Penpa Tsering, president of the Central Tibetan Administration, discusses the historical context of the India-China border dispute, warning against piecemeal settlements with Beijing. He highlights China's strategic infrastructure expansion on the Tibetan plateau and addresses the geopolitical implications of the Dalai Lama's future succession. Furthermore, Tsering touches upon regional trade imbalances, global economic support for China, and the urgent need for a collective Himalayan water-security framework to counter upstream dam projects.

Penpa Tsering, president of the Central Tibetan Administration, discusses the historical context of the India-China border dispute, warning against piecemeal settlements with Beijing. He highlights China's strategic infrastructure expansion on the Tibetan plateau and addresses the geopolitical implications of the Dalai Lama's future succession. Furthermore, Tsering touches upon regional trade imbalances, global economic support for China, and the urgent need for a collective Himalayan water-security framework to counter upstream dam projects.

Penpa Tsering, president of the Central Tibetan Administration, discusses the historical context of the India-China border dispute, warning against piecemeal settlements with Beijing. He highlights China's strategic infrastructure expansion on the Tibetan plateau and addresses the geopolitical implications of the Dalai Lama's future succession. Furthermore, Tsering touches upon regional trade imbalances, global economic support for China, and the urgent need for a collective Himalayan water-security framework to counter upstream dam projects.

Interview/ Penpa Tsering, president Central Tibetan Administration

The border dispute with China cannot be understood without acknowledging Tibet’s historical role, says Penpa Tsering, sikyong (president) of the Central Tibetan Administration, the Tibetan government-in-exile based in Dharamsala, as he explains the shift in China’s thinking on the vast frontier. If India accepts a piecemeal settlement of the border dispute, he warns that Beijing could conclude that certain areas have been resolved or that there is no problem there, while keeping the more difficult territorial disputes open. Excerpts from an exclusive interview:

China’s present strategy is to transform an entire generation of Tibetans into Chinese. If that succeeds, the traditional respect and cultural relationship between Tibet and India will also change.

Q/ There have been reports of expanding Chinese infrastructure along the Arunachal Pradesh border and an increasing military presence on the Tibetan plateau. Is there a significant shift underway?

There is certainly a major shift. If you look at China’s thinking, Tibet is a huge frontier. China has been building infrastructure, roads and villages for many years because its thinking is that if you have to secure a nation, you have to secure its frontier. I visited Nathu La in 2007, shortly after it reopened. There was practically one narrow road. That reflected a largely defensive posture on our side. China, meanwhile, continues to push its territorial claims. It is not simply about individual areas but part of a much larger strategy. We must understand the historical context as well as the changing military realities.

There has also been a change in India’s position on resolving the border dispute. Earlier, India’s position was that any settlement had to be comprehensive, covering the eastern, central and western sectors, rather than addressing the dispute piece by piece. China, however, has long advocated an early-harvest approach. I fear that if we accept a piecemeal settlement, China could say that certain areas have been resolved or that there is no problem there, while keeping the more difficult territorial disputes open. That has been its strategy.

Q/ India has repeatedly maintained that normalisation of bilateral relations depends on peace along the border. Yet trade continues to increase even as tensions persist.

India’s trade deficit with China has grown to around $112 billion in 2025-26. Trade is increasing, which benefits China, even as Beijing continues to create problems along the border. India must ask itself what it is gaining from this relationship. At one point, India took a strong position that normalisation could not happen without disengagement and a return to traditional military positions before the Galwan clash. China continues to push for what it considers important to its interests. The larger question is whether India fully understands the trajectory of China’s ambitions and how it intends to use its economic strength to expand its influence.

I often tell our friends in Europe that the dragon is biting them today. But who made the dragon so powerful? It was the Americans. China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2001 opened the channels for its integration into the global economy. European investment and technology transfers, whether legal or otherwise, as well as Japanese investments, also contributed to making China what it is today. Now, knowing that China is challenging them, why do countries continue to feed the dragon?

Giving peace a chance: A file picture of Indian Army returning yaks that strayed across the LAC in East Arunachal Pradesh to China | PTI

Q/ Is this part of a larger geopolitical strategy extending beyond Taiwan and the South China Sea?

Absolutely. China’s ambitions are not restricted to China, Taiwan, the South China Sea or the East China Sea. They are much wider. Look at the Belt and Road Initiative. More than a decade after its launch, what has been its impact on countries in the Global South? Several countries have accumulated enormous debt after accepting Chinese investments. When they are unable to repay those loans, China gains leverage over their decisions.

There are strategic implications, too. Look at Cambodia, the Coco Islands in Myanmar, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Djibouti. China is expanding its presence through infrastructure and military-related facilities. It is not just about land; it is also about access to the sea and strategic routes. What is happening in Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and even within China itself gives us an indication of the kind of system China wants to promote. There are restrictions on people’s freedom, the movement of capital and political expression. These are not isolated developments. They reflect a larger template. The world must understand that the more economic power China acquires, the more leverage it has to influence other countries.

