OPINION | The cold peace: Mapping China's designs on Ladakh

On October 13, 2026, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning reiterated the Chinese position on Ladakh and opposed India’s announcement of standard names for places in disputed border areas, including those under China’s control, stating the move is illegal and invalid.

The strategic significance of Ladakh and Aksai Chin to China is that it acts as a vital geographic connector between Xinjiang and Tibet, serving to protect Chinese infrastructure and the China–Pakistan axis. Beijing has historically manipulated its territorial claims through cartographic deception and diplomatic double standards to undermine Indian sovereignty in the region.

China’s Kashmir policy is a notable aspect of its foreign policy, the trajectory of which can be traced right from 1947 to recent turbulent times. China has had a special interest in the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), as through it lay the easiest route to Tibet. In later years, it started specifically claiming Ladakh as part of its territory, calling it ‘Little Tibet’. After the 1962 war with India, China responded to Pakistan’s offer to settle occupied Kashmir’s boundary, which Pakistan had initiated in 1959. Foreign Ministers Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Chen Yi signed their boundary agreement on March 3, 1963, in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, in the presence of the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China and Premier Zhou Enlai (The American Journal of International Law, 1963). Pakistan recognised Chinese sovereignty over hundreds of square kilometres of land in Northern Kashmir and Ladakh (Sino-Pakistan Frontier Agreement and Sino-Pak Boundary Agreement of 1963 between the governments of Pakistan and China).

The abrogation of Article 370 in Kashmir resulted in Pakistan unilaterally downgrading diplomatic relations with India and suspending all bilateral trade. The Chinese reaction was initially guarded and somewhat limited to only Ladakh, but the Galwan Valley clash in June 2020 spoke loudly of China’s intentions towards Ladakh.

A few publications from China after the abrogation of Article 370 and China’s moves clearly highlight the long-term plan it had for Kashmir. Even though Pakistan’s bid to internationalise the Kashmir issue suffered a setback, China gave full support to Pakistan.

On the other hand, China very clearly and strongly laid its claim to Ladakh, which was highlighted in a very detailed article published in Duowei News on May 18, 2019, before the abrogation of Article 370. The article clearly states that China is a stakeholder in Kashmir and quotes historical incidents, including treaties during British rule in India, to reiterate its claim to Ladakh (owing to its links to Tibetan culture) and Aksai Chin. The article states that China followed a non-intervention policy in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan but changed its position after the 1962 Sino-Indian War. The Chinese also raised objections on the issue of Ladakh during the Indian External Affairs Minister’s visit in August 2019, alongside its implications for the India–China border issue.

Since 2017, China has significantly increased its military presence and infrastructure along the India–China border, enabling rapid troop movement and extended stays. This has been coupled with China’s direct military support to Pakistan during the 2025 conflict. For example, a May 20 report by the Chinese think tank Spark claimed that Pakistan’s J-10CE aircraft shot down six Indian fighters—including Rafale, Su-30MKI, MiG-29, and Mirage-2000 jets—during the three-and-a-half-day conflict, describing a “6:0” outcome.

The report highlighted Pakistan’s integrated “four-in-one” combat system comprising J-10CE fighters, PL-15 missiles, ZDK-03 AEW&C aircraft, and air-defence radars. China also put out Pakistani propaganda via Reuters in Tokyo.

The current peace along the border is likely tactical and temporary. For now, the China–India relationship appears to be in a phase of temporary repair. However, the signals from China’s leadership and policy community, as well as military activities in the Western Theatre Command, suggest this is merely a truce. India should be prepared for continued pressure from China, particularly along the Line of Actual Control.

(The author is a research fellow at the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author's and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK)