India’s defence industry has made remarkable progress in recent years. Domestic production is growing, exports are expanding, and dependence on imported weapons and ammunition is gradually declining. Yet a fundamental question remains: Can India’s defence industrial base sustain a prolonged, high-intensity, two-front conflict against China and Pakistan?
The test of a defence industry is not merely its ability to manufacture impressive platforms in peacetime. It is whether its factories can replenish missiles, artillery shells, air-defence interceptors, drones and critical spare parts faster than an adversary can destroy or exhaust them. Equally important is its ability to repair damaged equipment, regenerate combat power and maintain uninterrupted supplies under attack.
The honest answer must concern India’s security planners. Industrial capacity is now as important to national defence as military preparedness itself.
A genuine transformation is underway
India’s defence-industrial ecosystem is no longer the import-dependent establishment of the turn of the century. Domestic defence production reached a record ₹1.78 lakh crore in FY 2025–26, a 15.6 per cent increase over the previous year. Public-sector enterprises accounted for approximately 76 per cent of production, while the private sector contributed 24 per cent. Defence exports rose to ₹38,424 crore, reaching more than 80 countries.
Equally significant is the progress in ammunition indigenisation. Of 175 ammunition variants, 159 have reportedly been indigenised, representing approximately 91 per cent self-sufficiency. In a high-intensity conflict, where artillery shells, rockets, mortar bombs and small-arms ammunition are consumed rapidly, this achievement is particularly important.
India also possesses considerable latent strengths: a large engineering workforce, established public-sector manufacturing facilities, expanding private industry, a growing missile and munitions ecosystem, and DRDO’s research and development capabilities. The Defence Testing Portal, providing domestic manufacturers and start-ups access to facilities across 24 DRDO laboratories, is another positive initiative.
These achievements provide a strong foundation. However, they should not be mistaken for a fully developed wartime industrial capability.
The real test begins after Day 30
Modern warfare consumes weapons and ammunition at an extraordinary rate. The conflicts in Ukraine and West Asia have demonstrated how quickly precision-guided munitions, air-defence interceptors, drones, artillery ammunition and electronic-warfare equipment can be depleted. Combat effectiveness depends not simply on what a military possesses on Day One, but on what it can replace on Days 30, 60 and 90.
India’s experience during Operation Sindoor, despite the relatively short duration of the conflict, offers important lessons. The government invoked emergency procurement powers, allocating ₹9,100 crore under Emergency Powers Revenue 2025, while a further ₹31,000 crore was directed towards emergency revenue and capital acquisitions across the three Services. India also reportedly resorted to urgent foreign procurement for sophisticated systems, including Excalibur artillery ammunition and Javelin anti-tank missiles.
These developments merit closer examination. If emergency procurement and foreign sourcing became necessary following a limited military operation, a simultaneous crisis along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and the western front would place substantially greater demands on stockpiles, manufacturing facilities, logistics and repair infrastructure.
India’s industrial strengths
Indian defence industry’s primary advantage is scale. Its large domestic market, skilled industrial workforce and substantial defence requirements provide the economic justification for expanding manufacturing capacity. Few countries combine the requirements of a continental army, a modernising air force, a blue-water navy, a space programme and a nuclear deterrent with an indigenous industrial ecosystem of comparable breadth.
Second, there is growing momentum in ammunition and missile production. India’s ability to manufacture artillery ammunition, propellants, rockets and guided weapons is strategically more consequential in a prolonged conflict than the acquisition of a few additional high-value platforms. Growing exports also demonstrate the increasing competitiveness of Indian manufacturers.
Third, the private sector is emerging as a significant contributor. Companies such as Tata Advanced Systems, Larsen & Toubro, Bharat Forge, Mahindra Defence, Adani Defence and Solar Industries are expanding capabilities in aerospace, artillery, armoured vehicles, missiles, drones and ammunition.
Private companies contributed ₹17,353 crore, or 45.16 per cent, of defence exports in FY 2025–26. Their contribution to exports, disproportionately higher than their share of domestic production, reflects their growing competitiveness and potential.
The government’s targets of ₹3 lakh crore in defence production and ₹50,000 crore in exports by 2029 are ambitious but necessary. The challenge is to translate this growth into assured wartime production capacity.
The vulnerabilities that could decide a war
Despite the progress, several structural weaknesses could seriously undermine India’s ability to sustain a prolonged conflict.
Single-source dependence: Although most Army ammunition variants have been indigenised, some remain dependent on single manufacturers. A factory fire, cyberattack, supply-chain disruption or precision strike could interrupt the supply of a critical munition. In a multi-front conflict, redundancy is not a luxury but a necessity.
Import dependence at the component level: Domestic assembly does not necessarily mean complete indigenisation. Aircraft, missiles, radars and other sophisticated platforms may still depend on imported engines, sensors, semiconductor chips, rare-earth magnets, seekers, specialised alloys and electronic components. This upstream vulnerability is particularly serious when some critical inputs originate in China, India’s principal strategic adversary. Indigenisation must therefore extend beyond final assembly to the entire supply chain.
