The year 2026 is unlikely to mark a clean break from the turbulence of the past three years. Instead, it will deepen and institutionalise many of the structural disruptions already reshaping global politics, economics, and security. The illusion of a stable post–Cold War order has long evaporated; what is emerging in its place is not a neat multipolar balance, but a fragmented, highly contested, and technologically accelerated world. For India, 2026 will be a year of heightened risk – but also of unprecedented opportunity, provided it reads the strategic landscape with clarity and acts with coherence.
Here are a few strategic predictions:
The global order: From ‘efforts at multipolarity’ to 'disorderly polarity'
By 2026, the international system will have moved beyond the language of ‘multipolarity’ into what might best be described as “disorderly polarity”. Power will be diffused across states, blocs, corporations, and technology platforms, with no single actor capable of enforcing rules or guaranteeing stability.
The United States will remain the most powerful actor, and increasingly aggressive as it feels constrained— fiscally stretched, domestically polarised, and strategically overextended across Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East. China, meanwhile, will not have achieved hegemonic parity with the US, but will continue to contest influence through selective assertiveness, economic leverage, and grey-zone coercion rather than outright confrontation.
Russia, weakened by prolonged conflict and sanctions, is less likely to behave as a global power and more like a ‘strategic disruptor’, willing to destabilise regions through energy, cyber, and military means. The European Union will remain economically significant but strategically hesitant, torn between internal politics, demographic decline, and security dependence on the US.
For India, this fragmented order means fewer fixed alignments and more ‘issue-based’ relationships, demanding diplomatic agility rather than ideological rigidity.
War without peace: Normalisation of protracted conflict
By 2026, the world will have grown accustomed to ‘wars that do not end’, only mutate. The Russia–Ukraine conflict, the Israel–Hamas–Iran axis tensions, instability in the Red Sea, and unresolved flashpoints in Africa will persist at varying intensities.
The defining feature of modern conflict will be ‘managed escalation’—states seeking to hurt adversaries without triggering full-scale war. Precision strikes, proxy militias, cyber sabotage, economic warfare, and information operations will become routine instruments of statecraft.
This trend has profound implications for India. It suggests that the line between war and peace will remain blurred, particularly along India’s borders with China and Pakistan. India must prepare not just for conventional war, but for ‘persistent low-intensity confrontation’ across multiple domains.
China in 2026: Assertive, anxious, and adaptive
China in 2026 will be neither collapsing nor triumphant. Its economy will likely continue to slow due to demographic decline, property sector stress, constrained access to advanced technologies, and targeted strikes on its interests by the US. Yet these pressures are not likely to moderate Beijing’s behaviour; they may intensify it.
Strategically, China will double down on three priorities:
- Securing its periphery, particularly Taiwan and the South China Sea.
- Reducing vulnerability to Western technology and finance.
- Testing US resolve through calibrated coercion of its neighbours over territorial disputes.
Along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India, China will maintain pressure through infrastructure build-up, rotational deployments, and psychological signalling—attempting to keep India strategically tied down without provoking a major war.
India should expect no early ‘reset’ with China. 2026 will reinforce the reality that China sees India not as a partner, but as a long-term competitor - whose rise must be undermined.
The United States: Committed but conditional
US strategy in 2026 will be marked by continuity in objectives but variability in execution. In addition, a more muscular ‘Monroe Doctrine 2.0’ will be at play to ensure ‘hemispheric dominance’. Regardless of political leadership, Washington’s core priorities—retaining global supremacy, containing China, sustaining alliances, and preserving technological primacy—will remain intact.
However, US commitment will increasingly be ‘conditional’ rather than ‘unconditional’. Allies and partners will be expected to shoulder greater burdens, align more clearly, and deliver tangible strategic value.
For India, this creates both leverage and responsibility. The US will court India as a critical Indo-Pacific balancer, but will also expect:
- Greater defence interoperability
- Clearer alignment on regional security
- Faster progress on defence and technology collaboration
India’s challenge will be to repair relations and deepen cooperation without compromising strategic autonomy—a balancing act that will become even more delicate in 2026.
