Ahead of the 18th anniversary of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, India has intensified its focus on coastal security through major maritime exercises like Exercise Sea Vigil 2026 and upcoming policy measures by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Amid rising asymmetric threats from regional adversaries and an increasingly volatile maritime environment in the Indian Ocean Region, experts emphasize the urgent need to streamline maritime governance, enhance secondary coastal forces, and formally designate the Indian Coast Guard as the nodal agency for overall coastal defense.

Ahead of the 18th anniversary of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, India has intensified its focus on coastal security through major maritime exercises like Exercise Sea Vigil 2026 and upcoming policy measures by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Amid rising asymmetric threats from regional adversaries and an increasingly volatile maritime environment in the Indian Ocean Region, experts emphasize the urgent need to streamline maritime governance, enhance secondary coastal forces, and formally designate the Indian Coast Guard as the nodal agency for overall coastal defense.

Ahead of the 18th anniversary of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, India has intensified its focus on coastal security through major maritime exercises like Exercise Sea Vigil 2026 and upcoming policy measures by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Amid rising asymmetric threats from regional adversaries and an increasingly volatile maritime environment in the Indian Ocean Region, experts emphasize the urgent need to streamline maritime governance, enhance secondary coastal forces, and formally designate the Indian Coast Guard as the nodal agency for overall coastal defense.

India will soon mark the 18th anniversary of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, which was a turning point in the country’s approach to national security. Just ahead of this, the Indian Navy (IN), which is the designated lead agency for overall maritime security, including coastal security, conducted the fifth edition of ‘Exercise Sea Vigil 2026’ from November 11 to 19, in coordination with other national maritime stakeholders. The exercise is a direct precursor and build-up to ‘Exercise TROPEX’, the IN-led biennial theatre-level exercise, which will fan outwards into the Indian Ocean. These exercises together will validate India’s coastal security and maritime preparedness.

The Centre, having just successfully addressed the Naxal problem along the Red corridor, now appears to be turning its attention to coastal security. Home Minister Amit Shah, speaking at a meeting in Goa on September 7, 2026, stated that “the ministry of home affairs (MHA) would move forward very seriously on coastal security over the next two years.” With the Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) Phases I &II having been completed some time ago, the ministry is now reportedly preparing to roll out Phase III of the scheme. The Centre has also established the Bureau of Port Security (BoPS) as a dedicated statutory body under the Merchant Shipping Act, 2025; with the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), designated to deal with the ‘International Ship and Port Security Code’ and other coastal security matters.

These measures are indeed very timely. The recent wars such as the Russia-Ukraine war, the US /Israel war against Iran and Operation Sindoor have highlighted the changing nature of modern warfare. Asymmetric and hybrid threats exemplified by small vessels, drones and unmanned & autonomous  systems  can  all be  exploited by state and  non-state actors to strike at ports, off shore oil & gas  installations and other underwater  infrastructure , such as submarine  internet cables  .

For India, the threat is highly credible, given Pakistan’s potential desire to avenge its defeat in Operation Sindoor and also due to the economic distress caused by the suspension of the ‘Indus Waters Treaty’. In fact, several media reports have indicated that the Pakistan-based ‘Lashkar-e-Taiba’ has been training its cadres in scuba diving operations at Mangla dam in ‘Pakistan-occupied Kashmir’ and at Churna Island near Karachi, in Pakistan. While Pakistan or its proxies could strike anywhere along India’s  now  revised coastline of 11,098 km and in the adjoining  Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) , the threat perception is particularly high in the ‘Sir Creek’ region  due to the  unresolved maritime boundary  and in  the  Gulf of Kutch , which  is home to  several critical energy infrastructure, including the ‘Reliance oil refinery’ at Jamnagar, which Pakistan  has threatened to target in any future conflict .

Meanwhile, the maritime threat environment in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has changed vastly since 2008. Chinese warships, submarines, oceanographic research ships and missile & satellite tracking vessels are now increasingly active in the IOR . Chinese fishing fleets, which often have a dual role of intelligence collection, operate along the periphery of India's EEZ. There has also been a surge in   drug seizures by the IN and the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) in the Arabian Sea, all staging through Pakistan’s Makran coast.

The Centre has, in recent years, expanded its co-operative engagement with friendly regional partners through the Indo–Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and   the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). India has also enunciated its maritime doctrine of ‘Security and Growth for All in the Region’ (SAGAR) and ‘Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions’ (MAHASAGAR). The above has meant greater IN participation  in back-to- back bilateral and multilateral exercises across the globe, in addition to 'mission-based deployments’, escorting  energy shipments from  West Asia , tracking Chinese naval units in the IOR, fighting piracy off Somalia, etc. The IN today shoulders an expansive spectrum of responsibilities ranging from coastal security to blue- water operations and sea- based nuclear deterrence, which risks diluting its focus and is not in the country’s best strategic interest.

Meanwhile, the ICG, which celebrated its 50th Raising Day on February 1, 2026, has evolved into a credible maritime force. As it expands its operational footprint across the Indo-Pacific, with overseas deployment, joint exercises and capacity-building missions, maintaining an impenetrable inner ring of coastal security will become increasingly challenging. This puts greater onus on the State Marine Police (SMP), Customs Marine Wings (CMW) and the ‘water wings’ of the Border Security Force (BSF) and the CISF, to ensure robust coastal security. Any breach of coastal security similar to 26/11 could seriously jeopardise India’s expanding global maritime ambitions.

Unfortunately, other than the IN and ICG, the other coastal forces lack a dedicated ‘seagoing cadre’. Consequently, personnel of these forces trained by the IN, ICG or the more recently established National Academy of Coastal Policing (NACP) at Dwarka in Gujarat are routinely transferred out every year, resulting in non-accretion of specialised maritime training value.

The material status and operational exploitation of the patrol craft of these coastal forces also need to be enhanced with better engineering and technical support. Further, these forces require new and modern patrol craft, which can operate effectively in rough sea conditions, including monsoons,   and remain at sea for extended periods.

The foregoing discussion highlights a recurring proposal advanced by the MHA and certain coastal states: the transfer of the ICG from the MoD to the MHA. This would ensure better integration of the ICG with all coastal security agencies operating under the MHA. The MoD, however, has put forward valid arguments against this proposal. Irrespective of the government’s eventual decision on the matter, the time has come to formally designate the ICG as the ‘Nodal agency responsible for India’s overall coastal security’. Such a designation would free the IN to concentrate on its primary responsibility of war-fighting.

Thus, streamlining the maritime governance structure would ensure clear lines of authority and accountability, while enhancing the country’s security preparedness to prevent any recurrence of 26/11.

(The author is a former Principal Director, Naval Intelligence, and has been a Director in the Cabinet Secretariat)

(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)