Recent critiques questioning India's senior military leadership overlook the importance of civilisational heritage, constitutional discipline, and strategic restraint in evaluating institutional effectiveness.

Recent critiques questioning India's senior military leadership overlook the importance of civilisational heritage, constitutional discipline, and strategic restraint in evaluating institutional effectiveness.

Recent critiques questioning India's senior military leadership overlook the importance of civilisational heritage, constitutional discipline, and strategic restraint in evaluating institutional effectiveness.

Colonel Ajai Shukla’s article, ‘A Leadership Deficit in the Military ’, questions the professional judgement of India’s senior military leadership, citing Sanskrit quotations, alleged careerism, disillusionment among junior officers and a perceived reluctance to take operational risks. These are serious allegations, but the conclusions appear broader than the evidence presented. Criticism of the armed forces is legitimate in a democracy; a sweeping diagnosis of institutional failure, however, demands a more rigorous assessment.

Civilisational confidence is not professional incompetence. The suggestion that military leaders quoting Sanskrit are pandering to a political constituency confuses cultural expression with professional conduct. India’s civilisational heritage has long emphasised duty, discipline, courage, sacrifice and collective purpose. These values are hardly incompatible with modern military professionalism.

The Rigveda declares, “संगच्छध्वं संवदध्वं सं वो मनांसि जानताम्”—move together, speak together, and let your minds be united. This is a powerful expression of cohesion and collective endeavour. The Mahabharata’s “यतो धर्मस्ततो जयः” similarly invokes the relationship between duty, righteousness and victory. Why should invoking such wisdom be evidence of a leadership deficit? Military institutions worldwide draw strength from their history, traditions and national identity. India need not abandon its civilisational roots to embrace modern technology, professional excellence and strategic sophistication. The true test of a commander is the quality of judgement and leadership, not the language used to express institutional values.

Civil–military unity is strength, not a weakness. In a constitutional democracy, elected civilian authority determines national policy and strategic objectives, while military leaders provide professional advice and execute authorised decisions. This relationship requires mutual respect, candid communication and clarity of responsibility. Military commanders must be able to express professional disagreement, but once a lawful decision has been made by the competent authority, disciplined implementation demonstrates institutional maturity.

This is not blind obedience. It is constitutional discipline. Professional independence does not mean political autonomy, just as civilian supremacy does not justify ignoring military advice. A healthy civil–military relationship combines frank professional discussion with unity of purpose. Portraying coordination between political and military leadership as evidence of institutional weakness risks overlooking one of the essential foundations of national security.

Operational restraint must not be mistaken for indecision. Col Shukla questions the response to Chinese actions in eastern Ladakh in 2020, drawing comparisons with earlier confrontations. But military decisions cannot be judged simply by how aggressive they appear. Commanders must consider intelligence, terrain, force availability, logistics, escalation risks and the political objectives of the operation. An offensive may look bold yet produce an unfavourable strategic outcome; restraint may preserve options, strengthen positions or create conditions for a better result.

Doklam in 2017 and the eastern Ladakh crisis unfolded in different circumstances. Their lessons deserve professional examination, not simplistic comparisons. The relevant questions are what objectives were set, what options were available and what outcomes were achieved. Hindsight cannot establish that a more aggressive alternative would necessarily have been more successful. Nor can operational performance be separated from the coordination required to achieve it. Complex operations depend on clear direction, intelligence, logistics, joint planning and effective execution at every level. Where operations demonstrate such coordination,  that is evidence of institutional capability. Failures must be examined honestly, but achievements should not be dismissed through selective interpretation.

Courage requires judgement, not recklessness. Col Shukla’s concern about a “zero error syndrome” deserves attention. Excessive risk aversion can discourage initiative and delay decisions. A military that punishes every honest mistake will struggle to innovate. Yet the opposite extreme—taking risks merely demonstrating boldness — can cost lives and undermining national objectives. The real requirement is a culture that encourages initiative, candid advice and calculated risk-taking while maintaining accountability. Commanders must be able to act decisively, but their decisions must be grounded in professional competence and strategic purpose. Against a stronger adversary, effectiveness depends not merely on aggression but on intelligence, technology, training, logistics, morale and adaptability. Knowing when to advance, hold ground or exercise restraint is itself a measure of leadership.

Questions about post-retirement appointments, junior officers’ morale and senior commanders’ performance also deserve scrutiny. But allegations must be supported by evidence. A post-retirement appointment alone does not prove compromised professional judgement; isolated observations do not establish widespread disillusionment. Where genuine shortcomings exist, they require transparency, accountability and institutional reform—not generalisations about the entire military leadership. India’s armed forces must continually modernise, strengthen joint operations and prepare for emerging threats. They need leaders who combine intellectual independence with discipline, courage with judgement, and initiative with accountability. Civilisational heritage, constitutional responsibility and operational competence are complementary strengths, not competing ideas.

Col Shukla is right that military leadership should be scrutinised. But cultural expression is not proof of ideological subordination; civil–military coordination is not weakness; strategic restraint is not necessarily cowardice; and following lawful orders is not an absence of independent thought.

The real measure of military leadership is not how aggressively a commander speaks or how publicly he disagrees. It is whether he provides candid professional advice, makes sound decisions, maintains cohesion and accomplishes the mission in the national interest. A leadership deficit must be demonstrated through evidence of professional failure—not inferred from civilisational confidence, constitutional discipline or strategic restraint.

(Air Vice Marshal K.S. Suresh Kumar (Retd) is an Indian Air Force veteran. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)