OPINION | From Hormuz to Malacca: Why India's next strategic frontier is maritime
In the Red Sea, India has been escorting tankers and bringing seafarers home. In the East, it has spent years arranging access before it needs any. The difference is what good maritime planning looks like
India is proactively strengthening its strategic maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific through quiet diplomatic engagements, joint naval exercises, and vital mutual logistics agreements with key regional partners like Singapore and Vietnam, ensuring long-term operational readiness along critical sea lanes.
India is proactively strengthening its strategic maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific through quiet diplomatic engagements, joint naval exercises, and vital mutual logistics agreements with key regional partners like Singapore and Vietnam, ensuring long-term operational readiness along critical sea lanes.
India is proactively strengthening its strategic maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific through quiet diplomatic engagements, joint naval exercises, and vital mutual logistics agreements with key regional partners like Singapore and Vietnam, ensuring long-term operational readiness along critical sea lanes.
On any staff course, the administrative plan is the part everyone skims. Where does the fuel come from, who repairs the ship, who takes the wounded? Dull questions. They also decide whether an operation survives its second week.
That thought stayed with me through the past month, which brought two quiet pieces of news from India's east. On October 16, India and Vietnam held their fourth Security Dialogue in New Delhi, co-chaired by Deputy National Security Adviser Pavan Kapoor and Vietnam's Deputy Minister of Public Security, covering maritime engagement, economic security, cyber security and emerging technologies. Then, from October 21 to 26, the Indian Navy and the Republic of Singapore Navy held the 33rd SIMBEX off Visakhapatnam: a harbour phase, then three days in the Bay of Bengal with anti-submarine, anti-surface and anti-air drills. Singapore sent the frigate RSS Supreme. The harbour phase was less dramatic and arguably more useful, with planning conferences, cross-deck visits and exchanges between subject experts.
Neither made the front pages. Both deserve more attention than they got. Singapore and Vietnam sit beside the sea lanes that join the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, and India's access to those lanes is being arranged in rooms like these.
Access agreed in calm weather
The paperwork behind the ceremonies is where the substance lies. In November 2017, India and Singapore signed a bilateral agreement on naval cooperation that includes mutual logistics support and temporary deployments from each other's naval facilities. Singapore's defence minister of the time said he would encourage the Indian Navy to visit Changi Naval Base more often. It was reported then as India's first logistics pact with a country east of Malacca.
Vietnam followed in June 2022 with a memorandum on mutual logistics support, the first such major agreement Hanoi had signed with any country, allowing each side's forces to use the other's bases for repair and replenishment. Vietnam has since signed a BrahMos deal with India, the defence secretary confirmed on May 30, though the value has not been made public. Sales like that matter less for the money than for what follows: spares, training, technicians, and years of reasons to visit each other's ports.
The economics point the same way. India's embassy in Hanoi puts bilateral trade at more than $18 billion in 2026, and the two countries have signed an agreement between India's IREL and a Vietnamese institute on cooperation in rare earths. A relationship with that much traffic in goods will want the traffic in ships protected.
Put the pieces together, and a chain appears. Port Blair and Great Nicobar on one side, Changi and Vietnamese facilities on the other, and the Sabang port partnership with Indonesia, announced in July, as a further link. Nobody ever announced the chain as such. It was assembled one agreement at a time.
What the West is teaching us
Set that beside the other side of the country. Around Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, India has been escorting tankers, rescuing crews and bringing stranded seafarers home. On August 4, the Indian-flagged MSV Faize Noore Oliya sank off Yemen. On November 3, an Indian-crewed dhow was attacked as it left the Strait of Hormuz, and Oman's navy picked up the survivors, according to UKMTO reports carried by Outlook. Most of this was necessary, and much of it was done well. But it is how a navy behaves when it arrives at a crisis.
The eastern network is what a navy builds before one. That is the military lesson, and it is a plain one: protect the logistics route before the crisis arrives.
Why logistics decides presence
A warship that cannot refuel, repair or land a casualty within reach of a strait is a visitor, not a presence. Time on station depends on arrangements somebody made years earlier. You cannot negotiate a berth in the week the shooting starts. Nobody will have the time, and the other side may no longer be free to say yes.
Every Army officer who has served at high altitudes understands this. Forward posts are stocked before the passes close, because nobody delivers rations through a blizzard. The sea is no different. Stock the route while the weather is kind.
That is why the quiet agreements deserve more credit than the loud ones. A joint exercise tells you two navies can work together on a good day. A logistics agreement tells you one of them might take the other's ship in on a bad one.
What would make it real?
A memorandum is only words until a ship has tested it. The first step is to use these arrangements: rotate Indian ships through Changi and Vietnamese facilities on a regular schedule, and now and then at short notice, so the paperwork meets the pier before it has to in earnest.
The second is to keep the chain joined up with the Andaman and Nicobar Command and with the port projects at Great Nicobar and Sabang, which lie about 160 kilometres apart and neither of which is finished. The east should work as one system, not four separate announcements.
The third is honesty about what these arrangements are. Singapore and Vietnam are partners, not allies. Both will go on hedging, as smaller states beside bigger ones do. A logistics agreement is not a promise of wartime access, and I would not write it up as one.
From Hormuz to Malacca
India cannot be everywhere and should not try. The better habit is the eastern one: choose the places that matter, do the dull work early, and let the exercises and dialogues build on it. The West is showing what arriving late costs. The east, so far, shows what arriving first looks like.
Malacca is not India's next crisis, and I hope it never is. It is the place where India can still prepare for one.
(Colonel M.V. Shashidhar (Retd) is a Defence & Strategic Affairs Expert, Certified Independent Director (IICA), ESG Advocate and Governance Thought Leader. Contact: 5cg9220rg@gmail.com | +91-7620080437 | linkedin.com/in/mylapore-venkata-shashidhar)
(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)