The weaponisation of economics and technology
By 2026, economic interdependence will no longer be viewed as a stabilising force, but as a strategic vulnerability. Sanctions, export controls, supply chain manipulation, and financial coercion will be mainstream tools of geopolitical competition.
Technology will sit at the heart of this contest. Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum computing, space assets, and cyber capabilities will define national power more than traditional industrial metrics.
India’s strategic position here is mixed. It is not yet a technology leader, but it is indispensable as a manufacturing alternative, digital market, and talent pool. In 2026, India’s success will depend on whether it can:
- Translate “China+1” rhetoric into real industrial capacity, generating better employment opportunities for its people
- Secure critical technologies without overdependence
- Diversify corporate power and clamp down on corrupt practices
- Align its economic security strategy with its national security goals
Failure to do so risks India becoming a battleground economy rather than a strategic beneficiary.
The Indo-Pacific: The world’s strategic centre of gravity
The Indo-Pacific will be the primary theatre of global competition in 2026. Maritime security, freedom of navigation, undersea cables, chokepoints, and island chains will dominate strategic planning.
The Quad will continue to evolve—not as an alliance, but as a ‘coordination mechanism’ spanning security, technology, infrastructure, and resilience. Meanwhile, ASEAN will struggle to maintain relevance amid great-power competition, while smaller states hedge rather than choose sides.
India’s role in the Indo-Pacific will expand, but so will expectations. New Delhi will be increasingly judged not by statements, but by its ability to:
- Sustain naval presence
- Deliver regional public goods
- Act decisively in crises
Strategic credibility, not rhetorical leadership, will be the currency of influence.
India’s immediate neighbourhood: Instability likely as the norm
South Asia in 2026 will remain one of the world’s most volatile regions. Pakistan will continue to oscillate between economic fragility and military dominance, using sub-conventional tools to retain relevance. Its recent external partnerships may embolden it towards military adventurism across borders. Afghanistan will remain unstable, exporting extremism and uncertainty. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka will face internal political and economic pressures with regional spillovers.
For India, neighbourhood instability will not be episodic—it will be structural. Managing it will require:
- A blend of firmness and restraint
- Economic engagement without political naïveté
- Strong internal security to prevent spillovers
India’s greatest vulnerability lies not in external aggression, but in the possibility of cascading regional instability interacting with domestic fault lines.
Internal strength as the foundation of external power
Perhaps the most important strategic truth of 2026 is that ‘external power will be inseparable from internal cohesion’. Countries that manage political stability, social trust, economic growth, and technological adaptation will outperform those that rely solely on military strength.
For India, this means that national security will increasingly depend on:
- Economic resilience and job creation
- Existence of institutional independence, social harmony and democratic legitimacy – and related external perception of the same
- Optimising military capacity, policy coherence and self-reliance
- Resolution of ongoing internal conflicts and prevention of new ones.
Strategic ambition without internal strength will be unsustainable.
Conclusion: 2026 as a test of strategic maturity
The world of 2026 will not reward complacency or romanticism. It will favour states that think long-term, invest patiently, and act decisively when required. For India, the year will be less about dramatic breakthroughs and more about strategic consolidation—strengthening deterrence, deepening partnerships, securing supply chains, and stabilising its neighbourhood.
India will not yet be a global rule-maker in 2026 - in fact, far from it. But it can decisively shape the rules of its immediate environment. The choices it makes—between alignment and autonomy, between acceleration and caution, between rhetoric and capacity—will determine whether it enters the 2030s as a confident leading power or a perpetually emerging one.
In that sense, 2026 will not merely be another year in India’s rise; it will be a quiet but consequential test of its strategic adulthood.
(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK)
(The writer was Vice Chief of the Indian Army. He has authored the book ‘A National Security Strategy for India – the Way Forward’)
