Rehman is a senior Pakistani journalist and former Lahore resident editor of the Dawn
THREE YEARS and eight months into power, Prime Minister Imran Khan is forced to get his hands dirty to avert the toppling of his government. A veteran of 26 years in politics, he had earlier used powerful backers to do the dirty work. One of these tasks was in July 2018: Delivering the right number of lawmakers necessary for Khan’s election as prime minister. They achieved it in the face of adversity, namely Mian Nawaz Sharif. But now, Khan, the chief of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), is desperately seeking the support of these legislators to stay in the saddle. If the past is a guide, his fall is imminent.
Khan’s battle has been one of survival from day one—despite all these references to him being consistently on the same page as the king-making army chief. Even now, the impetus for the opposition’s thrust against the PTI government is linked directly with an extension of tenure for current Pakistan Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa.
The aam aadmi’s feed of this story has been played out in the all-important Punjab province. It is the same Punjab that catapulted Khan to the top in a pulsating finish against the once invincible Sharifs. It is the politicians from various “ignored” corners of the same province—who now figure prominently in the list of the original 14 dissidents—who have shaken the Insafian edifice of power.
Asha’ar Rehman
These dissidents say they have turned against the government in Islamabad as their conscience has awoken. But in reality, they have been there for long, poised to advance on Khan’s uneasiness, if not from the outset. Khan’s men have encouraged the people to confront these “traitors”; there have already been a few demonstrations outside the houses of these renegades. Alternatively, the PTI is also trying to defeat the revolt legally, but it is the thinly-veiled provocations asking the public to go after the dissidents which capture the essence of the party’s politics. Khan has made no attempts at any time during his 44-month-long rule to hide his contempt and hatred for his political opponents.
His ferocious attacks on the very parliament which he was and still is a part of, and which of course made him the prime minister, were staggering. He had declared the parliamentary opposition as a band of thieves to the applause of his supporters in the house—which included some new names, but mainly elements who had switched parties for a chance at power under Khan.
This was a dangerous course where a treasury bench permanently behaved like an opposition, or in the fashion of a revolutionary outfit that had won freedom for people from usurpers but did not know how to come out of the “movement” mode.
Similar observations had earlier been issued about the Asif Ali Zardari-led Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), but this was not at all the reason why many advised the PTI to explore an alliance with the Zardari brand. It was the visible strength of the Pakistan Muslim League (N) that encouraged a partnership between the PPP and the PTI. The possibility of any kind of coalition between the experienced and “dirty” Zardari and the untested and “clean” Khan were dashed early given the righteous tone adopted by the prime minister.
Khan had repeatedly attempted—but failed—to create political splits in the PPP-ruled Sindh. Just as he was up against a new phenomenon in Punjab, where large numbers stayed with the Sharifs and their model of development. The PTI apparently found it impossible to make inroads into the widespread PML(N) territory in Punjab. Instead, it placed all its faith on a breakup of its largest opponent in the province—and in the rumours about a feud brewing inside the Sharif family.
It panned out beautifully for the clever Sharifs. The “feud”, as it was mistakenly described, provided the family with two distinct prongs. One flank is led by Nawaz Sharif and his “pretty” daughter Maryam Nawaz. The other, moderate, side to the PML(N) had the redoubtable Shehbaz Sharif leading the reconciliatory initiative.
It was this reconciliatory core of Shehbaz that later on was visible in getting parties such as the PPP, the PML(N) and Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam together in Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM). Inevitably, the PPP left the alliance as Rehman and the more radical sections within PDM tried to carve something revolutionary out of the situation—that necessitated a confrontation with the army and endangered PPP’s government in Sindh.
The current calls for a political gherao of Khan from all sides are based in the opposition’s fears that the PTI might be able to achieve in the remaining part of its five-year term what it has not been able to accomplish in the preceding years.
Khan has put a lot of emphasis on the accountability of the rulers of the past. But the PML(N) and the PPP leaders have escaped rather unscathed so far. The fear was that Mr Clean was about to put his foot on the accelerator as a means to contain the opposition.
Letting loose the accountability juggernaut in the rival’s camp was all the more necessary because of a lack of any significant points scored by Khan’s men in power—most notably in Punjab, where Chief Minister Sardar Usman Buzdar has failed to deliver. When the crunch came, as expected, a large number of treasury bench lawmakers rebelling against Khan happened to be Buzdar’s neighbours from around Dera Ghazi Khan.
There was a talk that Khan could save himself by sacrificing Buzdar, but maybe the time for that has already gone. The embattled prime minister is now trying to prove his all-rounder capabilities by trying as many options to stay in power as are suggested to him. The skipper may pretend not to see what is staring him in the face, leaving even more complex questions in the air—like who could replace him? Shehbaz Sharif clearly understands the challenge when he talks about some kind of coalition to replace Khan. Zardari would agree.