.
Ten, Netanyahu possesses unmatched tactical resilience and political endurance under extreme crisis conditions. Whether navigating legal battles, mass street protests, or parliamentary no-confidence motions, Netanyahu’s patience and tolerance for brinkmanship routinely outlast his rivals. By leveraging incumbency advantages, controlling legislative timetables, and using iterative negotiation strategies, he outmanoeuvres political rivals who lack comparable institutional capacity.
Strategic surprises could still emerge on 27 October, but as of today, Netanyahu is the winner.
The author is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
