One Nation, One Election: India's solution for reform or a democratic risk?

Following the release of the high-level committee’s report on simultaneous elections in March 2024, the government moved quickly to introduce the Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill, 2024, to pave the way for ‘one nation, one election’ (ONOE). If implemented, India would adopt a single election calendar, allowing voters to elect the Lok Sabha and the assemblies simultaneously. Such synchronised elections were held between 1951 and 1967, and even today a few states continue to follow aligned election cycles. On the face of it, the idea entails many positives. But it is also faced with a string of critical questions and intractable issues that are likely to outweigh its perceived benefits.

Billed as a significant step towards electoral reforms, supporters of ONOE count many benefits. One, it will help overcome issues related to the model code of conduct (MCC), which comes into force with the announcement of poll dates, affecting the normal functioning of government, at least for two months each for the Lok Sabha and the assemblies, if not more. During the period the MCC remains in force (from the announcement of poll dates to the declaration of poll results), the government cannot announce any new scheme or make new appointments or transfer employees without the approval of the Election Commission. Hence, adoption of ONOE has the potential to prevent or reduce frequent cycles of policy and governance paralysis.

Two, the costs of holding elections in India are among the highest in the world. Simultaneous elections for different tiers of democracy will save a substantial amount of public money that could be used for public utility.

Three, a large battery of human resources is required to be deployed to conduct elections smoothly, and this has to be done twice, once for the Lok Sabha and once for assemblies. This creates two interrelated problems. The first is what is known as ‘governance downtime’, whereby much of the bureaucracy is taken away from regular duties to perform election-related tasks. Second, frequent diversion of administrative resources from their core responsibilities will have adverse effects on the delivery of governance and development, causing ordinary citizens to suffer. With ONOE, these issues will diminish.

The questions associated with holding simultaneous elections are legion. First, the issues and concerns on the basis of which voters express their party preference differ across levels of elections. We are in an era of hyper-nationalism where national issues often get played out in local-level elections. If elections for different tiers of democracy are held simultaneously, it is highly likely that national issues will overshadow local ones. If this happens, national parties will benefit, whereas regional parties might struggle.

Second, implementation of ONOE will lead to expansion or contraction of the tenures of assemblies. Let us suppose that ONOE is implemented with general elections in 2029. Elections to the Karnataka assembly will be held just a year before, in 2028. Two possibilities exist. One is the postponement of the assembly elections by a year. In this case, the state would have to be placed under president’s rule. If so, would there not be policy paralysis for a year? The second is to allow the assembly elections to take place but curtail its tenure after a year to align it with the tenure of the Lok Sabha. One may therefore ask: is depriving people of a popular government not against the fundamental tenets of democracy?

Third, even if we discount the democratic costs involved in expanding or curtailing the tenures of assemblies for the sake of ONOE, serious challenges remain. Political stability is not guaranteed. Let us assume that the government at the Centre topples, say, within two years after the Lok Sabha is constituted, and no alternative government is formed. As a consequence, the Lok Sabha is dissolved and fresh elections are announced. What will happen to the assemblies?

The Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill stipulates that if Lok Sabha or a State Assembly is dissolved earlier than its five-year term, an election for it will be held for a term equal to the remainder of the five-year term so that synchronisation does not break. Fair enough. But it flies on the face of the argument that ONOE is better than the existing arrangements in terms of cost effectiveness because under the existing arrangements a fresh election entails a full five-year term whereas under the ONOE regime it is for a period equal to the remainder of the five-year term. It effectively means that in a situation of recurring political instability, elections will take place more frequently under the ONOE regime. Moreover, since a mid-term election under the ONOE regime puts in place a short-term government, policy formulation as well as efficacy of governance will suffer. In other words, it goes against the argument that ONOE promises better delivery of governance.

Taken at face value, ONOE promises to be a stepping stone towards electoral reforms and improved governance, as its adoption is likely to rid the nation of frequent elections, governance disruption and wastage of financial resources. But its implementation is far from easy. Its adoption is likely to create more problems than it solves.

The author is professor, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi.