China is worried about another gang of four—this time from outside.
The first one was a gang of four political leaders who wielded power in the post-Cultural Revolution period when Mao Zedong's health was on the decline. This time it is a gang of four countries—India, Japan, Australia and the US—who call themselves the Quad.
The Quad is yet to attain the political gravitas or even diplomatic halo, but the idea is gaining increased traction among strategic and economic thinktanks. Now, a report brought out by a Quadripartite Commission on the Indian Ocean Regional Security has recommended that the Quad powers should elevate their dialogue progressively to political level.
The commission, a creation of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation of Japan in cooperation with Vivekananda International Foundation, Australian National University and Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, has given 20 recommendations in three areas of diplomacy, economy-environment-humanitarian security and defence. And all the recommendations do have a bearing on China's conduct in the Indo-Pacific.
Though the idea of Quad had been there for more than a decade along with the concept of Indo-Pacific, it was China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative which, “even if executed in part, has the potential to cause a fundamental shift in the strategic environment in the Indian Ocean rim as well as the Asian landmass, extending to Europe” that gave an urgency to the Quad thinking.
Quad proponents deny that they are thinking about containment of China. On the contrary, the quadripartite report recommends that “while discouraging a unilateral military role for China”, the four countries “should involve China in diplomatic efforts to ensure the safety of navigation through critical energy routes, including the Persian Gulf.”
The four Indo-Pacific powers who have been having misgivings about China's Belt and Road Initiative, should now “take coordinated action within multilateral development institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to ensure that infrastructure investment follow high standards.”
The authors of the report, including former Indian foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal who is an adviser to VIF, note that several downstream partners in the BRI are already having second thoughts about getting into debt traps set by China. Only the other day had Malaysia's nonagenarian Prime Minister Mahathir Muhamad, wary of getting into a debt trap, cancelled two major Chinese-funded infrastructure projects worth $22 billion signed by his predecessor.
Late last year, Nepal, Myanmar and China's all-weather friend Pakistan had cancelled or cold-storaged three major hydroelectricity projects worth nearly $20 billion, planned by Chinese companies. Pakistan cancelled the $14 billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam project, citing tough financing terms imposed by China; Nepal scrapped a $2.5 billion hydroelectricity project finding irregularities in the running of the Chinese company that got the contract; and Myanmar stopped a $3.6 billion Chinese-backed dam-building project.
“From Sri Lanka and Djibouti to Myanmar and Montenegro, many recipients of cash from Chinese’s huge infrastructure financing campaign, the Belt and Road Initiative, have discovered that Chinese investment brings with it less-savory accompaniments, including closed bidding processes that result in inflated contracts and influxes of Chinese labour at the expense of local workers,” a New York Times report commented over the development recently.
The commission report makes it clear that all the four nations are concerned that China's economic and military initiatives in the Indo-Pacific region will affect their interests. China has already established commercial presence in Indian Ocean ports such as Sittwe in Myanmar, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Gwadar in Pakistan, Djibouti which is a key point in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the neighbouring Doraleh. Currently, Chinese navy has only one base, in Djibouti, but “has the potential to provide logistic support and even full military support at a network of ports spread across the Indian Ocean.”
Apparently, there is a realisation that the Quad idea needs political involvement to move forward. The concerns have been identified, the goals are clear, but any action requires major political decisions.
And it is here that the Quad has to grapple with major policy departures for all the four powers. For instance, Quad would remain a pious prayer meeting unless all the four acquire the required military muscle, and a willingness to flex it if and when required.
All the four have problems on this. The commission report itself says that “Japan will need to increase the long-range operational capability and deployment of its naval fleet, including its submarines.” But the catch is that any further increase in the operational capability would require acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, and that needs major overhaul in Japan's policies and even its pacifist constitution. Similarly, Australia still cannot make up its mind whether it needs to have deeper engagement with China or be seen ganging up against China.
And India? India is indeed building – or looking to build – strategic assets in the Indian Ocean Region from Indonesia to the Seyschelles. But its maritime capital capabilities—in terms of surface and underwater fleet size—may be found wanting in a realistic assessment.
Then there is a fourth imponderable—the USA. Is it going to be around? For, Trump's America has been showing signs of both assertion across the globe as also isolationism.