Outer space has transformed into an active warfighting domain where satellites are primary targets, presenting significant strategic challenges and security imperatives for India amidst growing regional threats from China and Pakistan.

Outer space has transformed into an active warfighting domain where satellites are primary targets, presenting significant strategic challenges and security imperatives for India amidst growing regional threats from China and Pakistan.

Outer space has transformed into an active warfighting domain where satellites are primary targets, presenting significant strategic challenges and security imperatives for India amidst growing regional threats from China and Pakistan.

Space is no longer just the quiet, benign sanctuary of scientific discovery and national prestige. Alongside the land, sea, air, and cyber domains, outer space has rapidly transformed into an active, contested warfighting domain, where satellites play a number of critical roles. In modern conflicts, where the military force that can see farthest, communicate seamlessly, navigate independently, and deny those exact capabilities to an adversary will hold the decisive operational edge, the role of satellite-based technologies has become critical.

For India, this shift carries profound strategic consequences. Both India’s military modernisation and its civilian economy spanning banking, telecommunications, power grids, and disaster management are increasingly tethered to orbital infrastructure. Yet this growing reliance is a double-edged sword. Satellites are no longer mere force multipliers; they are also primary military targets. Disrupting or blinding them would not just cripple frontline troops; it could paralyse critical national infrastructure at home. India can no longer treat space primarily as a civilian scientific enterprise. It must become a core pillar of national security strategy.

The changing character of orbital conflict

The defining trend of contemporary warfare is the transition of space from a passive support medium to an operational theatre. Modern militaries depend on a continuous, real-time flow of orbital data to track enemy deployments, guide precision munitions, and synchronise multi-theatre operations. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites now peer through dense cloud cover and darkness, while artificial intelligence and machine learning are beginning to fuse optical, infrared, and electronic intelligence into automated, near-instantaneous targeting loops.

Simultaneously, the proliferation of small satellites and commercial constellations in low Earth orbit (LEO) is rewriting the rules of resilience. Rather than relying on a handful of expensive, vulnerable legacy satellites, militaries are moving toward distributed networks that are far harder to knock out entirely. The war in Ukraine has vividly underscored how commercial satellite communications and imagery can sustain a modern military campaign, just as widespread GPS jamming and spoofing across global flashpoints have demonstrated how easily orbital services can be degraded. And access to satellite support from Russia and China has enabled Iran to defend itself and attack its formidable adversaries.

Crucially, future space warfare will likely favour stealthy, non-kinetic disruption over dramatic destruction. While direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles grab headlines, they generate hazardous clouds of orbital debris that threaten every spacefaring nation, including the attacker. Cyber intrusions, electronic jamming, signal spoofing, high-powered lasers, and co-orbital "inspector" satellites capable of stalking or tampering with rival spacecraft offer cleaner, reversible ways to blind sensors or sever data links without firing a shot. Victory in orbit will depend not merely on launching satellites, but on ensuring their signals survive under hostile electronic and cyber bombardment.

The China challenge and the two-front nexus

India’s most consequential strategic challenge in orbit comes from China. Beijing views space dominance as central to comprehensive national power and has harnessed a formidable civil-military fusion model to accelerate its capabilities. By seamlessly integrating state research institutes, commercial startups, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China has deployed an expansive architecture of optical and radar reconnaissance satellites, electronic intelligence platforms, secure communications networks, and the global BeiDou navigation system.

Across the Indo-Pacific and along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), this constellation gives the PLA persistent surveillance over Indian troop movements, airfields, ports, and naval deployments, feeding directly into long-range precision-strike networks. Equally alarming is Beijing’s counter-space arsenal, which spans proven direct-ascent ASAT missiles, sophisticated satellite rendezvous and proximity operations, and ground-based directed-energy and electronic warfare systems.

Compounding this threat is the deepening China-Pakistan space nexus. Beijing has actively helped Islamabad build its orbital footprint, from the PRSS-1 remote-sensing satellite in 2018 to the PRSC-EO1 Earth-observation satellite in 2025, while granting Pakistan military access to BeiDou.

There was clear evidence during Operation Sindoor in May 2025 that China had provided Pakistan with space-based capabilities, including live inputs for targeting Indian military assets. Even accounting for commercial imagery, drones, and terrestrial intelligence, the prospect of Beijing piping near-real-time space-based intelligence to Islamabad alters India’s two-front security calculus. It extends China’s strategic reach deep into the subcontinent, eroding India’s ability to conceal force movements or achieve operational surprise.

