OPINION | Decoding Pakistan’s military strategy against India in 2026

Pakistan’s military calculus against India in 2026 is being shaped by three converging developments: the lessons of Operation Sindoor, Field Marshal Asim Munir’s consolidation of authority, and Islamabad’s widening network of partnerships with China, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and some other West Asian countries. Together, these have raised Pakistan’s diplomatic visibility and may improve its military resilience. But they have not altered the underlying asymmetry between the two countries—or removed the danger that another crisis could escalate beyond either capital’s control.

The central question is whether Pakistan will use these perceived advantages to adopt a more assertive posture toward India, or whether the experience of May 2025 will constrain it to exercise caution. The most plausible answer is both. Islamabad is likely to pursue greater confidence in limited, deniable and technology-enabled confrontation, while relying on nuclear deterrence to discourage a large-scale Indian conventional response.

Operation Sindoor: Lessons and limits

The Pahalgam terrorist attack of 22 April 2025, in which 26 civilians were killed, triggered India’s Operation Sindoor. Based on available evidence, India attributed the attack to Pakistan military-backed terrorist networks, though Pakistan denied responsibility.

On May 7, 2025, India struck  terrorist-infrastructure targets in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. The confrontation then widened to drones, missiles, air operations and strikes against military targets, before the two Directors General of Military Operations agreed to cease all firing and military action on land, air and sea from 1700 hours IST on May 10, 2025.

For Pakistan, the episode produced mixed lessons. It confirmed that India was willing to conduct cross-border military action in response to a major terrorist attack without necessarily initiating an all-out war. It also demonstrated how quickly a limited operation could expand once military assets became legitimate targets.

The balance of outcome in that conflict remains disputed in terms of claims concerning aircraft losses, radar destruction and damage to military infrastructure. But what is not disputed is the military advantage held by India when the conflict ended, and the primary strategic lesson: neither India nor Pakistan can any longer assume that the other will remain within familiar thresholds.

Pakistan is therefore likely to prioritise air defence, surveillance, electronic warfare, precision strike, resilient command-and-control and rapid battle-damage repair. To that end, its broader aim would be to impose costs on India while keeping any future confrontation below the level of a general war.

For India, the lesson is equally direct. Deterrence must persuade Islamabad that enabling or sponsoring terrorism could invite a military response whose timing, scope and escalation consequences would be beyond Pakistan’s control.

Munir’s power: Capacity without invulnerability

Asim Munir’s promotion to Field Marshal in May 2025, followed by the 27th Constitutional Amendment, has strengthened the Pakistan Army’s already dominant domestic position in national security and foreign policy. The concentration of authority gives the military leadership greater freedom to calibrate pressure on India, with fewer meaningful civilian checks.

This does not automatically mean a greater appetite for war. Pakistan continues to face economic fragility, political polarisation and persistent militancy along its western frontier. A prolonged conflict with India would compound fiscal stress, disrupt supply chains and expose the limits of its conventional forces.

The greater danger is psychological and institutional. After a setback, a major terrorist incident or an Indian operation, Pakistan’s leadership may feel compelled to demonstrate resolve. National prestige, Army credibility and domestic political pressures could encourage risk-taking even when the strategic costs are obvious.

Munir’s enhanced authority therefore increases Pakistan’s capacity for calibrated confrontation. It does not make a major war inevitable—or wise.

China: The principal enabler

China remains Pakistan’s most consequential military partner. It supplies combat aircraft, missiles, air-defence systems, naval platforms and technologies that support joint production and operational integration. Pakistan’s J-10C and JF-17 fleets, together with associated missile systems, are central to its effort to contest Indian air power.

Chinese cooperation with Pakistan in drones, electronic warfare, surveillance and precision-strike systems has to be given due attention by  Indian planners. China offers Pakistan three advantages: access to modern equipment, support for maintenance and replenishment, and the latent possibility of strategic pressure on India from a second direction.

That last advantage matters most. But the China-Pakistan relationship is yet not an automatic mutual-defence alliance. Beijing has strong reasons to avoid a war that endangers its investments, trade routes and wider strategic interests. It may assist Pakistan diplomatically and materially without joining a confrontation initiated by Islamabad.

India should therefore plan on the assumption that, essentially,  Chinese assistance could improve Pakistan’s military capacity and staying power more than anything else.

Washington: Access, not assurance

President Donald Trump’s rapport with Munir and Pakistan’s role in facilitating US-Iran diplomacy have enhanced Islamabad’s international profile. Pakistan may hope that its usefulness to Washington will yield economic benefits, diplomatic influence and a more sympathetic American response in a future crisis.

Islamabad will likely seek to exploit Washington’s interest in regional stability to encourage early international intervention and pressure New Delhi toward restraint.

But a personal relationship between President Trump and Munir is not a security guarantee. The United States has independent interests in preventing nuclear escalation, preserving regional stability and maintaining its relationship with India. Pakistan’s diplomatic value may, paradoxically, increase external pressure on it to avoid destabilising conduct.

Pakistan’s realistic objective is not American military backing against India. It is diplomatic shaping: internationalising a crisis, limiting India’s freedom of action, and securing a ceasefire on terms that preserve its narrative and minimise its losses.

Saudi Arabia and Türkiye: A new strategic network

The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye on August 7, 2026, adds a new layer to Pakistan’s external security relationships. Its central provision states that an armed attack against one signatory will be regarded as an attack against all, framed as collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Türkiye contributes a sophisticated defence industry, especially in drones and electronic warfare. Saudi Arabia offers financing, advanced equipment and regional influence. Pakistan brings a large military establishment, operational experience and a nuclear deterrent. The pact has already moved toward institutionalisation, including a secretariat and defence-industrial cooperation.

