OPINION | Grey-Zone conflict: How India can counter coercion without starting a war

India’s most consequential security challenge is no longer confined to the possibility of a conventional war with China or Pakistan. Increasingly, it lies in the expanding space between peace and war, where adversaries employ border provocations, cyber intrusions, disinformation, proxy violence, economic leverage and maritime coercion to advance strategic objectives without triggering an outright military confrontation. The purpose is not necessarily to defeat India militarily, but to exhaust its resources, undermine its confidence, alter the status quo and constrain its strategic choices.

This form of competition, commonly described as grey-zone conflict, exploits the reluctance of democracies to escalate, the difficulty of establishing attribution and the absence of clearly defined thresholds for retaliation. For India, facing two nuclear-armed adversaries with increasingly convergent strategic interests, the challenge is particularly complex.

India cannot treat every provocation as a casus belli. Equally, absorbing repeated coercion without imposing consequences risks encouraging further adventurism. The answer lies in a calibrated national strategy that denies adversaries easy gains, imposes proportionate costs, preserves escalation control and communicates credible red lines. India needs a comprehensive grey-zone doctrine integrating diplomatic, military, economic, technological, intelligence and informational capabilities.

The grey zone is India’s everyday security environment

The grey zone encompasses activities that fall below the threshold of conventional armed conflict but can have significant strategic consequences. These include cyberattacks against power grids, railways, financial systems and telecommunications; disinformation campaigns targeting social cohesion; incremental territorial encroachments; proxy terrorism; economic pressure; and coercive maritime activities.

China has institutionalised several elements of this approach through its concept of comprehensive national power and its ‘three warfares’ —public opinion, psychological and legal warfare. Its incremental actions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), infrastructure development in disputed areas, patrol assertiveness and maritime expansion demonstrate how strategic objectives can be pursued without initiating conventional hostilities.

Pakistan’s approach has traditionally relied on terrorism, proxy networks, disinformation and asymmetric warfare to impose costs on India while limiting the risk of conventional retaliation. Its growing defence and technological cooperation with China adds another dimension to India’s security concerns. The convergence of Chinese and Pakistani interests creates the possibility of coordinated pressure across land, maritime, cyber and informational domains, even if their operational objectives and methods differ.

The 2020 eastern Ladakh crisis demonstrated how incremental military actions could produce a prolonged confrontation and compel India to divert substantial resources. Operation Sindoor subsequently illustrated India’s willingness to employ calibrated military force against terrorist infrastructure while seeking to retain control over the wider escalation ladder. Meanwhile, cyber intrusions, unmanned systems, electronic warfare and disinformation have expanded the range of instruments available to adversaries.

The grey zone is therefore not a peripheral security concern. It is becoming a permanent feature of India’s strategic environment.

Why escalation alone is not the answer

A major challenge for India is distinguishing between demonstrating resolve and allowing an adversary to dictate the terms of escalation.

Pakistan has an incentive to provoke crises that internationalise bilateral disputes, attract third-party intervention and generate domestic political support. China, meanwhile, can exploit incremental pressure to test India’s responses, normalise territorial changes and stretch Indian military resources.

An inadequate response risks encouraging further coercion. An excessively aggressive response, however, may provide an adversary with justification for wider military action, disrupt India’s economic priorities and undermine its diplomatic relationships.

India must therefore develop a middle path: firm enough to deter, proportionate enough to remain credible and sufficiently controlled to avoid unintended escalation. Strategic patience should not be confused with strategic passivity. Recommendations:

1. Adopt a national grey-zone doctrine

India needs a formally articulated national doctrine defining grey-zone threats, assigning institutional responsibilities, establishing response thresholds and identifying the instruments available to the state.

Three principles should underpin it.

First, denial must precede punishment. India’s priority should be to prevent an adversary from achieving a strategic gain. This includes denying territorial encroachment, protecting critical infrastructure, disrupting proxy networks and countering disinformation before it gains traction.

Second, responses must be proportionate and calibrated. A cyber intrusion need not automatically invite a military response. Depending on its scale and consequences, it could justify diplomatic action, public attribution, sanctions, legal measures or calibrated cyber countermeasures. The response should impose costs without unnecessarily widening the confrontation.

Third, red lines must be credible. Attacks on critical infrastructure, military command systems, financial networks and other nationally vital assets should attract clearly communicated consequences. India should develop a declaratory framework linking the severity and consequences of hostile actions to the range of possible responses, without committing itself to automatic retaliation.

Such a doctrine would provide strategic clarity without revealing operational capabilities or compromising flexibility.

2. Establish a national grey-zone coordination mechanism

India’s institutional challenge is fragmentation. Intelligence agencies, military headquarters, cyber-security organisations, diplomatic establishments, economic regulators and domestic security agencies operate within different administrative structures. Grey-zone operations deliberately exploit the gaps between them.

India should establish a permanent National Grey-Zone Crisis Coordination Centre under the strategic direction of the National Security Council Secretariat. It should integrate the armed forces, intelligence agencies, Ministries of Defence, Home Affairs and External Affairs, CERT-In, the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC), financial regulators, telecommunications authorities and relevant state governments.

Its responsibilities should include identifying converging threats, coordinating intelligence assessments, developing response options, ensuring consistent strategic communications and conducting regular inter-agency crisis simulations.

India already possesses important institutional building blocks, including CERT-In and NCIIPC. The priority should be to connect these capabilities through common operating procedures, secure information-sharing systems and clearly defined decision-making responsibilities.

