The nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia announced on Tuesday has sparked serious concern about proliferation and the possibility of a regional arms race. Critics of the deal are worried about the break from long-standing American non-proliferation practice, particularly the prospect of Saudi Arabia eventually enriching uranium and reprocessing spent nuclear fuel on its own soil, without international oversight. This could give the kingdom the basic infrastructure needed to shift from civilian nuclear energy to weapons production down the line.
The most immediate worry is tied to Iran and the wider rivalry between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran. The timing could hardly be more awkward, coming as the United States is waging a war against Iran to stop it acquiring a nuclear weapon. Handing Riyadh enrichment capabilities in the middle of a war fought precisely to prevent Iranian nuclear armament strikes most observers and experts as reckless and self-defeating. Senator Chris Murphy, for instance, has argued that giving Saudi Arabia this capacity will only push Tehran closer to finishing its own weapon, removing any incentive for Iran to hold back.
Saudi intentions are not exactly a secret. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has made it clear that if Iran built a nuclear bomb, the kingdom would move quickly to build one, too. Since the new agreement lays the groundwork for facilities that could enrich uranium with limited monitoring, critics worry that a nuclear-capable Saudi Arabia would in turn prompt Iran into moving faster and more aggressively towards its own weapon. Former Israeli defence ministers Avigdor Liberman and Benny Gantz have both warned that a Saudi civilian nuclear programme under these terms would almost certainly end in weapons production, and could set off what they described as a mad arms race across the entire Middle East.
The deal also badly undercuts Washington's remaining leverage with Tehran. Any future nuclear negotiation with Iran will now have to contend with a much lower bar, set by this agreement itself. It is hard to see how the United States could credibly insist on zero enrichment from Iran while allowing Saudi Arabia the very same right. Nor will it be easy to demand that Iran accept intrusive inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency while Washington lets the Saudis operate under a far lighter, non-IAEA inspection arrangement.
This softer approach to oversight marks a real departure from the so-called gold standard of non-proliferation, set when the United States signed a nuclear deal with the United Arab Emirates back in 2009. Under that agreement, the UAE gave up its legal right to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium and agreed to strict international monitoring. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has refused to sign the IAEA's Additional Protocol, the mechanism that gives inspectors wide-ranging access to detect covert nuclear work at undeclared sites. Instead, Washington and Riyadh are leaning on private bilateral safeguards and the vague notion of "black-boxing" sensitive technology, an approach many experts regard as far too weak to stop a determined state from going nuclear.
The dangers do not stop with Saudi Arabia and Iran. There is a real risk of an arms race across the wider region. If Riyadh secures the right to enrich uranium domestically without strict IAEA compliance, other American partners, among them Turkey, Egypt, Qatar and the UAE, are likely to demand the same terms. Turkey has already signalled that it might pursue nuclear weapons should Iran obtain them. Once the door to domestic enrichment is open, several of these states would sit only a short technical step away from building their own arsenals.
Finally, the agreement sets an uncomfortable precedent that other major powers may be tempted to exploit. Analysts caution that Russia and China could point to Washington's example to justify sharing sensitive nuclear technology with their own regional allies, arguing, as the United States now does with Saudi Arabia, that bilateral inspection arrangements are sufficient safeguards against weaponisation. By stepping back from the demand that Saudi Arabia permanently renounce sensitive nuclear activities, the United States risks doing lasting damage, both to stability in the Middle East and to the global non-proliferation system it has spent decades trying to uphold.