Inadequate surge capacity: A factory meeting annual peacetime orders may not be capable of doubling or tripling output during war. Expanding production requires skilled manpower, machine tools, raw materials, explosives-handling facilities, testing infrastructure, quality assurance and reliable transportation. Without advance planning, additional orders alone cannot generate additional capacity.
Fragmented coordination: DRDO, DPSUs, the former ordnance factories, private manufacturers, MSMEs and start-ups constitute a substantial industrial ecosystem. However, development, procurement, production and maintenance often operate on different timelines. Greater integration is essential to ensure that technological development translates rapidly into scalable manufacturing and operational availability.
Inadequate repair and regeneration capacity: A prolonged conflict will inevitably result in damage and equipment losses. India must be able not only to manufacture replacement aircraft, tanks, ships, radars and vehicles but also to repair and return damaged equipment to service rapidly. Forward repair facilities, mobile maintenance teams, pre-positioned spares and digital equipment-health monitoring must become integral to military logistics.
The road ahead: Build for attrition
India’s defence-industrial policy must move beyond celebrating production figures and indigenisation percentages. The central measure of success should be wartime sustainability: the ability to replace equipment and ammunition at faster rates than at which they are consumed. Important issues:
First, establish a National Defence Industrial Mobilisation Plan. A comprehensive, legally backed framework should identify critical weapons, ammunition, components and manufacturing facilities; prescribe surge-production targets; map supply-chain vulnerabilities; and designate alternate manufacturers for single-source products. The plan should be reviewed and tested annually.
Second, build strategic reserves of critical inputs. Propellants, explosives, seekers, rare-earth magnets, specialised semiconductors, electronic components, machine tools and other difficult-to-replace materials must be stockpiled in adequate quantities. Such reserves should sustain production for months rather than merely weeks.
Third, avoid locating critical production facilities close to international borders. The proliferation of drones and precision-guided weapons has made industrial infrastructure increasingly vulnerable to long-range attacks. The Ukraine conflict has demonstrated the ability of relatively inexpensive unmanned systems to strike deep inside an adversary’s territory. Critical defence factories, ammunition depots and supporting infrastructure should therefore be located at appropriate strategic depth, away from vulnerable border regions. Existing facilities must be hardened and protected.
Fourth, disperse and protect manufacturing capacity. Concentrating ammunition, missile or electronics production in a handful of locations creates unacceptable vulnerabilities. Critical production lines should be geographically distributed, with redundant facilities, hardened infrastructure and assured backup power, communications and logistics. No single strike should be capable of disabling an entire production chain.
Fifth, mobilise dual-use civilian industry. Automotive, electronics, chemical, pharmaceutical, aerospace and precision-engineering industries could contribute significantly during wartime. However, conversion cannot be improvised during a crisis. Qualified designs, pre-negotiated contracts, trained manpower and conversion protocols must be established beforehand.
Sixth, reform procurement practices. Small, fragmented and delayed orders discourage manufacturers from investing in additional capacity. Long-term bulk contracts for ammunition, missiles, drones and spare parts would provide predictable demand and encourage private investment. Proposed provisions in DAP 2026 for long-term bulk acquisitions and assured post-trial orders could be valuable, provided they are implemented decisively.
Seventh, make the private sector a strategic partner. Private manufacturers must be treated as equal partners in national defence production rather than merely as vendors or subcontractors. Predictable orders, timely payments, access to testing facilities, technology transfer and participation in high-value programmes are essential. The private sector’s substantial contribution to exports demonstrates the potential that remains to be harnessed.
Finally, India must conduct annual industrial mobilisation exercises. Just as the Armed Forces exercise operational plans, the government should test whether factories can expand production, alternate suppliers can be activated, critical spares can reach forward formations and manufacturing networks can withstand cyberattacks and infrastructure disruption. An untested mobilisation plan is little more than a paper exercise.
The strategic bottom line
India’s defence industry has made impressive strides. Record production, growing exports, ammunition indigenisation and increasing private-sector participation represent genuine achievements. However, progress in peacetime production must not be confused with readiness for prolonged war.
A simultaneous conflict with China and Pakistan would stretch India’s military resources, industrial capacity and logistics across multiple theatres. Its outcome would depend not only on the quality and quantity of weapons available at the outset, but also on India’s ability to continue manufacturing, repairing and delivering them under sustained military, cyber and economic pressure.
India can increasingly equip itself for a short, high-intensity conflict. Its ability to sustain a prolonged, multi-front war, however, remains insufficiently demonstrated.
The imperative is clear: build redundancy, secure critical inputs, expand surge capacity, disperse vulnerable production facilities, strengthen repair infrastructure and integrate the private sector into national defence planning. Industrial mobilisation must become an essential component of military preparedness.
India does not need a defence industry that merely looks impressive on parade day. It needs one that can continue delivering on Day 30, Day 60 and Day 90 of a war.
(Lt Gen Philip Campose (Retired) is a former Vice Chief of the Indian Army. He has authored a book titled ‘A National Security Strategy for India: The Way Forward’)
(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)