A crisis involving a border confrontation, cyberattack and coordinated disinformation campaign should not find different government agencies responding independently. India needs a whole-of-government response mechanism capable of acting at the speed of the threat.

3. Build resilience against cyber, economic and technological coercion

Critical infrastructure is an attractive grey-zone target because disruption can create disproportionate political and economic consequences. Power grids, ports, railways, telecommunications, payment systems, hospitals and energy networks must therefore be treated as strategic assets.

India should strengthen cyber protection through zero-trust architecture, network segmentation, mandatory security audits, continuous monitoring, incident reporting and regular recovery exercises. Protection must extend beyond government systems to private operators, state utilities, contractors and supply-chain partners.

Economic resilience is equally important. Dependence on a limited number of external suppliers for critical minerals, semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, energy technology and essential software can create strategic vulnerabilities. Diversifying supply chains, expanding domestic manufacturing, strengthening indigenous research and development and developing trusted international partnerships must become integral to national security planning.

The objective is not technological autarky but strategic freedom of action. An adversary should not be able to paralyse essential services or influence India’s foreign policy through economic or technological pressure.

Resilience itself is deterrence: coercion becomes less attractive when disruption cannot produce lasting strategic advantage.

4. Win the information battle through credibility

Disinformation is no longer simply a propaganda exercise. It can deepen social divisions, undermine institutional credibility, create public anxiety and constrain political decision-making during a crisis.

China’s information warfare and Pakistan’s established disinformation networks demonstrate the importance of controlling the narrative surrounding security incidents. False claims, manipulated imagery and fabricated accounts can spread internationally before official verification is complete.

India’s answer should not be censorship or the suppression of legitimate debate. That would weaken the democratic credibility that gives India an important international advantage.

Instead, India needs a professional strategic communications capability that can verify and publish facts rapidly, use satellite imagery and technical evidence where appropriate, brief domestic and international media consistently and expose coordinated manipulation. Partnerships with independent researchers, fact-checkers, technology platforms and academic institutions can improve credibility.

The guiding principle should be simple: India must be first with verified facts, not first with accusations. Transparency, consistency and institutional trust are more sustainable instruments of information security than state-controlled narratives.

5. Develop pre-authorised, proportionate response options

Grey-zone crises often move faster than conventional bureaucratic decision-making. If every response requires fresh consultations across multiple ministries, India risks surrendering the initiative.

Political leadership should therefore approve a graded set of response options in advance, linked to clearly defined scenarios and escalation assessments. These should include diplomatic, economic, legal, informational, cyber and military instruments.

For example, border provocations should trigger rapid documentation, enhanced surveillance, local reinforcement and diplomatic protest. Cyber intrusions should invite immediate containment, technical attribution, legal action and, where justified, calibrated countermeasures. Disinformation campaigns should be countered through rapid fact publication, exposure of coordinated networks and international engagement. Proxy attacks should be addressed through intelligence-led disruption, financial investigations, diplomatic action and military options governed by clear political objectives.

Importantly, every response should include an assessment of likely adversary reactions, escalation risks and termination conditions.

This approach would allow India to impose costs without automatically resorting to kinetic force. It would also prevent adversaries from exploiting uncertainty about India’s thresholds and decision-making processes.

6. Extend deterrence across the maritime and conventional domains

India’s grey-zone strategy must extend beyond its land borders. The Indian Ocean is increasingly a theatre of strategic competition, with China expanding its naval presence, port access, surveillance capabilities and dual-use infrastructure across India’s maritime neighbourhood.

Maritime coercion can take several forms: persistent naval deployments, intelligence-gathering activities, ostensibly civilian vessels operating in contested waters, pressure on smaller littoral states and threats to ports, offshore energy installations and undersea communication cables.

India must strengthen maritime domain awareness through integrated coastal surveillance, satellite monitoring, unmanned platforms, information-sharing with friendly navies and closer cooperation with Indian Ocean littoral states. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands, given their strategic location overlooking the approaches to the Malacca Strait, deserve particular attention.

Conventional military deterrence remains equally important. Modern border infrastructure, surveillance, logistics, air defence, electronic warfare, drones, precision munitions and joint operational capabilities are essential to deny China or Pakistan a local military advantage. Strong conventional forces provide political leaders with the confidence to exercise restraint in other domains.

Military strength, however, must complement rather than dominate the gray-zone response. The objective is to deter major aggression while retaining the flexibility to respond through non-military instruments.

The larger objective: Make coercion unprofitable

India should not measure success in grey-zone competition by the visibility or severity of each retaliation. The more meaningful measure is whether adversaries are prevented from changing the status quo, disrupting national life or constraining India’s strategic choices.

That requires moving from a reactive posture to one of proactive deterrence and strategic initiative. India must be capable of anticipating hostile actions, denying opportunities, exposing covert operations, imposing calibrated costs and building partnerships that reduce vulnerabilities.

Equally important is preserving diplomatic off-ramps. As a major economy with expanding global interests, India cannot allow every confrontation to derail its developmental priorities or strategic partnerships. Its objective should be to defend national interests while retaining freedom of manoeuvre.

The grey zone rewards preparation, patience and precision. India must recognise it as a permanent arena of national competition, not merely a lesser form of conventional warfare.

Ultimately, India’s success will not be determined by how forcefully it retaliates, but by how effectively it prevents coercion from succeeding. The ability to deter below the threshold of war, without being drawn into war, will be a defining measure of India’s strategic maturity and its emergence as a consequential global power.

(Lt Gen Philip Campose (Retired) is a former Vice Chief of the Indian Army. He has authored a book titled ‘A National Security Strategy for India: The Way Forward’)

(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)