Progress and gaps in India’s space architecture

India is hardly starting from scratch. Decades of frugal innovation by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) have yielded world-class launch vehicles and a robust fleet of dual-use assets. High-resolution Cartosat and all-weather RISAT imaging satellites, the EMISAT electronic intelligence platform, and dedicated military communications satellites such as GSAT-7 for the Navy, GSAT-7A for the Air Force and Army, and the November 2025 launch of GSAT-7R (CMS-03) provide vital operational support. Meanwhile, India’s regional navigation system, NavIC, offers an essential sovereign alternative to foreign GPS signals.

India has also demonstrated technological resolve. The 2019 Mission Shakti ASAT test proved an indigenous capability to intercept a satellite in LEO, while ISROs Project NETRA and the IS4OM facility have laid early groundwork for tracking orbital debris and monitoring space traffic. With 53 operational government satellites in orbit by the end of 2025, 22 in LEO and 31 in geosynchronous orbits, India possesses substantial orbital real estate.

Yet institutional and architectural gaps remain. The creation of the Defence Space Agency (DSA) and the Defence Space Research Organisation (DSRO) marked important bureaucratic steps, but India’s military space posture appears fragmented compared to China’s integrated ecosystem. A single kinetic ASAT test does not equate to sustained space deterrence, and NavIC’s coverage and military adoption require urgent expansion. India must transition from operating isolated space assets to fielding a resilient, responsive warfighting network.

A six-point roadmap to space power

To bridge this gap, India needs a comprehensive national space security strategy anchored in six immediate priorities.

First, build distributed, resilient constellations. India must accelerate dedicated military constellations for persistent surveillance, communications, and navigation across the LAC, the western border, and the Indian Ocean Region. Pairing high-altitude strategic satellites with proliferated, lower-cost LEO constellations will ensure that the loss of a few nodes does not blind theatre commanders during prolonged hostilities.

Second, harden space domain awareness and cyber defences. You cannot defend what you cannot see. India must expand Project NETRA into an integrated civil-military space surveillance network using long-range radars, optical telescopes, and space-based sensors capable of detecting hostile co-orbital manoeuvres early. Simultaneously, ground stations, control links, and satellites must be fortified with military-grade encryption, anti-jamming payloads, and frequency-agile communications to survive electronic and cyber attacks.

Third, craft credible, non-kinetic deterrence. New Delhi must clearly define its deterrence thresholds in space. Rather than sparking a self-defeating orbital debris race, deterrence should rest on resilience - the ability to absorb a hit, rapidly reconstitute lost capabilities, and impose non-kinetic costs on an adversary through offensive cyber and electronic warfare options.

Fourth, overhaul doctrine and command structures. India needs a formal Space Security Doctrine that defines military responsibilities, rules of engagement, and joint operational integration. The Defence Space Agency should be elevated and empowered, potentially evolving toward a full-fledged Space Command with dedicated personnel and permanent planning cells embedded in theatre commands. Routine war-gaming must train commanders to fight through degraded communications and lost satellite navigation.

Fifth, unleash the private sector for rapid reconstitution. State agencies alone cannot match the pace of modern space innovation. Building on the reforms of IN-SPACe, defence procurement must offer assured, long-term contracts to Indian private startups in satellite manufacturing, microelectronics, propulsion, and launch services. In a high-intensity conflict, the industrial capacity to build and launch replacement satellites within days or weeks will be just as vital as the satellites already in orbit.

Sixth, leverage strategic partnerships without sacrificing autonomy. Space is inherently global, and India should deepen operational cooperation with trusted partners such as the United States, France, Japan, and Australia. Reciprocal arrangements for space situational awareness, early-warning data, and commercial imagery sharing during crises can dramatically expand India’s visibility, provided foreign partners supplement, rather than replace, sovereign Indian capabilities.

Conclusion: Shaping the rules of the final frontier

Finally, military preparedness must be paired with proactive diplomacy. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, drafted in an era of superpower moon races, is ill-equipped to govern modern threats like cyberattacks, electronic jamming, co-orbital stalking, and the weaponisation of commercial constellations. India should take a leading role in shaping international norms against destructive ASAT testing and harmful interference with civilian space infrastructure, while championing transparency and crisis-prevention mechanisms. Yet diplomatic norms only carry weight when backed by hard capability and independent verification.

The next major conflict between modern militaries will likely open not with cross-border artillery fire, but with silent strikes in orbit resulting in severed communications, spoofed navigation, and blinded sensors. Faced with a technologically assertive China and its growing space collaboration with Pakistan, India cannot afford strategic complacency. India already possesses the scientific talent, industrial momentum, and diplomatic partnerships required to secure its orbital flanks. What it needs now is the doctrinal clarity and institutional urgency to evolve from a celebrated spacefaring nation into a truly prepared space power.

(Lt Gen Philip Campose (Retired) is a former Vice Chief of the Indian Army. He has authored a book titled ‘A National Security Strategy for India: The Way Forward’)

(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)