In 1910, a Chinese warlord sent an expedition to the Lohit Valley in the far eastern part of present-day Arunachal Pradesh. The expedition’s arrival near Walong, in today’s Anjaw district, caused an alarm in London. Though it was a brief intrusion, the British were worried that Chinese expansion towards the Himalayan frontier could undermine Tibet’s position as a buffer between British India and China. Soon, the British found an opportunity and decided to call for a tripartite conference in Simla (now Shimla) to settle the boundaries and political relationship between Tibet, China and British India.
“The borders were first drawn on two sheets of paper in March 1914,” says Claude Arpi, distinguished fellow at the Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies at Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence, Delhi. “It carried two signatures and two seals—of Sir Henry McMahon, the British plenipotentiary, and Lonchen Shatra Paljor Dorje, the Tibetan prime minister. China did not sign it.”
Beijing has since maintained that Tibet did not possess the authority to conclude an international boundary agreement independently. For India, this agreement gave birth to the McMahon Line. “It was not a perfect map,” says Arpi. “In some areas, discrepancies with the watershed were noticed by the authorities, but that was much later.”
Today, there are no mutually agreed maps delineating the Line of Actual Control in these areas, and the patrolling patterns of border forces along this long stretch of mountainous terrain are generally respected by both sides. But China seems to have broken the status quo, and deviations of even two to three kilometres are worrying Delhi. The ministry of external affairs describes these developments as “diverging from established patrolling patterns”, bringing the focus back to the need to speed up the complex border negotiations.
THE MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR AN UNDERSTANDING
One of the early attempts at border negotiations came during Chinese premier Zhou Enlai’s visit to India in 1960. According to an account referred to by former diplomat and minister K. Natwar Singh, who was then a junior foreign service officer involved in arrangements for the Chinese premier’s visit, Zhou was of the opinion that India should not insist on calling it the McMahon Line because it was a British colonial instrument. “China would in no circumstance accept McMahon line,” he wrote.
“Some accounts suggest that it could instead be called the People’s Line, which might make it easier for the Chinese side to accept,” says Srikanth Kondapalli, professor of Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. “This is significant because it suggests that the Chinese position on the eastern sector was not always as rigid as it subsequently became.”
But this came with a caveat. China wanted India to recognise Aksai Chin as Chinese territory. Jawaharlal Nehru did not agree to a territorial exchange. The 1962 India-China war underscored how differently the two sides viewed the LAC.
Over the past two decades, there has been a significant shift in China’s position on Arunachal Pradesh, with Beijing once again advancing the argument that the Indian state is part of what it calls Southern Tibet. “By linking its territorial claim to Tibet, Beijing has once again sought to give the issue a larger political and strategic significance,” says Kondapalli.
THE THREE STAGES OF BOUNDARY RESOLUTION
When the Sino-Indian Special Representatives’ dialogue mechanism began in the early 2000s, the emphasis was on the clarification and definition of the LAC. Over time, the terminology used in the discussions appears to have evolved.
There are broadly three stages in resolving a territorial boundary dispute, says Kondapalli. The first involves defining the boundary or clarifying the Line of Actual Control. Both sides put forward their respective territorial claims, maps, historical arguments and supporting evidence. The objective is to establish a mutually understood line. The second stage is delimitation, in which the two sides negotiate the precise alignment of the boundary on maps. The third stage is demarcation, in which the agreed boundary is marked on the ground, using cartographic surveys, GPS technology and other technical instruments to establish the precise boundary in coordination with the other side.
In August, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met in Beijing, where both sides agreed to advance discussions on an “early and substantial harvest” of boundary delimitation and border management. The next round of Special Representatives’ talks will be held in India in 2027. “The use of the term delimitation in the SR discussions suggests that the negotiations may have moved beyond the initial stage of simply clarifying the LAC. But the proceedings are confidential, and it is possible that once the officials work through the technical and cartographic aspects, the matter will eventually be placed before the political leadership,” says Kondapalli. “The political leadership will then need to get it ratified through the appropriate constitutional process.”
India’s experience with major constitutional decisions, including the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, indicates that a government with sufficient parliamentary support can take significant political decisions through Parliament.
DIPLOMATIC DILEMMA OR AN OPPORTUNITY?
But, before that happens, negotiators are wary of the continuing militarisation under the guise of economic development, which could shift the tactical balance along the eastern sector of the LAC. Namrata Hasija, research fellow at the Delhi-based Centre for China Analysis and Strategy, points to infrastructure projects in Nyingchi (Nyingtri), a strategic hub in the Tibet Autonomous Region. According to Hasija, the Nyingtri Municipal Development and Reform Commission’s outline for the 15th five-year plan, issued in June, outlines the scale and direction of China’s ambitions in the region opposite Arunachal Pradesh.
Similarly, the Yarlung Tsangpo hydropower station project has raised concerns about dual-use infrastructure, accompanied by the deployment of large numbers of PLA personnel for logistical and security purposes. “Therefore, whether it is the renaming of villages in Arunachal Pradesh or the deployment of advanced surface-to-air missile systems to protect the Three Gorges Dam in Hubei, Chinese assertions reflect the shift in the tactical balance engineered by Beijing, going beyond established patrolling patterns,” she says.
But New Delhi cannot limit its options to simply trying to match Beijing’s infrastructure or military strength. According to Penpa Tsering, president of the Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala, India needs to revisit its own historical records, maps and negotiations to recognise its historical boundary with Tibet and not allow China to dictate the terms of a piecemeal border settlement.
Given China’s evolving position on the border, international diplomatic support also remains important for New Delhi. Notably, the United States has, over time, increasingly demonstrated its recognition of the McMahon Line, beginning with historical references to the American State Department’s position during the 1962 war and extending to visits by successive US ambassadors to Arunachal Pradesh.
More recently, US lawmakers have introduced bipartisan legislation, known as the Assuring the Future of Tibet Act of 2026, to formally recognise and support the Central Tibetan Administration. US support for the CTA in the post-Dalai Lama era has the potential to bring American interests in countering Beijing’s authoritarian ambitions right to India’s doorstep.
While the American argument may be limited to the religious and cultural freedom of Tibetans, the larger unanswered question is whether this could create an opportunity for India to reassess its own Tibet policy, particularly its position on the historical India-Tibet boundary and the unresolved border dispute with China.