Israel-UAE relations: Behind Netanyahu’s unannounced Abu Dhabi visit

The unannounced visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in September 2026, followed by an official confirmation of the same, indicates a significant development in the evolving relationship between Israel and the Gulf states.

Prime Minister Netanyahu met UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi, with both governments acknowledging the purpose as strengthening bilateral relations and discussing regional challenges. The circumstances of this visit bring together three interconnected dimensions, i.e., the strategic partnership established through the Abraham Accords in 2020, the political consequences of the Gaza conflict, and the broader regional security environment following the ongoing conflict involving Iran.

From non-recognition to normalisation

For decades, Israel–UAE relations remained constrained due to the unresolved Palestinian question and the larger Arab–Israeli conflict. Both UAE and Israel share concerns regarding Iranian regional influence, technological security and the changing strategic balance in the Middle East, formal diplomatic relations did not exist.

However, in September 2020, the two nations signed the Abraham Accords during President Trump’s first administration. Abraham Accords established formal diplomatic relations between the two nations and led to the opening of embassies in Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi in 2021. Unlike the case between Israel, Egypt and Jordan, the Abraham Accords were not preceded by a bilateral war between Israel and the UAE. They contemplated strategic, economic and technological convergence of interests along with the willingness to separate bilateral normalisation from the resolution of the Palestinian issue. The normalisation process subsequently expanded into trade, investment, tourism, aviation, healthcare, energy, cybersecurity and technological cooperation. The UAE–Israel Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in 2023 provided an additional framework for economic integration. These developments indicate that the relationship acquired substantial institutional and economic foundations beyond diplomatic symbolism.

In the case of the UAE, engagement with Israel provides for technological innovation, investment opportunities and potential partnerships in the domains of security and connectivity. For Israel, this normalisation opened an important gateway to the Gulf Arab states along with strengthening its regional diplomatic position and creating opportunities for economic engagement with Gulf markets.

The Gaza war and emerging contradictions

The Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023 and subsequent military campaign in Gaza significantly complicated this partnership. The UAE maintained diplomatic relations with Israel, but the humanitarian effects of the war generated considerable political pressure and exposed the limits of normalisation. Abu Dhabi repeatedly emphasised the need to protect Palestinian civilians, facilitate humanitarian assistance and preserve the prospect of an independent Palestinian state. An important dimension of this is the UAE’s opposition to Israeli annexation of the West Bank. In September 2025, a senior Emirati official described this annexation as a red line that could undermine the foundations of the Abraham Accords. The UAE’s approach is an attempt to salvage the strategic and economic benefits of normalisation while preventing the Palestinian issue from becoming an insurmountable hurdle to its regional legitimacy. As a result, bilateral relations between the two nations have become characterised by pragmatic cooperation alongside political disagreements.

The circumstances surrounding Prime Minister Netanyahu’s September 2026 visit add a diplomatic dimension to this relationship. The UAE’s official confirmation stated that the leaders discussed bilateral relations and ways to strengthen them, without publicly confirming the reported purpose concerning the October 2023 warning. The visit is significant because the allegations concern not merely bilateral diplomacy but also the political accountability surrounding Israel’s failure to prevent the October 2023 attacks. Any suggestion that a foreign leader had advance knowledge of an impending attack raises questions about intelligence assessment, the exchange of information and the subsequent handling of warnings. For Netanyahu, the controversy has potential domestic political implications with Israel’s October 2026 elections just around the corner. This unannounced visit also drew attention to the management of sensitive diplomatic engagement. Nevertheless, the visit should be understood as an officially acknowledged meeting whose circumstances attracted scrutiny, rather than as an indication by itself of a covert strategic agreement or a fundamental change in bilateral policy.

Iran and regional security

Beyond the immediate controversy, the relationship remains influenced by the regional balance of power, especially regarding concerns related to Iran. Israel and the UAE have overlapping interests in monitoring Iranian military capabilities, missile and drone threats, and maritime insecurity. Their diplomatic relationship provides channels through which security concerns can be communicated, although the precise scope of intelligence or defence cooperation should not be assumed without specific evidence. For the UAE, however, maintaining relations with Israel does not eliminate the need to manage its wider regional relationships. Abu Dhabi must consider the security of its territory, commercial infrastructure, energy exports and maritime routes while avoiding unnecessary escalation with Iran and other regional actors. Israel is interested in sustaining regional partnerships that can reduce its diplomatic isolation and create opportunities for cooperation beyond the immediate Arab–Israeli conflict. The relationship, as a result, is kind of a strategic pragmatism; both countries have incentives to preserve cooperation despite disagreements over Gaza, Palestine and the political consequences of the October 2023 attacks. However, the continuation and expansion of such initiatives depend partly on regional stability and the ability of participating states to manage political disagreements.

Partnership under strategic and political pressure?

PM Netanyahu’s unannounced visit to the UAE illustrates the complex character of Israel–UAE relations in 2026. The relationship has developed beyond symbolic diplomatic normalisation into a substantial economic partnership supported by institutional mechanisms and overlapping strategic interests. However, it has exposed important political constraints. So, this visit should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of a new strategic breakthrough. Its significance lies in demonstrating that both governments consider direct engagement despite the political sensitivities surrounding their partnership. For Israel, the UAE remains an important regional partner, and for Abu Dhabi, relations with Israel offer economic and strategic opportunities. The future of this relationship will depend not only on bilateral trade and security cooperation but also on how both countries navigate the Palestinian question, regional tensions and domestic political pressures. It can be said that the Abraham Accords have established a framework for engagement, but sustaining that framework requires managing the contradictions between strategic cooperation and the unresolved conflicts shaping the Middle East.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the institution.

The author is an assistant professor, Amity Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Amity University, NOIDA.