Why India needs to recalibrate its foreign policy after decade of pro-US shift

The first course featured a delicate goat cheese gateau. The highlight of the main course was a rack of spring lamb. The dessert on offer was a nectarine tart with creamy ice cream. The White House luncheon on June 18 was as lavish as any state banquet. But for the two men seated across the table, the menu may have been the least memorable part of the afternoon.

The guest was Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief. The host, President Donald Trump, was savouring a carefully staged diplomatic play. Quietly, Munir may have let himself indulge in a bit of smug self-satisfaction. After more than a decade in Washington’s cold storage, Pakistan was being welcomed back into the fold. The high-profile visit was a victory for Munir at home as well, burnishing his image after the four-day military face-off with India in May. His message of defiance against New Delhi had played well domestically. A White House reception was the cherry on top.

Still, there were concerns. What would China make of this sudden thaw between Islamabad and Washington? Pakistan’s military performance against India in May was bolstered by Chinese military hardware, including JF-17 and J-10 fighter jets, PL-15 missiles, Wing Loong drones, HQ-9 air defence systems, and even near real-time battlefield intelligence. For years, Beijing had been Pakistan’s principal defence partner.

A senior Indian military official told THE WEEK, “At least 80 per cent of Pakistan’s war effort against India in the recent conflict can be attributed to China. For weapons and equipment, Pakistan has become truly and totally dependent on China. After all, who will be supplying the spare parts for the war platforms, the ammunition and the missiles in the times to come?”

Still, Munir had a political play of his own. By endorsing Trump’s claim of brokering a ceasefire between India and Pakistan, he hoped to earn further goodwill in Washington. India, predictably, had dismissed the claim. On June 21, Munir got Islamabad to officially nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize.

The gesture quickly backfired.

A day later, the US president ordered a massive strike against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. In a mission named Operation Midnight Hammer, B-2 Spirit stealth bombers flew from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, carrying 14 GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs) or bunker-busters, designed to destroy deeply buried targets. The bombers struck the heavily fortified Fordow enrichment site, while 30 Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from a submarine slammed into Iran’s Natanz and Isfahan facilities.

Iran responded on June 24 with a missile salvo targeting America’s Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Though none of the missiles reached their target, the symbolic escalation was clear.

Trump’s unilateral decision caught Islamabad off guard. Just 24 hours after celebrating Trump’s supposed peacemaking, Pakistan’s foreign ministry was forced to condemn the US strikes and reiterate Iran’s right to self-defence under the UN Charter. The irony was not lost on observers. The Nobel nomination now looked premature, if not outright embarrassing.

Meanwhile, Trump had his own considerations for entertaining Pakistan’s top general. First of all, he hoped to undercut Pakistan’s strategic tilt toward China. Beijing’s recent offer to supply Pakistan with fifth-generation J-35 stealth fighters has raised alarm in Washington. On the economic front, deeper US engagement with Pakistan might weaken the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), where Beijing has invested over $60 billion.

Another point to consider is Pakistan’s vast mineral resources that are of immense interest to Washington. Baluchistan holds significant deposits of copper, gold and rare earth minerals, including lithium—a commodity in high demand for the US green tech sector. Talks between Islamabad and American firms on mining cooperation have reportedly advanced in recent weeks.

The White House would also have carefully considered Pakistan’s role as a valuable ally in the fight against Islamic State and affiliated groups that still target American assets. The recent statement by General Michael Kurilla, who heads the US Central Command, that Pakistan was a phenomenal partner in the American battle against terrorism was a clear indicator of Washington’s decision to rehabilitate Pakistan.

Finally, the optics mattered. With tensions peaking in the Middle East, Trump perhaps wanted the leader of the Muslim world’s only nuclear power beside him, before launching one of the most audacious US military operations in years. But in the aftermath, Trump showed little concern for the diplomatic mess Pakistan now found itself in.

India, too, has been caught off balance.

