Should a small unit of the National Security Guards (NSG)—the elite counter-terror force which carried out the 26/11 operation—be posted in the valley? A proposal moved by the NSG in this regard has led to a furious debate within the security establishment about the state of affairs of the counter-terror (CT) operations in Kashmir and whether it demands a relook.
Many within the security establishment have started questioning whether it is a measure that has come too late and is too little. Today, there is no dearth of central forces in the valley. From the state police to CRPF, BSF, Indian Army, small unit of Marcos and, more recently, the IAF's Garud Commandos, the valley has the presence of almost all central armed forces. Predictably enough, almost all the stakeholders are opposing the proposal.
Conceding of space may give the impression that the armed forces already deployed in the valley were not capable of certain kind of operations or even raise a bigger question mark on the level of preparedness of the security forces battling insurgency in Kashmir.
Security sources said the idea behind deploying the NSG in the valley stems from the fact that a force which has been at the forefront of counter-terror operations like Mumbai 26/11 or the Pathankot strike, has not been deployed in active counter-terror operations till now. "The NSG has been training for CT operations ever since its inception but has not been involved in active operations. The best training happens during operations. But when have we seen the NSG actually carrying out operations. Twice in last several years?'' asked an officer.
While the NSG's mandate is anti-hijack operations and not routine CT operations, a large section believes that the NSG alone specialises in ''intervention operations'', the kind of operations being carried out in the valley to flush out terrorists from buildings, houses and closed structures that demands special training and skills.
"There has been simmering unrest among the locals about the way the CT operations are being carried out by burning down the houses where the terrorists have been holed up. A small unit of NSG deployed in the valley for the purpose of intervention operations can go a long way in sending a message that the central agencies are using limited force in the valley,'' said a senior intelligence official.
Presently, the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), a counter-insurgency force, forms the major chunk of deployment of armed forces in the valley carrying out CT operations. Just like the NSG, it comprises soldiers deputed from other parts of the Indian Army. So far, all CT operations are being led by the RR. But there is a feeling within a section of the security brass that the NSG may be better equipped with the required skills for intervention operations.
In most counter-insurgency operations in the valley which have been carried out in the last few months, most actionable intelligence has been provided by the state police while the central paramilitary forces have actively been engaging in crowd control while the operations are led by the Army.
"That is the way operations have traditionally been carried out in the valley. But with more training and infrastructure being pumped into the various central paramilitary forces after the 26/11 attack, these forces and the police officers are looking towards expanding their forces and their areas of operations. What we must keep in mind is that the valley should not be made a destination for all central armed forces of the country. There should be limited footprint of security forces, who are equipped and trained for the valley,'' said a senior police officer posted in the valley.
When Centre's interlocutor Dineshwar Sharma sits down with the various stakeholders responsible for maintaining peace and tranquillity in the valley, the issue is expected to be discussed threadbare as one of the bigger concerns that need to be addressed in the right measure.