India needs a dedicated mountain strike corps to tackle China

In June 1986, during an annual patrol along the Sumdorong Chu river in Arunachal Pradesh’s Tawang district, Indian troops were shocked to see Chinese structures, including a helipad, in Indian territory. The location was close to where the first clashes of the 1962 war took place. India lodged an official protest over four months, but to no avail. That is when Army chief General Krishnaswamy Sundarji launched Operation Falcon, airlifting an infantry brigade (nearly 5,000 men) to Zemithang, close to Sumdorong Chu. With the Army upping the ante, the People’s Liberation Army of China had to come to the negotiating table.

That incident revealed India’s need for a dedicated mountain strike force to keep China in check. The government, however, warmed up to the idea only after the April 2013 standoff between Indian and Chinese troops in eastern Ladakh’s Depsang Valley. An internal report by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, too, said that 640sqkm in Raki Nala in northeast Ladakh had been inaccessible to troops because of a large PLA incursion.

Finally, on January 1, 2014, Major General Raymond Joseph Noronha hoisted the flag of the newly-sanctioned XVII Corps in Ranchi. The XVII Corps was raised on the principle that ‘the best defence is in offense’. Military planners expected a corps of 90,000 men for the Himalayan frontiers, with two divisions armed with integral air assets like attack and transport helicopters and drones. But, the XVII Corps, also known as Brahmastra Corps, has only one infantry division with 16,000 men in Panagarh, West Bengal. The proposed second division in Pathankot has been shelved.

With the ongoing border tensions with China, the Army has added 10,000 more troops to the XVII Corps. Its Operation Snow Leopard, to occupy Kailash Ridge in August 2020, is proof that a defensive strategy no longer works with China.

As per latest intelligence inputs, the Chinese have built permanent accommodations and depots in eastern Ladakh. “The Chinese military (will cause us) more embarrassment if we do not have enough boots on the ground,” says former Army chief General J.J. Singh, who was also governor of Arunachal Pradesh.

Agrees Lt General (retired) Vinod Bhatia, former director general of military operations (DGMO): “Chinese military only respects strength, and if you lack it, they will bully you.” The office of the DGMO led by Bhatia was instrumental in raising the XVII Corps. A.K. Antony, then defence minister, was keen on the project, but apprehensive about its cost. The Manmohan Singh-led Cabinet Committee on Security gave its approval for the accretion of force, but failed to allocate the initial raising expenditure of about Rs65,000 crore.

“The aim [behind XVII Corps] was persuasive deterrence and to have enough reserves (personnel) for it,” says Bhatia. “With China, we need to look for a war prevention strategy, not a war waging strategy.”

Also, India’s military focus has been largely Pakistan-centric. Of the 14 Army corps, just four-and-a-half faced China. Similarly, just 12 of the Army’s 38 divisions faced China; 25 were on the India-Pakistan border and one division was a reserve under Army headquarters. The Army has four strike corps—the Mathura-based I Corps, the Ambala-based II Corps, the Bhopal-based XXI Corps and the partially-raised XVII Corps. Only the XVII Corps focuses on China.

But in the recent past, the Sena Bhawan in New Delhi has done significant rebalancing to focus more on China. I Corps will now be an offensive formation for eastern Ladakh to support the Leh-based XIV Corps. The Allahabad-based 4 Division and the Bareilly-headquartered 6 Mountain Division will form the core of I Corps. In case of aggression, the Hisar-based 33 Armoured Division could also be moved to Ladakh. The Palampur-based 39 Division will be a reserve force and the Dehradun-based 14 Division will be deployed along the Chinese border in Uttarakhand. The XVII Corps, which was earlier mandated to cover the entire northern border, will be restricted to Sikkim and the northeast. For the eastern sector, the Kolkata-based Eastern Command has three corps—IV, III and XXXIII—based in Tezpur, Dimapur and Siliguri, respectively.

Singh, however, says, “Kneejerk reaction of moving troops from west to east is not an ideal way to deal with China, as it will not work every time.”

But, force expansion does not find many takers. As Prime Minister Narendra Modi told military commanders aboard INS Vikramaditya in December 2015, “Modernisation and expansion of forces, both at the same time, is a difficult and unnecessary goal.” So, military planners had to come up with innovative and cost-effective ways. Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat, as Army chief, had revived the concept of Integrated Battle Group, which operate swiftly, launching limited offensives by a combined force of infantry, artillery, tanks and air assets. The XVII Corps is supposed to have three IBGs, each comprising around 4,000 soldiers headed by a major general.

Strategists claim that IBG is an old concept, and insist that India should follow China's three R strategy—reserve, radar and roads. The Border Roads Organisation has been working tirelessly for the last four years, and has been allocated an additional budget. For radars, the Indian military is deploying drones to keep round-the-clock surveillance. It will be getting a more advanced version of drones from Israel.

But, Major General (retired) Shashi Asthana maintains that we need a dedicated corps, which should be trained and organised with logistics to threaten vital objectives across the border. “This will impose the required cost on the adversary, making settlement of the border issue a better option than not doing so,” he says.

Also, experts say that the northern section on the China border, like the eastern one, needs more attention. Singh says that “due to different terrain and conditions” what works in Ladakh may not work on the McMahon Line. “Thinking of expenditure at the cost of losing sovereignty,” he adds, “is not a wise idea.”