FOR DIPLOMATS ACROSS the world, the year 2020 has begun on an ominous note. The assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, by the US has the potential to push the Middle East into yet another long-drawn conflict. Iran’s swift response—hitting US bases in Iraq with ballistic missiles—shows that it is unlikely to back off in the face of American aggression. But Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif hinted at deescalation as he called the missile strikes an act of self-defence. “We do not seek escalation or war, but will defend ourselves against any aggression,” tweeted Zarif.
The US, too, seems to be eyeing deescalation. In his formal response to the Iranian missile strikes, US President Donald Trump said he wanted to work with Iran in promoting peace in the Middle East. But he was sharply critical of Iran’s nuclear programme and threatened further sanctions against the country’s leadership. The immediate threat of an all-out war, however, seems to have dissipated following Trump’s speech.
But for countries like India, which share close ties with both Iran and the US, the coming days are likely to throw up further challenges and test their diplomatic skills. The official statement issued by the ministry of external affairs on Soleimani’s assassination shows how carefully India needs to tread. There was no reference to Soleimani by name in the statement. Instead, India chose to refer to him as “a senior Iranian leader’’. The statement also avoided the word assassination, and called for “restraint’’. “Peace, stability and security in this region is of utmost importance to India. It is vital that the situation does not escalate further,’’ said the statement. India sent a joint secretary to the Iranian embassy to sign the condolence book kept for Soleimani, in an attempt to stress its neutrality.
India has been keeping a close watch on the rising tensions in the Middle East and has been trying to engage the key players. In a deliberate balancing act, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishanakar went to Tehran for the joint economic commission talks with Iran soon after the 2+2 dialogue held in Washington in December.
For India, the concerns in the Middle East are manifold. The region is India’s largest supplier of oil. As many as 85 million Indian expats live and work there. “The US and Iran have started putting their naval vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. Our ships carrying oil pass through this region,’’ says Anu Sharma, associate fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.
While India has chosen to bring down oil imports from Iran to almost zero under American pressure, there are other areas where India and Iran are partners. Any hostility in the region, for instance, puts the fate of the Chabahar port in jeopardy. The work on the port, which is India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, has been progressing at a glacial pace, despite the active involvement of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. At the recent meeting of the India-Iran joint economic commission held in Tehran, the two sides promised to expand connectivity. But, India has been unable to generate much enthusiasm from private companies to invest in Iran, especially after the stringent sanctions imposed by the US. And, without private investment, the Chabahar project is unlikely to succeed.
The ongoing crisis has also revealed the limits of India’s diplomatic leverage, despite the goodwill it enjoys in both Washington and Tehran. Jaishankar did not figure in the call list of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo after Soleimani’s assassination, but Pakistan army chief General Qamar Bajwa did, demonstrating Pakistan’s growing importance in the changing scenario. Pompeo also reached out to Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas and French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian. It took a phone call from Jaishankar to voice India’s apprehensions. He called up Pompeo on January 5 to highlight India’s stakes and concerns in the region. He also reached out to Zarif and reiterated that India remained deeply worried about growing tensions in the region.
“We cannot play a mediating role between the US and Iran, because we have tilted more towards the US,’’ says Sharma. The dynamics of the relationship changed under prime minister Manmohan Singh, especially after India and the US signed the civilian nuclear deal in 2005. In 2009, India voted against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency, criticising its nuclear programme. When Jaishankar retired as foreign secretary, he said the Chabahar project was not moving forward because Iran kept on changing the goalposts. India and Iran have not been able to sign a deal on developing an Iranian gas field despite negotiating with each other for more than a decade. Modi did try to add some warmth to the relationship, but with India actively wooing Israel and Saudi Arabia—Iran’s sworn enemies—the leverage India enjoys with Iran is limited.
“Iran is somewhat annoyed about the oil imports,’’ says former diplomat Ashok Sajjanhar. “There is no other country, other than Russia, which does not need its oil. But China, which has its own problems with the US, and countries like Japan and South Korea had to fall in line with what the US wanted under the threat of CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act).’’
Even more worrying for India is the fact that a conflict between the US and Iran could spill over beyond the Gulf. “Afghanistan is very worried,’’ said former Indian ambassador to Afghanistan Rakesh Sood. “Soleimani had been dealing with Afghanistan from the 1990s.” His death will have an impact on the non-Pashtun population, which is considered close to Iran. Any deterioration in the Afghan security situation is yet another strategic challenge that New Delhi will be desperate to avoid at the moment.