Israel–Gulf relations: Shifting from economic normalisation to operational defence
Israel-Gulf relations have entered a critical phase following the February 2026 conflict, pivoting the regional dynamic from broad economic normalisation toward urgent, tactical air-defence and intelligence cooperation
The February 2026 conflict fundamentally reshaped Israel-Gulf relations by transforming economic partnerships into urgent operational security needs while simultaneously highlighting deep political divergences regarding regional stability and Iran.
The February 2026 conflict fundamentally reshaped Israel-Gulf relations by transforming economic partnerships into urgent operational security needs while simultaneously highlighting deep political divergences regarding regional stability and Iran.
The February 2026 conflict fundamentally reshaped Israel-Gulf relations by transforming economic partnerships into urgent operational security needs while simultaneously highlighting deep political divergences regarding regional stability and Iran.
Before February 2026, Israel’s engagement with the Gulf region was largely pragmatic normalisation, economic cooperation and emerging security partnerships. The signing of the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain in September 2020 was a departure from the traditional Arab position that normalisation should follow a resolution of the Palestinian question. For the UAE and Bahrain, closer engagement offered opportunities for economic diversification, access to advanced defence technologies, intelligence cooperation and coordination against expanding Iranian influence in the region. The UAE emerged as Israel’s important Gulf partner, with significant bilateral trade. Also, the 2023 UAE-Israel Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) further institutionalised these economic ties.
In this context, the security considerations are also important. Israeli integration into the US Central Command (CENTCOM) framework in January 2021 facilitated greater coordination with selected Arab partners in missile defence, intelligence sharing, cybersecurity and maritime security. Iran’s counterattacks against Israel in April 2024 further indicated the potential value of such cooperation. Nevertheless, these developments represented pragmatic coordination rather than complete strategic alignment. More importantly, Gulf countries did not share an identical understanding of the Iranian threat. While Israel considers the Iranian nuclear programme, missile capabilities and regional network of non-state actors existential security challenges, Gulf monarchies increasingly recognised the limitations of confrontation. Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement with Iran in March 2023, facilitated by China, reflected the Kingdom’s preference for de-escalation. Qatar and Oman similarly prioritised diplomatic engagement with Tehran. Thus, while Israel favoured military deterrence, Gulf nations pursued strategic hedging, balancing their security partnerships with the US against the need to maintain regional stability. The October 2023 attack by Hamas and subsequent Israeli military campaign in Gaza generated considerable public opposition to normalisation across the Arab world. Although the UAE and Bahrain maintained diplomatic relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia linked normalisation to a credible pathway towards Palestinian statehood. As a result, by early 2026, economic and security cooperation had expanded, but the political foundations for wider regional integration remained fragile.
Iran conflict and changing Gulf security
The military confrontation between Israel, Iran and the US beginning in February 2026 marked a critical turning point. Iranian retaliatory missile and drone strikes against Gulf states exposed the vulnerability of their energy installations, military facilities and commercial infrastructure. The disruption of the Strait of Hormuz further demonstrated how regional conflict could threaten the economic foundations of Gulf monarchies. In fact, the Gulf states became directly affected stakeholders rather than concerned observers of this confrontation. For instance, following the Iranian attacks in February 2026, UAE–Israel relations reportedly evolved from discreet security engagement to operational military cooperation, with Israeli air-defence support highlighting Israel’s growing importance as a security partner against missile and drone threats. The Iranian attacks generated differentiated responses across the Gulf region. The UAE adopted a more assertive position towards Iran, whereas Saudi Arabia continued emphasising de-escalation and diplomacy despite asserting its right to self-defence. Qatar and Oman retained their preference for mediation. These differences indicate that Gulf countries distinguish between defending their territorial sovereignty and participating in Israel’s broader confrontation with Iran. Their immediate priorities remain protecting national infrastructure, energy security and economic stability.
Kingdom’s position deserves particular attention because of its political, economic and religious significance. Before February 2026, Saudi-Israeli normalisation was considered one of the most consequential potential developments in regional geopolitics. Riyadh’s engagement with Washington, interest in advanced defence capabilities and an economic transformation agenda created incentives for an agreement. However, Saudi Arabia consistently maintained that normalisation required meaningful progress towards Palestinian statehood. Following the February 2026 conflict, Iranian strikes reinforced Saudi concerns about regional security; they did not automatically translate into greater willingness to normalise relations with Israel. Riyadh must consider the reputational and strategic costs of appearing to endorse Israeli military policies, particularly given their wider implications for regional stability. Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s preference for diplomatic engagement with Iran contrasts with Israel's emphasis on military pressure. Therefore, future normalisation will depend not simply on shared concerns about Iran but also on Israel's willingness to accommodate Saudi interests concerning Palestinian statehood and regional stability.
Emerging strategic paradox
The most significant consequence of the February 2026 conflict is the emergence of a strategic paradox, i.e., greater practical security cooperation accompanied by growing political divergence. Iranian attacks have increased the value of Israeli defence capabilities, intelligence sharing and integrated air-defence mechanisms. Simultaneously, the conflict has exposed differences in strategic priorities. While Israel remains focused on containing Iranian military and regional influence, Gulf states are concerned about preventing prolonged conflict that could undermine economic diversification, foreign investment, energy exports and international connectivity. In this, the UAE may emerge as Israel’s closest operational security partner in the Gulf, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman maintain more cautious approaches.
For India, these developments have predominantly negative short-term implications. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz threaten India’s energy supplies, while instability in the Gulf region jeopardises the lives of approximately 10 million Indian expatriates. However, closer UAE-Israel security cooperation could create opportunities for India in defence technology, intelligence sharing and trilateral engagement. The crisis also provides India an opportunity to strengthen its diplomatic relevance through balanced regional diplomacy and mediation. So, the immediate economic and security risks outweigh the potential strategic opportunities, although the latter may become significant in the longer term.
The period before and after February 2026 represents two distinct phases in Israel-Gulf relations. Before the conflict, relations were driven by normalisation, economic interdependence, technological cooperation and strategic hedging against Iran. But after the February 2026 conflict, the emphasis shifted towards territorial vulnerability, immediate security requirements and managing regional instability. Although the conflict has strengthened Israel’s relevance as a security partner, particularly for the UAE, it has simultaneously reinforced the desires of the Gulf states for strategic autonomy and de-escalation. The central question is therefore no longer simply whether Gulf countries are willing to normalise relations with Israel, but whether Israel can become part of a regional security framework that accommodates Gulf priorities. The future of these relations will ultimately depend on whether tactical security cooperation can translate into genuine strategic convergence.
Dr Anu Sharma is an Assistant Professor at Amity Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (AIDSS), Amity University in Noida.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the institution.