When the United States releases a National Security Strategy (NSS), it is less a doctrinal textbook than a political signal — a map of priorities, a hierarchy of interests, and a guide to how Washington intends to spend attention, resources, and risk.
The US National Security Strategy (NSS) 2025, released by the Trump administration on 4 December 2025, prioritises American sovereignty, economic power, and industrial capacity as core pillars of security. It shifts from prior globalist approaches to "America First" principles, emphasising reindustrialisation, tariffs, export controls, and reshoring supply chains to counter China economically.
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Economic nationalism drives the strategy, treating trade imbalances, border security, and energy dominance as vital defences, while rejecting mass migration and climate agendas like Net Zero. Military buildup focuses on lethal, advanced forces for quick victories, including AI, quantum technology, and potential systems like the "Golden Dome".
The Western Hemisphere tops priorities via a "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, curbing Chinese influence. Allies face demands for 5% GDP defence spending and alignment on export controls, with transactional burden-sharing. China remains the primary threat, targeted through economic rebalancing.
The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy does not elevate the India relationship any further, nor does it demote it dramatically. What it does, instead, is more consequential: it redefines the terms of engagement. For India, the message is clear. Washington still wants New Delhi close — but no longer out of sentiment, or perceptions of shared values and grand democratic narratives. The relationship is now framed in hard, transactional terms: what India brings to the table in the Indo-Pacific, how it strengthens U.S. leverage vis-à-vis China, how it fits into America’s narrower conception of national interest, and possibly, how it reaffirms its traditional democratic values. That shift has profound implications for India–U.S. relations.
A strategy of retrenchment, not retreat
The 2025 NSS is shaped by a more inward-looking America. It does not announce withdrawal from the world, but it is explicit about selectivity. The United States will prioritise theatres that directly affect its prosperity, technological edge, and security. The Indo-Pacific remains one such theatre — and that is where India’s relevance endures.
Yet the tone has changed. Unlike earlier strategies that spoke of “defining partnerships” and “shared democratic values,” the current document speaks the language of burden-sharing, reciprocity, and returns on investment. Alliances and partnerships are no longer ends in themselves; they are tools. For India, accustomed to strategic autonomy and wary of entanglements, this approach is both familiar and unsettling.
India still matters — but differently
There is no question that India retains strategic salience in U.S. thinking. The NSS explicitly identifies India as a key partner and highlights its role in Indo-Pacific stability, maritime security, supply-chain resilience, and emerging technologies. Cooperation through the Quad is reaffirmed, and defence-technology collaboration is encouraged.
This continuity matters. It confirms that India is not a passing interest, nor merely a counterweight of convenience. The U.S. recognises India as a consequential power whose choices will shape Asia’s balance.
But recognition is not reassurance. The NSS 2025 stops well short of offering political or security guarantees. There is no promise of U.S. involvement in India’s continental challenges, no explicit mention of border tensions with China, and no indication that Washington would place Indian security concerns above its own escalation thresholds. India is important — but not indispensable.
The end of strategic romance?
Perhaps the most significant change lies not in what the NSS says, but in what it omits. Gone is the expansive rhetoric of democratic solidarity. Gone, too, is the suggestion that India–U.S. ties are uniquely values-driven.
Instead, the relationship is framed as pragmatic convergence. India is valued for its geography, its market, its military mass, and its political weight — not for ideological alignment. This suits sections of the Indian strategic establishment that have long been sceptical of value-laden foreign policy. But it also means that goodwill is more fragile. In a transactional relationship, leverage matters more than sentiment.
Security without guarantees
For Indian planners, the NSS reinforces a sobering reality: the United States will help India build capacity, but it will not underwrite Indian security. Cooperation will focus on interoperability, intelligence sharing, logistics, and technology — not treaty commitments.
This is not necessarily bad news. It aligns with India’s preference for avoiding formal alliances. But it also means that India must plan for contingencies without assuming American intervention. Deterrence against China, particularly along the Himalayan frontier, remains primarily India’s responsibility.
At the same time, the NSS’s emphasis on maritime security and the Indo-Pacific opens space for deeper naval coordination, domain awareness, and presence operations. These measures strengthen deterrence indirectly, complicating Chinese calculations without binding either side to automatic escalation.
Technology: The bright spot — with conditions
If there is one area where the NSS offers tangible upside for India, it is technology and economics. The document treats supply chains, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and defence innovation as core national security concerns. India’s scale, talent pool, and manufacturing ambitions make it a natural partner.
This creates an opportunity to move beyond buyer–seller defence relations towards co-development and co-production. It also aligns with India’s own push for technological self-reliance.
But here too, transactionalism cuts both ways. It appears access will be conditional. Export controls, intellectual-property concerns, and expectations of policy alignment will shape cooperation. India will need to negotiate hard to ensure that technology partnerships enhance autonomy rather than create new dependencies.
The China factor — Central but complicated
China remains the organising principle of U.S. strategy, and India is implicitly positioned as part of the competitive landscape. Yet the NSS is careful not to frame India as a frontline state or proxy. Washington appears keen to avoid commitments that could entangle it in a continental conflict.
For India, this reinforces an uncomfortable truth: while U.S. interests and Indian concerns overlap vis-à-vis China, they are not identical. The U.S. focus is maritime and technological; India’s primary challenge is territorial and continental. The NSS does little to bridge that gap.
Russia: The unspoken tension
India’s relationship with Russia remains an undercurrent in India–U.S. ties. The NSS’s hardening stance on strategic competitors indirectly increases pressure on countries that maintain close ties with Moscow.
Washington may tolerate India’s Russia policy, but patience is not infinite. Defence diversification, reduced dependence on Russian platforms, and clearer signalling on long-term orientation will become increasingly important for New Delhi. Managing this transition without compromising readiness or autonomy will test Indian diplomacy.
What India should do
- The 2025 NSS does not require India to rethink its partnership with the United States — but it does demand greater realism.
- Indigenous Capability: India must double down on indigenous capability. In a world of conditional partnerships, self-reliance is the ultimate hedge.
- Practical Cooperation: New Delhi should lock in practical cooperation where interests align — technology, maritime security, supply chains — while resisting pressures that constrain strategic choice.
- Diversification: India must continue diversifying partnerships. Europe, Japan, ASEAN, and the Global South are not alternatives to the U.S., but complements that reduce vulnerability.
- Exert Influence: India should enhance and exert influence. A transactional world rewards those who bring assets, shape norms, and set agendas. India’s convening power — in the G20, Quad, BRICS, and beyond — is a strategic asset that the NSS implicitly acknowledges.
Conclusion
The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy appears to mark the end of the "romantic phase" of India–U.S. relations and the beginning of something more transactional — and more demanding. The partnership remains valuable, but it is no longer cushioned by assumptions of automatic alignment or rhetoric like "natural allies" or "shared democratic destiny".
For India, this is not a setback. It is an invitation to act as what it increasingly is: a power that cooperates by choice, not by dependency. The NSS reminds New Delhi that in today’s world, friendships endure not because they are proclaimed — but because they are continually analysed and renegotiated. It also reminds India that its own NSS is long overdue.
(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK)
(The writer was Vice Chief of the Indian Army. He has authored the book ‘A National Security Strategy for India – the Way Forward’)