Trump’s repeated references to Kashmir and offers to mediate between India and Pakistan took on new urgency during and after Operation Sindoor. India has always been against any sort of third-party involvement in resolving the Kashmir issue. By equating the two neighbours, the US president inadvertently lent international credence to Pakistan’s claims, much to India’s discomfort. Even more frustrating for New Delhi was Trump’s silence on the Quad, India’s strategic grouping with the US, Japan and Australia.

The sharp turn on trade is another matter of concern for India. On April 2, Trump declared a “Liberation Day” for the US and imposed high tariffs on imports, shocking allies and rivals alike. India, which had begun trade negotiations early in Trump’s second term in the hope of some leniency, was blindsided. Despite a 90-day reprieve and ongoing talks, no trade deal has materialised so far, while China, once denounced as a bitter rival, at least has a framework offer.

Back to geopolitical concerns, India’s long-standing policy of strategic autonomy had helped it navigate the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas conflicts with some credibility. But the recent US strike on Iran has upended the balance. Pressure is building, both from the West and from Moscow, for India to take sides.

In response, India is exploring alternative paths.

On June 13, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong in New Delhi. They discussed “stabilising and rebuilding ties” and agreed to prioritise people-centric exchanges and address key economic concerns. Ten days later, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval met China’s top diplomat Wang Yi in Beijing on the sidelines of the 20th meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Security Council secretaries. The meeting was viewed as a step towards de-escalation following the Ladakh border stand-off five years ago. Wang is expected to visit India soon for the 24th round of the special representative talks. Doval also met Aleksandr Venediktov, deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council, in Beijing.

In his remarks at the SCO meeting, Doval reminded member states of India’s “centuries-old linkages” and called for joint action to combat terror groups including Al Qaeda and its affiliates. He urged collaboration against radicalisation and suggested coordinated information campaigns to combat extremist ideologies.

In this context, the SCO defence ministers’ meeting in Qingdao, China (June 25-26), and the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro (July 6-7), carry added importance. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh is representing India at the Qingdao summit.

Trump, meanwhile, has become increasingly vocal in his criticism of BRICS. He has opposed the group’s de-dollarisation agenda, now that Iran is part of the expanded bloc. US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has warned India against purchasing Russian arms and backing BRICS initiatives that seek to reduce reliance on the dollar. “That is not how you make friends in Washington,” he said.

Russia, on the other hand, wants to revive the RIC (Russia-India-China) trilateral, dormant since the 2020 Ladakh clashes. Trump’s erratic diplomacy may ironically push these three powers closer together. “The US has become increasingly unreliable. Its withdrawal from key international agreements like the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris Accord, and its weaponisation of trade and sanctions, make Indian diplomacy more comfortable with partners like Russia and China,” said Major General Deepak Mehra (retd).

Mehra, who served as India’s military attaché in Moscow during the Crimea annexation and the Syrian intervention, said New Delhi was pivoting towards a more multipolar world order, one where no single country dictates the rules.

Trump’s sudden and unexpected announcement on June 24 that Israel and Iran had agreed to a “complete and total ceasefire”, was perhaps an acknowledgment of the fact that unilateralism may not work in a world that is becoming increasingly multipolar. After all, Tehran managed to land significant blows on Israel during the war, despite the latter’s overwhelming military superiority.

It appears Trump opted for ceasefire diplomacy after realising the war was spiralling out of control. Doubts persist over whether the US strikes truly destroyed Iran’s nuclear capability. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, who now serves as the deputy chair of the country’s Security Council, said several countries were prepared to supply Iran with nuclear warheads if needed, a remark likely intended to raise the geopolitical stakes.

India may have to recalibrate its foreign policy options after such dramatic geopolitical shifts. Kumar Sanjay Singh, who teaches history at Delhi University, said India’s foreign policy had shifted fundamentally towards the US over the years. “India has gradually moved into alignment with the US, especially under Prime Minister Modi. We have started adopting American positions without always considering our own interests.” He pointed to India’s abandonment of the Palestinian cause, closer ties with Israel and a cooled relationship with Iran as signs of that shift. “We mirrored the US in West Asia. We also became increasingly hostile to China.”

But as recent developments show, those alliances may not be set in stone. All it may take is one more Trump U-turn to redraw the priorities once again.