Q/ Tibet was a signatory to the 1914 Simla Convention, under which the McMahon Line was drawn. Given this historical position, what role can Tibet play in defining India’s response to China’s territorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh?

The Simla Convention was negotiated in 1914. There were Chinese representatives in the initial negotiations, but the Chinese representative did not sign the final convention. The British and Tibetan representatives proceeded with the agreement.

This is part of the historical legacy that independent India inherited. Even today, when you look at maps, newspapers and strategic papers, Tibet is often represented only as the Tibet Autonomous Region. But Tibet extends beyond that administrative boundary. Qinghai and parts of Sichuan, including the Kham region, are also part of the larger Tibetan geographical and cultural landscape. Unless we recognise this reality, we cannot properly understand the historical relationship between India, Tibet and China. Tibetans have traditionally respected India as the land of the Buddha. But China’s present strategy is to transform an entire generation of Tibetans into Chinese. If that succeeds, the traditional respect and cultural relationship between Tibet and India will also change.

Q/ Do you think India should revisit its position on Tibet, particularly when China continues to claim Arunachal Pradesh as part of Southern Tibet?

India must recognise that both its northern and eastern borders were historically shared with Tibet, not with China. We are not asking countries to invent history, distort it or spread disinformation. We are asking them to acknowledge historical facts. There is enough material available. But when people do not have access to this information or are repeatedly exposed to Chinese propaganda, they begin to accept a distorted version of history.

Q/ The Dalai Lama's succession is emerging as a major geopolitical issue. What role do you expect India to play in this succession process?

China has been preparing for this for more than two decades. The first community to be affected will be the Tibetan community, but the implications extend to the larger Buddhist world and countries that respect religious freedom. China would like the Dalai Lama’s successor to return to China and Tibet so that it can control the entire institution. It believes that if it controls the next incarnation, it can control the Tibetan issue internationally. But a government that does not believe in religion wants to become the final arbiter of reincarnation. That would destroy the entire religious tradition.

His Holiness made his position very clear in his statement released on July 2, 2025, shortly before his 90th birthday. He affirmed that the institution of the Dalai Lama would continue and that the responsibility for recognising the next incarnation would rest with the Gaden Phodrang Trust. The process will follow Tibetan Buddhist traditions. The best way to understand it is to study how the 14th Dalai Lama himself was recognised after the demise of the 13th Dalai Lama. The process begins only after the present Dalai Lama’s demise. It is a religious process, not something that can be decided overnight.

The Indian government has already made certain statements supporting religious freedom. Just before His Holiness’s birthday, a minister publicly expressed his views. The ministry of external affairs has also stated that India respects religious freedom. These are important statements. There was a time, particularly between 2001 and 2008, when there was very little interest in Tibet. That has changed considerably. More people are now aware of the reality of China’s actions, despite the contradictions in international trade and diplomacy.

Q/ The United States has been taking legislative steps to support the Tibetan cause, including legislation on the succession of the Dalai Lama. Is recognising the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) the first step India should consider?

People should not be afraid to speak about the human rights situation in Tibet, the lack of religious freedom or the absence of political space. At the same time, we live here in India. We have survived because of the generosity of the Indian government and people. I have always said that I am in no position to advise the Indian government on policy matters.

The United States has passed several laws supporting Tibet, including legislation relating to the future of Tibet and the succession of the Dalai Lama. But the United States does not share a physical boundary with China. India does.

India’s northern boundary, which was historically the Indo-Tibetan border, has now become the India-China border. India’s immediate national interests have to be considered. We understand that. Even if the Indian government does not publicly announce everything it is doing, I believe it is doing enough to ensure that the Tibetan community survives. Without these communities in India, the Tibetan movement itself would be lost. We are grateful for the humanitarian support and the opportunities given to us. But, is that enough in the long term? That is the larger question.

Q/ Climate change in the Tibetan plateau is a cause of concern for India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Is it time to develop a common Himalayan water-security framework to address China’s upstream dam projects?

If you want to make it broader, then the five South Asian and Southeast Asian countries affected by China’s upstream projects should also come together. Whether it is the Brahmaputra, the Indus flowing into Pakistan, or the rivers flowing through Nepal and Bhutan, downstream countries are vulnerable to developments upstream. The Mekong and other major river systems are also affected.

China knows how to deal with individual countries. It also knows how to divide them and prevent them from acting collectively. Look at ASEAN. Every decision has to be taken through consensus. China has countries such as Laos and Cambodia that often act in ways that suit its interests. In South Asia, Pakistan is already aligned with China. Bangladesh is also witnessing changes in its relationship with Beijing. These developments have security implications for India. Bhutan and Nepal are particularly important. Bhutan is a small country, and it has to navigate its relationship with both India and China while protecting its sovereignty and culture. Unless these countries work together and align their interests more closely with India, it will be difficult to address the challenges. Ultimately, every country has to decide what kind of political system it wants to be associated with: democracy or authoritarianism.