Most Arab-Israeli war and spy stories are about how Israel prevailed— how cleverer their spies had been, how superior their tactics were, how they outwitted the Arabs who had larger forces, and so on. As if the enemies were dumbos! Often, these stories read like Alistair MacLean novels and movies, which were all about how Allied commandos always outwitted the Germans. The worst, though delightful to watch, was Where Eagles Dare.
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The Arabs too have been fine fighters, strategists, and tacticians, especially the Egyptians, who had kept oiled a fine war machine. Let’s hear one such story of how Egypt displayed superior tactics and outwitted the spy-smart Israelis, at least in the first phase of the 1973 war, often called the Ramadan war and the Yom Kippur War.
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat used to frequently raise war cries against Israel. Israel used to take these seriously and prepare to face an attack. But the attack wasn’t coming.
Meanwhile, Sadat asked the Soviet Union to send him MiG-23 fighter jets. He also began placing large orders for spare parts required for other weapons that Egypt had previously purchased, and began sending frequent reminders to Moscow.
Sadat knew that all his messages were being intercepted by the Israelis, who were skilled in espionage. Israeli spies informed their superiors that Egypt had placed large orders for weapons and spare parts. This made the Israeli prime minister Golda Meir, defence minister Moshe Dayan, and other leaders wonder: would Egypt prepare for war if it lacked so much of weaponry and spare parts?
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When the weapons and spares didn't arrive on time, Sadat feigned a minor tiff with Moscow. He sent back the nearly 20,000 Soviet military advisers who had been in Egypt. This convinced Israel that war was still a long way off. Much like the fable of 'The Shepherd Boy Who Cried Wolf.' Israel began to ignore Sadat's war cries.
From May to August, Egypt conducted military exercises near the Suez Canal. Each time the Egyptian army moved for an exercise, Israel prepared for battle, assuming that an attack was imminent. When such drills and movements, much like Sadat's war cries, became routine, Israel was convinced that Sadat was all bark and no bite. Slowly, Israel began to lower its guard.
In September, Egypt prepared for another military exercise. When reserve soldiers were also called up for this, Israel feared a war was imminent. However, on October 4, Egypt began to demobilise them, and also granted leave to those who had requested it to go on the Umrah pilgrimage.
Egyptian general staff knew that Israel was monitoring the movements of the pilgrims. When Israeli spies identified soldiers among the Egyptian pilgrims, they concluded that Egypt was not preparing for war. Moreover, would a Muslim country prepare for war during the month of Ramadan? Nevertheless, when Egypt's ally Syria also began a military exercise, Israel sent a small force to the Syrian border.
Spies reported to Israel’s top brass that Sadat would actually launch an attack on October 6. But in light of the other "evidence," Israeli leaders ignored their reports—a classic case of wolf, wolf cries. It was only a few hours before Egypt's attack on October 6 that Israel sensed danger. By the time they moved the forces, the enemy had captured much of the territory.
Egypt and its allies had the upper hand in the initial phase of the war. They recaptured the bulk of the territory that they had lost in the earlier wars. Although Israel finally prevailed, it was a pyrrhic victory of sorts—at the negotiation tables later, Israel was compelled to hand back to Egypt the entire Sinai Peninsula that they had captured in earlier wars.
