‘Trump does not see India as being in the same league as China, Russia’: M.K. Narayanan

To answer a hypothetical question as to whether India miscalculated its policy in Trump 2.0, one needs to determine whether Donald Trump’s MAGA (Make America Great Again) transitions as policy. MAGA is less a policy than megalomania, and given this, it is difficult to endorse or deny the perception that India may have ‘miscalculated’. What can be said is that several presumptions based on Trump 1.0 have proved wrong.

In some quarters, there did seem to be an impression that India would receive ‘special treatment’ during Trump 2.0. Undeniably, on tariffs, trade and Pakistan, India today seems more an ‘outlier’ than ally. The fault, dear Indians, lies not so much in our stars as in our mindset, our diplomatic manoeuvres and our perceptions.

No one in particular is to blame for this. It has, however, taken time—in this instance, the recent India-Pakistan conflict—for India to admit that relations with the US appear to be heading south. Whether we are about to see a return to the era of the Cold War, when the US and the West had made it clear that those who were not ‘proclaimed allies’ would be left out in the cold, however, remains to be seen.

India seems to have made a mistake in its assessment of Trump 2.0, and must try to remedy matters as quickly as possible. The US policy today is based on cold realism and on what the other country has to offer. Had our diplomats and politicians not been blind-sided by their own perceptions, they might have seen what was coming.

It should have been evident that Trump did not see India as being in the same league as China, Russia or other ‘near coequals’. In Trump’s benefit analysis, there was little room for an India that spouts ‘diplomatese’ but had nothing to give in return. In this respect, China had more to offer the US; even Pakistan had more to give—location-wise, minerals-wise and also a willingness to be a ‘cringe ally’. India had little to offer by way of trade or strategic support. India’s hesitations on the Quad imperative only served to confirm this. What should, hence, have been evident is that Trump is not like any of his predecessors in regard to his understanding of the importance of civilisational aspects when it concerns the future of the world.

It is uncertain as to who all in India are responsible for the ‘muddled’ thinking on Trump. Policy making in India is today shrouded in still greater secrecy, and it is hence unclear whether it is the senior political leadership that calls the shots or it is the foreign office mandarins who do so. A widespread impression exists, however, that a few ‘apparatchiks’ currently determine the main contours of the foreign policy.

The current impasse should be a ‘wake-up call’ for those who have been arguing that non-alignment is dead and are leaning towards the concept of ‘multi-alignment’, a newly coined euphemism for seeking closer links with the US and the West. We are currently at a stage where we are not with the non-aligned. Nor have we succeeded in getting adherents for multi-alignment. Meanwhile, we appear to have been overtaken by the sheer thrust of cascading events.

The hard reality is that Trump’s America is as self-centred as any administration could possibly be. No one has to be directly blamed for our situation, but India does need to understand that we have to rework our policy imperatives. India must reset its foreign policy and strategic compass in keeping with our current political, strategic and economic strength, which far eclipses that of almost every other nation in the world with the exception of the US, China and Russia.

The author is former national security adviser, former director of Intelligence Bureau and former governor of West Bengal.