In the annals of heroism, the stand of C Company of 13 Kumaon at Rezang La on November 18, 1962, will always be among the more glorious chapters. The monument at Chushul asks: “How can a man die better/ Than facing fearful odds/ For the ashes of his fathers / And the temples of his gods.” In the dark days of November 1962, the stand of C Company exemplified that.

The Chinese attacked on October 20, 1962, both in the East, in NEFA (modern-day Arunachal Pradesh), and in the West, in Ladakh. While Arunachal Pradesh was a complete debacle, in the Ladakh sector, the defensive battle was cohesive and better coordinated, which helped limit Chinese gains and prevented them from capturing their eventual objective—Chushul and its precious airfield—which lay just 15 kilometres from the border.

Until September 1962, the defence of all of Ladakh was vested with 114 Brigade, commanded by Brigadier T. N. Raina (later General and COAS). It consisted of just two infantry battalions, the 1/8 Gorkha Rifles and 5 Jat. When the gravity of the Chinese threat became clear, 13 Kumaon, which was at Baramulla in Kashmir, was sent to reinforce 114 Brigade. In the first week of October 1962, the 3 Himalayan (later Mountain) Division was formed for the overall defence of Ladakh, and the Chushul sector was entirely left to 114 Brigade, which set up its headquarters at Chushul and braced for the inevitable Chinese attack.

The initial Chinese attacks from October 20 to 23, 1962, managed to capture the forward posts and push the Indians back. There was a pause in operations as the Chinese prepared for their attack towards Chushul. The main approach was through the Spangur Gap, which led straight to Chushul, and the bulk of 114 Brigade’s defences faced the gap. The only other way to Chushul was through the 16,000-foot-high Rezang La pass, around 10 kilometres to the east. It was at Rezang La that C Company, 13 Kumaon, was deployed. Most expected that the Chinese attack would be directed at the Spangur Gap. Instead, when it came, it was launched at Rezang La.

battle-ai-map-old-pic
13 KUMAON before the battle

C Company had moved from the plains directly to these heights, and the men were not acclimatised. In the rarefied air, breathing was a problem, and many vomited blood even as they marched up to occupy the position. They spent a week digging defensive positions at those isolated heights, with their spades and pickaxes virtually ineffective on the frozen ground and often in full view of the Chinese. Rezang La had a more serious drawback. It was out of range of their own artillery support and away from the rest of the brigade positions. The company was virtually isolated and had to fight its battle alone.

Major Shaitan Singh Bhati, a Rajput from Jodhpur, commanded C Company of 13 Kumaon. The company was made up of Ahirs from Haryana who held antiquated .303 rifles with about 600 rounds per head and had just six light machine guns and two 2-inch mortars, with a handful of bombs. The well-armed and well-equipped Chinese had 7.62 mm self-loading rifles, MMGs and LMGs, along with 120 mm, 81 mm and 60 mm mortars and 75 mm and 57 mm recoilless guns to bust bunkers. Major Shaitan Singh deployed 8 and 9 Platoons in two forward positions, while the Company Headquarters and 7 Platoon were held in depth on Point 5150. But the platoons were widely dispersed and unable to support one another. Worse, they had absolutely no fire support from their own artillery.

As per Chinese accounts (they call it the Battle for Number 8 & 9 Posts of Ngari), the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment, reinforced with an additional company and supporting elements, was used for the attack. They reached the forward assembly area at night, moving by vehicles before climbing up, and were fresh and rested. Their attack plan was simple. One group—the Northern Group—would attack 8 Platoon, and the Southern Group would attack 9 Platoon simultaneously. Another group was to infiltrate to the rear of 7 Platoon in the depth position and thus isolate the company completely.

As the Chinese moved up from their forward assembly areas at the base of the feature (from their side), they were detected by one of our patrols at around 0400 hours on November 18, 1962. This early warning proved invaluable. When the Chinese launched their attack at 0500 hours, the company was ready and beat back the first attack, inflicting heavy casualties and forcing the attackers to withdraw. Following the failure of this attack, the Chinese pounded the positions on Rezang La with artillery and mortar fire for almost an hour and then launched a simultaneous attack on both platoons. These attacks, too, were beaten back, and the gullies were filled with dead and wounded Chinese. In spite of the lack of artillery support and without any radio communication with their own headquarters, the company was still holding on.

Unable to make headway in the initial attacks, the Chinese brought up 75 mm recoilless guns mounted on wheelbarrows for direct fire at the Indian positions. In the wake of this intense barrage, they attacked 8 Platoon and managed to penetrate the leading section positions. But around a dozen surviving Ahirs from the depth positions jumped out in a desperate counterattack and tried to push them back. However, outnumbered and weakened, the defenders fell to a man in the brutal hand-to-hand fighting.

From here, the Chinese launched an attack on the flanks of 9 Platoon, which fell after an hour or so of intense battle. An outflanking force moved behind 7 Platoon in its depth position, which was attacked from two sides and eventually fell. It was estimated that the Chinese had to launch as many as eight assaults to clear all three positions, which fell after six hours of intense close-quarters combat and after inflicting a huge toll on the attackers.

battle-ai-map
Depiction of the battle

Major Shaitan Singh had been rushing from position to position, urging his men to hold on. As he did so, he was hit by a burst of machine-gun fire in his arms and abdomen and fell, severely wounded. As two men tried to carry him away, he refused to be evacuated and asked to be placed behind a rock. He ordered the two men to go to the battalion headquarters and inform them of what was happening. He was last seen firing from his position behind the rock. Of the 120 men of C Company, 13 Kumaon, only six survived. Of the rest, 114 fell at their positions. Three were captured by the Chinese, badly wounded, and only three managed to make it back to the battalion.

The stand of C Company at Rezang La gained time for the rest of the brigade to consolidate itself. At Chushul itself, 1/8 Gorkha Rifles had fought another gallant delaying action, which prevented the Chinese from advancing on the airfield. The time gained was invaluable. On November 21, 1962, the Chinese announced a unilateral ceasefire, and Chushul remained in Indian hands.

In the aftermath of the chaotic fighting, no one really knew what had happened at Rezang La for over two months. Then, in February, a shepherd passed word of Indian soldiers lying in the snow at Rezang La. When Indian troops reached the spot, they saw a tableau of death. Each man was at his post, his body preserved in the cold. The mortar loader was frozen in the act of loading a bomb into his mortar. The medical orderly held a syringe in his hand that he was about to administer to a comrade. Major Shaitan Singh’s body was found with a Sten gun in his hand. The Chinese had covered his body with a blanket in a rare gesture of honour. The other bodies, too, were untouched by the Chinese, perhaps in acknowledgement of their courage.

battle-ai
The war memorial

All 114 bravehearts were cremated together at the base of Rezang La by the commander, Brigadier T. N. Raina. In the desolate area, no wood was available, so furniture from the Brigade Officers’ Mess at Tangste was brought forward for the mass cremation. Today, at the same spot, stands the Rezang La Memorial—a testimony to the battle and the men of C Company, 13 Kumaon, who made their last stand there.

Please click here to buy the book 'India's Battlefields: From Kurukshetra to Balakot'

Disclaimer: Comments posted here are the sole responsibility of the user and do not reflect the views of THE WEEK. Obscene or offensive remarks against any person, religion, community or nation are punishable under IT rules and may invite legal action.