The agreement could expand training, intelligence exchange, defence-industrial collaboration and diplomatic coordination. It may also give Pakistan additional strategic depth and international leverage.

Nonetheless, three caveats are essential to keep in view. First, the pact does not automatically create a unified military command. Second, its signatories have divergent strategic priorities. Third, Pakistan itself describes the accord as defensive and not directed against any country.

Nor should Pakistan’s commitments to Saudi Arabia be conflated with confirmed participation in combat against the Houthis. Recent arrangements for rapid deployment of forces and capabilities to Saudi Arabia demonstrate activation of the pact’s collective-defence machinery, but not proof of Pakistani troops engaged in frontline combat.

For India, the concern is not necessarily a coordinated military intervention. It is that Pakistan may acquire a wider network of partners, resources and diplomatic channels that complicates crisis management and dilutes international pressure.

Pakistan’s short-term options: the next 6–12 months

First, consolidate conventional deterrence. Pakistan will likely strengthen air defence, combat aviation, missiles, surveillance and electronic warfare. The objective is to raise the cost of Indian military action and reduce its own vulnerability in the opening phase of any future confrontation.

Second, retain sub-conventional pressure. Terrorism remains the most dangerous trigger for renewed hostilities. Any attack attributed to Pakistan-based groups could place both countries on an escalation ladder. If India concluded that Pakistani agencies had sponsored or enabled such an attack, another military response could follow—and Pakistan would risk losing control over its scale and duration.

Third, expand unmanned and cyber capabilities. Drones, loitering munitions, precision weapons and electronic warfare offer tools for surveillance, signalling and limited coercion. Cyber operations may also feature in a crisis, though attribution is difficult. These instruments enhance operational flexibility but multiply opportunities for miscalculation.

Fourth, mobilise diplomatic leverage. In a crisis, Pakistan will activate its relationships with Washington, Beijing, Riyadh and Ankara. Its aim will be to internationalise the confrontation, constrain India and secure an early ceasefire. Success in these efforts would depend heavily on the circumstances that triggered hostilities.

The pattern is reasonably clear: Pakistan’s immediate preference will be to strengthen deterrence while retaining instruments of limited confrontation—not to initiate a full-scale conventional war.

Medium-term options: One to three years

Over the next three years, Pakistan’s posture will depend on modernisation, external assistance and economic capacity. Likely priorities:

Integrated air power and precision strike will likely be Pakistan’s highest  priority.  Chinese aircraft, missiles, air-defence systems and unmanned platforms could contribute towards improving Pakistan’s ability to contest Indian air superiority.

Missiles and nuclear deterrence will also continue to anchor Pakistani strategy. Its nuclear arsenal is designed to deter a major Indian conventional offensive by raising the potential costs of escalation. But nuclear threats cannot guarantee immunity from conventional retaliation, and any movement toward nuclear use would carry catastrophic consequences for Pakistan.

Defence-industrial cooperation with China and Türkiye could improve Pakistan’s access to drones, electronics, maintenance and joint production. Yet dependence on external suppliers creates vulnerabilities in financing, components and wartime replenishment.

Further, Pakistan would depend on simultaneous Chinese pressure along the northern frontier even without launching a major operation itself. Still, coordination between Beijing and Islamabad should not be mistaken for an automatic commitment to fight a joint war.

The constraints Pakistan cannot escape

Nonetheless, Pakistan’s military ambitions are bounded by economic weakness, internal insecurity and dependence on external partners. Financing sustained military modernisation while meeting domestic needs will remain difficult. Militancy along the Afghan frontier competes for troops, intelligence resources and political attention.

China, the United States, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye each have interests of their own. None can be presumed to support every Pakistani decision, particularly one that risks a major regional war.

Also, India retains major advantages: a larger and more diverse military, greater economic weight, deeper defence-industrial capacity and broader international partnerships. Pakistan’s growing capabilities should not be mistaken for an ability to dictate the outcome of a prolonged conflict.

India’s response: Deterrence without overreach

India must prepare for a Pakistan that is more diplomatically confident, more deeply integrated with Chinese military technology and increasingly capable of pressure below the conventional threshold.

That requires resilient command and control, integrated air and missile defence, effective counter-drone systems, electronic warfare, reliable intelligence, adequate ammunition reserves and the capacity to sustain operations. Jointness across the armed services and accelerated domestic defence production are equally essential.

India must also retain a credible framework for responding to terrorism: evidence-based attribution, clear strategic objectives, calibrated military options and disciplined escalation management. Military preparedness must be matched by diplomatic engagement with Washington, Beijing, Riyadh and Ankara—and by a consistent international narrative that distinguishes Indian restraint from Indian weakness.

The aim is not to provoke Pakistan. It is to deny it the belief that it can impose costs while controlling every escalation pathway.

Conclusion: Pakistan may be more capable, but will remain constrained

Pakistan’s military options in 2026 are expanding through Chinese defence cooperation, Munir’s consolidation of power and its growing partnerships with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. In the short term, Islamabad will likely emphasise readiness, deterrence, limited confrontation and diplomatic leverage. Over the medium term, advances in air power, missiles, unmanned systems and defence-industrial cooperation could make future hostilities more technologically complex.

Yet economic fragility, internal security burdens and reliance on external partners impose real limits.

India’s principal concern is not that Pakistan has become invincible. It is that Pakistan may become more willing to take risks in the belief that nuclear deterrence and international intervention will prevent those risks from escaping its control.

India’s task is to disabuse Islamabad of that assumption—through credible conventional deterrence, resilient military capabilities, diplomatic preparedness and the demonstrated ability to respond decisively without surrendering control of escalation.

(Lt Gen Philip Campose (Retired) is a former Vice Chief of the Indian Army. He has authored a book titled ‘A National Security Strategy for India: The Way Forward’)

(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)