Was the end of February a turning point in power? Whether February 28 shook Iran or not, the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was more about the final decline of a state-building project rooted in the systematic ‘othering’ of the margins. The world watches the exchange of missiles between Iran and the U.S.-Israel alliance, with headlines focusing on ‘Operations Epic Fury’ and ‘Roaring Lion’. What lies beneath these headlines is a complex internal issue: the question of minorities. The current chaos in Iran, marked by intense protests and government crackdowns since December, is not unique; it is part of a long history of institutionalised marginalisation of minorities. The recent report by IranWire, “Conscience Held Captive,” provides data on the state’s “religious monopoly,” which treats its minority populations as threats to national security.
The alarming report on minorities describes the January 2026 massacre as an “organised” event, highlighting the Iranian regime’s failed state-building efforts. It became a catastrophic failure when the IRGC turned borderlands inhabited by minorities into free-fire zones. Instead of respecting minorities as full citizens and native populations, the regime views them as a threatening entity. To make matters worse, the regime implemented an internet blackout to hide the death toll. Additionally, this was an extreme attempt to silence calls for international attention, as the regime claims that minority protests are just foreign-backed insurgencies. However, the protests extended beyond minorities and became a nationwide movement. This allowed minorities to voice demands for a more inclusive Iran.
While current debates focus on who will be the next Supreme Leader, a line of grim contenders with failed ideologies remains. This is because their mindset is still stuck in 1989, when Ali Khamenei became the Supreme Leader. Instead of integrating them, they suppress minorities. Given the situation, comparing the reactions of minorities in 1989 helps us understand their responses in 2026. The political situation may be the same, but 2026 is not 1989. Iran was in a consolidation phase after the death of its first Supreme Leader, Ruhollah Khomeini. Minorities such as Sunni Baloch, Kurds, and Baha’is had to show submission, relying on coercion and mourning for their survival. In 2026, however, people in some areas celebrated the death of Zahhak (an evil person in Iranian historiography) in a muted, dance-like manner. The Iranian regime's suppression of its own citizens is paradoxical; it allowed or created space for these kinds of narratives to emerge, unlike in 1989, when such expressions had little room to flourish.
While Tehran was preoccupied with a dispute over nuclear survival, a significant development was taking place. A coalition was formed by five Iranian Kurdish parties to promote the goal to “overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Kurdish parties like KDPI and Komalah have worked to ensure the decentralisation of a still unified Iran. These parties have assured the Iranian state that it does not consolidate power, emphasising the distribution of authority, but without making extreme demands for self-determination. Desperate to restore their damaged image, the regime relied on President Masoud Pezeshkian as a key figure. An official with limited power issues an apology for the massacre on 11 February. In fact, this should have been handled by the Supreme Leader with particular attention to minorities; perhaps then it would have been an effective move.
In the ongoing conflict, rumours of a ground invasion by Israel have surfaced alongside Trump’s willingness to support armed groups inside Iran. Using the Doctrine of the Periphery Alliance, Israel appears to seek assistance from the Kurdish Peshmerga. If the Iranian government had integrated its minorities as citizensinstead of “othering” them, the entire crisis could have been avoided. Now, these minorities are viewed by the enemy as a practical and viable military partner against the clergy. It has transformed a state-building crisis into a matter of state survival.
Iran's desperate move to turn Iraqi Kurdistan into a buffer zone aims to serve as a kinetic wall to stop the Kurdish coalition on 22 February or any future uprisings. By expanding the conflict in the region and confining it to Kurdish areas of Iraq, Iran is hitting two targets simultaneously: eliminating Rojhelat, the Kurdish dominated northwestern part of Iran and keeping the US-Israel alliance distant.
Finally, a bigger question is, who will serve as a Supreme Leader? While Khomeini’s era was mostly a controlled environment with little interference from minorities, Khamenei’s era signified a shift where minorities are no longer passive recipients of Tehran’s orders; in fact, they are now the ones shaping the transition. What will be the fate of Kurds in the post-Khamenei era?